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Adopted by the World: China and the Rise of Global Intimacy 
Jack Neubauer 
 
This dissertation examines the histories of international adoption and child sponsorship in 
China from the 1930s to the 1950s to illustrate China’s crucial but unrecognized role in shaping 
the politics and practices of global humanitarianism.  After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese 
War in 1937, Chinese child welfare organizations developed a new form of humanitarian 
fundraising in which private citizens across the world “adopted” Chinese children by funding 
their lives at orphanages in China.  Under the adoption model, Chinese children and their foreign 
“foster parents” built personal relationships through the exchange of photographs, gifts, and 
translated letters that used familial terms of address.  The relationships forged between children 
and their foster parents constituted a new mode of affective and material exchange across 
national, racial, and cultural boundaries that I call “global intimacy.”  At the same time, the 
adoption plan was also deeply ideological, embedding the relationships between children and 
their sponsors within the politics of WWII and the Cold War.  At once emotional and economic, 
humanitarian and political, the adoption plan transformed the emotional loyalties of children into 
a key battleground on the affective terrain of these global conflicts. 
The emergence of the adoption plan as one of the most successful methods of 
humanitarian fundraising in China precipitated a broader “intimate turn” in global humanitarian 
practice.  During WWII, Chinese child welfare organizations developed new discursive and 
material practices—as well as new global administrative structures—that made the adoption of 
Asian children into a distinct form of humanitarian rescue.  After the war, an American 
 
organization called China’s Children Fund utilized the rhetoric of Christian love to transform the 
adoption plan into one of the largest humanitarian programs in Asia, systematizing the 
transnational flow of gifts and letters to create a paradoxical bureaucracy of global intimacy. 
When the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949, rather than dismiss the adoption 
plan as a tool of the reactionary Nationalist Party and their American imperialist allies, they 
instead sought to transform it into a centerpiece of a new form of “revolutionary 
humanitarianism.”  However, during the Korean War the CCP ultimately decided to dismantle 
all foreign humanitarian institutions in China, leading transnational aid organizations to again 
remake the adoption plan as a lynchpin of a new “Cold War humanitarianism” across East Asia.   
“Adopted by the World” sheds light on the global history of humanitarianism, the 
intertwining of intimate relations and international relations during the WWII and Cold War eras, 
and the political significance of children in modern Chinese history.  By analyzing how Chinese 
child welfare institutions utilized children’s letters to mold international opinion of China, I show 
how children were enlisted as key actors within the political campaigns of both the Nationalist 
and Communist parties.  Engaging with recent scholarship that has argued that the provision of 
global humanitarian aid served the Cold War foreign policy interests of Western powers, this 
dissertation explores how the recipients and critics of humanitarian aid in China both shaped and 
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Feng-ming’s path to the Yu Tsai School was as tortuous as it was tragic.  Born in Jiangsu 
Province, China, in October 1934, both of her parents died during the War of Resistance Against 
Japan when she was only a small child, and several years later her older brother died of 
tuberculosis.  Orphaned and alone, she was adopted by a cousin’s friend who forced her to 
perform hard labor and beat her daily.  Feng-ming managed to escape back to her cousin’s home, 
where she hoped to earn her keep by helping with chores while studying at the local night school.  
But her cousin objected to her attending the school and even threw away her books.  Finally, 
Feng-ming was “saved” when the school’s headmaster arranged for her to study dance at the Yu 
Tsai School, a prestigious arts school in the northern suburbs of Shanghai.  It was the fall of 1948.  
She was thirteen years old.1 
All of Feng-ming’s expenses at the Yu Tsai School were paid by the China Branch of an 
international child welfare organization called Foster Parents Plan for War Children (“PLAN 
China Branch”).  Opened in 1947, the PLAN China Branch supported children through a 
humanitarian fundraising strategy known as the “adoption plan for international child 
sponsorship.”  Under the adoption plan, foreign “foster parents” could “adopt” individual 
Chinese children by paying for them to live in child welfare institutions in China while 
exchanging photographs, gifts, and translated letters that used familial terms of address.  Similar 
adoption programs had been operating in China since the outbreak of full-scale war with Japan in 
1937, and they had quickly emerged as among the most successful fundraising strategies for 
humanitarian work in China.  The PLAN China Branch assigned an American woman named 
Joy as Feng-ming’s foster mother, and for the next eight months Joy and Feng-ming 
                                                
1 Case File #C211, Box 47, Folder 42, FPP. 
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corresponded regularly.  Joy even sent Feng-ming numerous gifts including pictures, books, and 
a dress and skirt that turned out to be just her size.  Then, on April 19, 1949, the PLAN China 
Branch sent Joy a letter informing her that Feng-ming had left the program: 
We know that for Feng-ming’s sake you will be pleased to learn that she has now left 
Plan care since she has found work which she believes will help her greatly; even more 
than her school work, and so she is very thankful to you for all that you have done in her 
behalf and now she will make it possible for another child to be taken into Plan in her 
place.2 
 
Perhaps Joy was pleased, as the letter suggested she should be, to read that Feng-ming had found 
meaningful work.  Or perhaps she was angry that Feng-ming had been permitted to drop out of 
school at the young age of fourteen.  Almost certainly, Joy never expected that she would hear 
from Feng-ming again. 
So it must have come as quite the surprise when in November 1949, six months since she 
had last heard word of Feng-ming, Joy received a long letter from Feng-ming herself.  Full of 
shocking revelations, dramatic tales, and one piece of tragic, life-altering news, the letter 
explained where Feng-ming had actually been those past six months, why she could not write 
sooner, and why she desperately desired to get back in touch now. 
 Dear Joy: 
 
I have not been able to write to you for almost six months.  I miss you a lot.  I left here 
this February…for the [Communist] guerilla territory of the Chekiang Province.  I went 
with many other schoolmates of mine.  When we reached there, we organized a cultural 
workers' corps…I was then responsible for the instruction of dancing and other 
performances.  We were requested to go, for there were very few who could dance.  
When we left the school, Shanghai was still under the [Nationalist Party’s] reactionary 
rule, and the people of Shanghai were all leading a most stifling life…Countless numbers 
of youths were then massacred by the reactionaries, especially on the eve of the liberation 
of Shanghai.  That was why we had to sneak away in secret.  I hope this can serve to 
explain why I failed to inform you.3 
                                                
2 Letter from Gerald Tannebaum, April 19, 1949, Box 47, Folder 42, FPP. 




The Yu Tsai School had long maintained ties with the underground Communist Party in 
Shanghai, and in the spring of 1949 it sent several of its older students, including Feng-ming, to 
Communist-held territory in Zhejiang (“Chekiang”) Province to form a “cultural workers’ corps” 
to travel with its guerilla fighters.  Feng-ming’s letter went on to describe the arduous but 
meaningful life she found among the Communist soldiers: 
Dear Joy, the liberation of China needs the effort of every one of us.  Hence it is also my 
duty to go to join in the people's service. Although I am yet young, but I work extremely 
hard all the same.  When I was engaged in guerilla warfare in the hills, I had to walk 
seventy to eighty 'li' of hill path all on foot, each day.  Yet I never felt tired. 
 
It was only at this point of her lengthy letter that Feng-ming divulged the tragic reason why she 
was once again writing to her former foster mother:  
I have been detected through fluoroscope inspection, to be serious infected with heart 
disease.  My heart is already suffering from some swelling. The doctor warned me 
against further dancing.  I have been told to take a long rest, without making myself the 
least tired.  That is why I have come back to the school...Dear Joy, is there any hope for 
one who is attacked by heart disease?  What agony it was, when I heard that I was unable 
to dance any more.  You never know how I love dancing.  It is really a part of my life. 
However I sincerely believe that I will become better someday.  I shall again write to you 
with a happy heart, when that day comes.  Dear friend, I wish that you could allow me to 
continue to be a friend of yours, and let me keep on writing to you.  I wonder if you 
would consent.  This is the only thing that I want of you. 
 
Feng-Ming’s letter was one of thousands that Chinese children wrote to their American 
foster parents during the tumultuous period surrounding the Chinese Communist revolution of 
1949.  In that year, Mao’s Zedong’s Communist Party defeated Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist 
Party in what had been a protracted civil war.  The United States had supported the Nationalists, 
and many regarded the Communists’ victory as a dramatic defeat for the United States in the 
emerging Cold War.4  Against this global political backdrop, Feng-ming and many other Chinese 
                                                
4 On the intertwined politics of the Chinese Civil War and the emerging U.S.-Soviet Cold War, see Chen Jian, 
Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 17-48 and Niu Jun, 
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children wrote to their American foster parents with deeply personal stories of the Chinese 
Communist revolution—stories that were strikingly different from what their foster parents 
might have encountered in the American press. 
Between the lines of the intimate revelations about her disease, despair, and desires, 
Feng-ming’s letter narrated for Joy the story of the revolution as refracted through the 
experiences of one girl, a girl for whom Joy had already come to care deeply.  In Feng-ming’s 
dramatic account, the U.S.-supported Nationalists had oppressed and massacred countless 
children—the very children Joy and Americans like her had “adopted.”  On the other hand, the 
Chinese Communist guerillas had provided her with refuge, purpose, and a chance to pursue her 
passion for dance.  We do not know how, or even whether, Joy responded to Feng-ming’s letter.  
But especially considering her emotional and monetary investment in Feng-Ming, it is possible 
that the letter prompted Joy to reconsider what she knew—or thought she knew—about China 
and its revolution. 
This dissertation examines the histories of international adoption and child sponsorship in 
China from the 1930s to the 1950s to illustrate China’s crucial but unrecognized role in shaping 
the politics and practices of global humanitarianism.  The outbreak of full-scale war between 
China and Japan in July 1937 transformed the plight of Chinese children into an international 
cause célèbre and ushered in a new era of humanitarian work in China.  In this context, Chinese 
child welfare organizations such as the National Association for Refugee Children (“NARC”) 
utilized the adoption plan to fundraise internationally for desperately needed child relief work in 
China.  In the aftermath of WWII, transnational child welfare agencies, many of them founded 
by American missionaries, began utilizing the adoption plan to fundraise for their own child 
                                                                                                                                                       
Lengzhan yu Xin Zhongguo Waijiao de Yuanqi, 1949-1955冷戰與新中國外交的緣起 [The Cold War and the 
Origin of Diplomacy of People’s Republic of China] (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2013), 26-131. 
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welfare institutions in China and across East Asia—where they also helped facilitate the rise of 
legal international adoption in Japan and Korea.  Among the most politically controversial and 
culturally significant humanitarian programs in Cold War East Asia, international adoption and 
child sponsorship remain prominent forms of humanitarian rescue and transnational family 
formation across the world today. 
The relationships formed between Chinese children and their foreign foster parents 
through the adoption plan constituted a new mode of affective and material exchange across 
national, racial, and cultural boundaries that I call “global intimacy.”  Linking the economic 
relationship of “sponsorship” to the emotional relationship of “adoption,” these programs sought 
to produce enduring bonds meaningful to both child and sponsor.  While the exchange of 
photographs and personal letters gave meaning to the exchange of money; the exchange of 
money in turn leant substance and credibility to the expressions of love contained in letters and 
jotted on the backs of photographs.  At the same time, the adoption plan was also deeply 
ideological, embedding the relationships between children and their sponsors within the politics 
of WWII and the Cold War.  While the promotional materials that introduced Americans like Joy 
to the adoption plan sometimes framed child sponsorship as a powerful means of spreading 
Christianity or containing the spread of Communism in Asia, Feng-ming’s story makes clear that 
the adoption plan could also be used to channel funds to Communist-friendly institutions and 
spread positive narratives of Communist rule across Cold War lines.  At once emotional and 
economic, humanitarian and political, the adoption plan transformed the emotional loyalties of 
children into a key battleground on the affective terrain of these global conflicts. 
The history of international adoption and child sponsorship in China sheds new light on 
the global history of humanitarianism, the intertwining of intimate relations and international 
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relations during the WWII and Cold War eras, and the political significance of children in 
modern Chinese history and global history.  By analyzing how Chinese child welfare institutions 
cultivated sentimental ties between children and their foster parents to mold international opinion 
of China, I show how children were enlisted as important actors within the international political 
campaigns of both the Nationalist and Communist Parties.  Engaging with recent scholarship that 
has argued that the provision of global humanitarian aid served the Cold War foreign policy 
interests of Western powers, this dissertation explores how the recipients and critics of 
humanitarian aid in China both shaped and challenged the post-WWII global humanitarian order. 
 
Global Humanitarianism: Histories and Historiographies 
Scholars and practitioners have long debated the definition of humanitarianism.  In line 
with numerous other historians, I use the term humanitarianism broadly to refer to activism on 
behalf of distant strangers.5  However, humanitarian organizations typically define their work 
more narrowly.  The most influential humanitarian organization, the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (“ICRC”), defines its “exclusively humanitarian mission” as the “impartial, 
neutral, and independent” provision of assistance to “victims of armed conflict and other 
situations of violence.”6  By describing humanitarianism as apolitical by definition, the ICRC 
and other organizations seek to secure maximum support for their work across all sides of the 
                                                
5 For a discussion of the definition of humanitarianism, see Michael Barnett and Jancie Gross Stein, “Introduction: 
The Secularization and Sanctification of Humanitarianism,” in Michael Barnett and Jancie Gross Stein (ed.), Sacred 
Aid: Faith and Humanitarianism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 11-15.  On the relationship between 
humanitarianism and human rights, see Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2010), especially 220-221, 243 (n. 17); “Theses on Humanitarianism and Human Rights,” 
Humanity Journal, September 23, 2016.  Available at http://humanityjournal.org/blog/theses-on-humanitarianism-
and-human-rights/. 




conflicts into which they intervene.  However, such definitions do not capture how 
humanitarianism has been practiced historically.  As historians have amply demonstrated, from 
its inception the practice of providing aid to far-away strangers has been deeply intertwined with 
political, economic, religious, and social agendas. 
 Although the term “humanitarianism” was not widely used until the early nineteenth 
century, the longue durée history of humanitarianism can be traced back to the beginnings of 
European overseas colonialism in the sixteenth century.7  Peter Stamatov argues that “long-
distance advocacy” was first institutionalized through the work of religious actors on behalf of 
non-Europeans during the processes of colonization between the sixteenth and eighteenth 
centuries.8  More commonly, however, historians locate the roots of modern humanitarianism 
with the emergence of the British abolitionist movement in the mid-eighteenth century.  The 
dominant historiographical tradition in this regard locates the rise of abolitionism—and its 
underlying humanitarian sentiment—with the rise of capitalism.  The view that the rise of 
humanitarianism was epiphenomenal to the rise of capitalism has roots dating back to Eric 
Williams’ classic 1944 book Capitalism and Slavery, in which he argued against the idea that 
humanitarian motives explained the rise of British abolitionism, arguing instead that abolitionism 
was rooted in slavery’s declining profitability.9  As a corollary to Williams’ claims, and informed 
by Marx’s critique of “bourgeois socialism,” historians in ensuing decades developed the 
argument that capitalism was a necessary condition for the rise of the humanitarian sentiment 
                                                
7 Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 19. 
8 Peter Stamatov, The Origins of Global Humanitarianism: Religion, Empires and Advocacy (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013).  While scholars have tended to treat post-WWII transnational humanitarianism as a new 
and novel phenomenon, Samatov makes a case for historical continuity, arguing that humanitarians today continue 
to use the “scripts” developed by religious actors in the sixteenth-eighteenth centuries. 
9 Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (London: Andre Deutsch, 1944). 
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expressed through eighteenth-century proposals such as the abolition of slavery, prison reform, 
poor relief, and the humane treatment of native peoples.  In outline, the rise of a new bourgeoisie 
with control over society’s means of production had a class interest in measures that ensured the 
docility and productivity of the work force.  Supposedly benevolent measures to prevent the 
worst abuses of the working class were therefore also self-interested policies implemented by the 
bourgeoisie to prevent any major disruptions to their own power and profits.10 
Historians of nineteenth- and twentieth-century humanitarianism have focused on the 
deeply intertwined relationship between humanitarianism and empire.  In his widely cited book 
Empire of Humanity, Michael Barnett traces the formation of the “international humanitarian 
order,” which he defines as “a cosmopolis of morally minded militias supported by international 
law, norms, and institutions that reach out to suffering strangers around the world.”  Barnett 
argues that the international humanitarian order resembles an empire in three key respects: 1) 
“long-distance rule by one people over another”; 2) “rule without the blessing or participation of 
the people; and 3) “power radiat[ing] downward for the purpose of advancing the empire’s 
interests.”11  Taking this argument a step further, Rob Skinner and Alan Lester contend that the 
connection between humanitarianism and empire “is not a simple matter of resemblance,” but 
                                                
10 A classic statement of this argument can be found in David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of 
Revolution, 1770-1823 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975).  For an insightful summary and critique of this 
argument, see Thomas L. Haskell, “Capitalism and the Origins of Humanitarian Sensibility,” American Historical 
Review, Vol. 90, No. 2 (1985), 339-361.  Haskell makes the alternative argument that the rise of capitalism and free-
market competition led to fundamental changes in modes of cognition that underpinned both the perception of new 
class interests and increased sensitivity to human suffering.  His argument nevertheless retains the essential causal 
connection between the rise of capitalism and the rise of humanitarian sentiment.  In contrast, Peter Stamatov rejects 
the fundamental premise of this historiography, arguing instead that the “moral dimension” of humanitarianism 
“cannot be explained as deriving from the logic of economic transformations.”  He posits that abolitionism—and its 
underlying humanitarian sentiments—“was a casually significant, non-derivative phenomenon that needs, first, to be 
studied and understood in its complexity and, second, to be situated in a complex causal context.”  Peter Stamatov, 
“Beyond and Against Capitalism: Abolitionism and the Moral Dimension of Humanitarian Practice,” International 
Social Science Journal, Vol. 65, No. 215-216 (2014), 33. 
11 Barnett, 220-221. 
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rather “the two phenomena are ultimately bound together in a series of mutually constituting 
histories.”12  Numerous case studies illustrate this close relationship between humanitarianism 
and imperialism.  For example, Ian Tyrell has shown how the dramatic upsurge in American 
relief efforts abroad during the 1890s helped pave the way for the United States’ acquisition of a 
formal empire in 1898.13  In her work on the British Save the Children Fund in the interwar 
period, Emily Baughan argues that its humanitarian agenda “was involved in a process of 
reimagining the British Empire as a peaceable, moral force, which exemplified the co-operative 
spirit of internationalism.”14  Even those humanitarians who were deeply critical of imperialism 
were nevertheless dependent upon the “structures of imperial power” to carry out their work.15 
A crucial part of this global history, the first humanitarian projects in China were deeply 
intertwined with the arrival of foreign imperialism.  Humanitarian organizations dedicated to 
Chinese causes emerged almost immediately after the mid-nineteenth century Opium Wars 
forced the Qing Empire to grant trading rights, extraterritoriality (immunity from local legal 
jurisdiction), and other privileges to Western powers.  The famed American medical missionary 
Peter Parker once described the Opium Wars as the “design of Providence” to enable Christian 
work in China. The U.S. Minister to China, Charles Denby, in turn praised missionary 
                                                
12 Rob Skinner and Alan Lester, “Humanitarianism and Empire: New Research Agendas,” Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, Vol. 40, No. 5, (2012), 731, 740. 
13 Ian Tyrrell, Reforming the World: The Creation of America’s Moral Empire (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2010). 
14 Emily Baughan, “‘Every Citizen of Empire Implored to Save the Children!’: Empire, Internationalism, and the 
Save the Children Fund in Inter-war Britain,” Historical Research, Vol. 86, No. 231 (2013), 116. 
15 Skinner and Lester, 735. For an example of an empirical case study that illustrates this point, see Bronwen Everill, 
“Bridgeheads of Empire? Liberated African Missionaries in West Africa,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, Vol. 40, No. 5 (2012), 789-805. 
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humanitarians like Parker as “the pioneers of trade and commerce” in China.16  In her study of 
American women missionaries who dedicated their careers to providing medical care and 
education for Chinese women and children, Carol Chin concludes, “American missionary 
women engaged in what can be called ‘beneficent imperialism.’ Confident they were bestowing 
the benefits of a more advanced civilization on China, they were quite unabashed about trying to 
impose their culture on the Chinese and expressed little discomfort with either their privileged 
position in Chinese society or the implicit backing they enjoyed from the power of the U.S. 
Government.”17 
In the aftermath of WWII, humanitarian aid agencies expanded on an unprecedented 
global scale, and their work took on increasingly urgent political significance in the context of 
the Cold War.  This global proliferation of humanitarian aid is generally narrated as an expansion 
from a European core out to Asian and African peripheries. By the late 1940s, the work of 
private relief organizations in Europe had largely been superseded by state-sponsored 
rehabilitation efforts like the United States’ Marshall Plan.  Propelled by discourses of humanity 
that in theory made the suffering of Asians and Africans equally important to that of Europeans, 
humanitarian agencies followed “the trail of suffering from Europe to the rest of the world.”  In 
the context of the Cold War, humanitarian rescue was not only an end in itself but also a means 
to the foreign policy goal of preventing the spread of Communism.  Barnett argues that powerful 
states like the United States and Britain were increasingly willing “to underwrite a 
                                                
16 Quoted in Joseph Esherick, The Origins of the Boxer Uprising (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 
75-76. 
17 “Beneficent Imperialists: American Women Missionaries in China at the Turn of the Twentieth Century,” 
Diplomatic History, Vol. 27, No. 3 (2003), 328.  As Chin points out, individual missionary humanitarians were often 
sharply critical of the imperialism that enabled their philanthropy. For example, Sarah Conger, the wife of the 
American minister in Beijing E.H. Conger, once wrote, “I do not wonder that the Chinese hate the foreigner.  The 
foreigner is frequently severe and exacting in this Empire which is not his own.  He often treats the Chinese as 
though they were dogs and had no rights whatever—no wonder they growl and sometimes bite.”  Chin, 350. 
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humanitarianism they viewed as vehicles of influence,” “integrating humanitarianism into their 
foreign policies” to the point of “erasing the distinction between themselves and aid agencies.”18  
In line with this broader narrative, historians have argued that the rise of international 
adoption and child sponsorship in Cold War East Asia served U.S. foreign policy goals.  In the 
1950s, American organizations created the first large-scale programs for legal international 
adoption, primarily targeting the mixed-race children of U.S. soldiers and local women in Japan 
and Korea.  As scholars such as Eleana Kim, Catherine Choy, and Arissa Oh have argued, the 
Cold War imperative of winning Asian hearts and minds helped make these children highly 
desirable for adoption by mostly white, U.S. couples.19  While there has been much less research 
on the history of child sponsorship, scholars have similarly explained its history through the lens 
of U.S. Cold War foreign policy.  Writing about American child sponsorship organizations in 
1950s Asia, Christina Klein argued that by creating symbolic family ties between Americans and 
Asian children, these programs helped make “America's increasing commitment to Asia seem 
natural, legitimate, and morally sound—and thus palatable to the millions of voters and 
taxpayers who had to pay the bill.”20  Likewise, Sara Fieldston has argued that American child 
                                                
18 Barnett, 118-124. 
19 Recent works on the origins of international adoption in Cold War Asia include, Eleana Kim, Adopted Territory: 
Transnational Korean Adoptees and the Politics of Belonging (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010); ); Catherine 
Ceniza Choy, Global Families: A History of Asian International Adoption in America (New York: New York 
University Press, 2013); Arissa Oh, To Save the Children of Korea: The Cold War Origins of International Adoption 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015).  Laura Briggs argues that “Madonna and child” images of suffering 
children both at home and abroad in 1930s U.S. media also played an important role in shaping Americans’ sense of 
responsibility for suffering children abroad.  See Laura Briggs, Somebody’s Children: the Politics of Transracial 
and Transnational Adoption (Durham, Duke University Press, 2012), 129-146. Emily Baughan has also shown that 
Anglo-American philanthropists, soldiers, and diplomats internationally adopted children from war-torn Europe as 
form of humanitarian rescue in the aftermath of WWI.  Emily Baughan, “International Adoption and Anglo-
American Internationalism, c. 1918-1925,” Past and Present, No. 239 (2018), 181-217. 
20 Christina Klein, "Family Ties and Political Obligation: The Discourse of Adoption and the Cold War 
Commitment to Asia," in Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945-1966, 
ed. Christian G. Appy (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000), 65; see also Christina Klein, Cold War 




sponsorship programs were premised on the idea that “intimate relationships between Americans 
and children overseas would curtail the spread of communism, binding together the citizens of 
the free world with ties that supported the United States’ political alliances.”21  
In short, whether they view humanitarian projects as facilitating imperialist agendas or 
mitigating imperialism’s worst effects, scholars have almost uniformly approached 
humanitarianism from the perspective of its primarily Western donors.  Even scholarship taking 
an explicitly transnational approach has focused overwhelmingly on what Silvia Salvatici aptly 
termed “the supply-side of humanitarian actions.”22  As a result, historians have paid less 
attention to how the people who received aid in the non-Western world reshaped humanitarian 
programs to suit their own interests.23  In a conversation on the history of humanitarianism 
recently published in Past and Present, the participating scholars were nearly unanimous in 
arguing, in the words of Emily Baughan, that understanding “the ways the work of aid 
organizations has been shaped, altered, and, at times, resisted by its ‘beneficiaries’” is among the 
most pressing tasks for historians of humanitarianism going forward.  As Kevin O’Sullivan put 
                                                
21 Sara Fieldston, Raising the World: Child Welfare in the American Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2015), 80.  See also, Sara Fieldston, “Little Cold Warriors: Child Sponsorship and International Affairs,” Diplomatic 
History, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2014), 240-250. Fieldston builds off Christina Klein’s earlier argument that by creating 
symbolic family ties between Americans and Asian children, child sponsorship programs helped make “America's 
increasing commitment to Asia seem natural, legitimate, and morally sound—and thus palatable to the millions of 
voters and taxpayers who had to pay the bill.” Christina Klein, "Family Ties and Political Obligation: The Discourse 
of Adoption and the Cold War Commitment to Asia," in Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United 
States Imperialism, 1945-1966, ed. Christian G. Appy (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000), 65; see 
also Klein, Cold War Orientalism. 
22 Silvia Salvatici, A History of Humanitarianism, 1755-1989: In the Name of Others (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2019). 
23 Some recent scholarship has begun to challenge this Eurocentric approach to the history of humanitarianism.  For 
example, Mark R. Frost has shown that in the Colonial Straits Settlements, Chinese, Arab, Malay, and Indian 
communities were often much more active than Europeans in providing humanitarian aid across racial, religious, 
and geographic boundaries.  Writing about famine relief in early twentieth-century China, Pierre Fuller provides a 
useful reminder that well-publicized international relief campaigns often paled in significance to local charity.  Mark 
R. Frost, “Humanitarianism and the Overseas Aid Craze in Britain’s Colonial Straits Settlements, 1870-1920,” Past 
and Present, Vol. 236, No. 1 (2017), 169-205; Pierre Fuller, “North China Famine Revisited: Unsung Native Relief 
in the Warlord Era, 1920-1921,” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 47, No. 3 (2013), 820-850. 
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it, the field “remains overly focused on the global North and on donor narratives of aid…Put 
simply, we still know very little about what it was like to be on the receiving end of these 
interventions.”  In large part, this reflects the extent to which recent histories of humanitarianism 
have relied on the archives of European and North American aid organizations as their primary 
source base.  “[W]ithout reading languages and archives beyond those of humanitarian 
organizations,” Tehilia Sasson noted, “historians risk (even if they don’t intend to) telling a story 
that doesn’t account for the agency of the populations who are recipients of this aid.”24  On the 
one hand, scholars have justifiably criticized humanitarians past and present for failing “to 
ensure the ‘victims’ of the world can speak on their own behalf and define their own vision of 
progress.”25  On the other hand, an almost exclusive focus on the providers rather than the 
recipients of aid has ultimately reinforced the impression that only the perspectives of the would-
be rescuers matter. 
 
Reconceptualizing the Global Humanitarian Order 
In contrast, my dissertation reconsiders the historical processes through which 
“humanitarianism went global after WWII.”26  First, it emphasizes the role of Chinese diasporic 
networks in bringing Asian causes to the forefront of the global humanitarian conscience.  
During WWII, Chinese child welfare organizations such as the National Association for Refugee 
Children utilized the adoption plan to attract mass numbers of donors from across Southeast 
Asia, Oceania, North America, and Europe.  In all of these locations, Chinese migrant elites 
                                                
24 Matthew Hilton, Tehila Sasson, Kevin O’Sullivan, Eleanor Davey, Bronwen Everill, and Emily Baughan, 
“History and Humanitarianism: A Conversation,” Past and Present, Vol. 241, No. 1 (2018), e15-28. 
25 Barnett, 14. 
26 Barnett, 118. 
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utilized their multicultural skills and transnational social networks to promote and coordinate the 
adoption plan on a global scale.  This work included: translating and reformulating Chinese 
philanthropic appeals for global audiences; founding “cooperating associations” that fundraised 
locally for Chinese child welfare institutions; and facilitating the international circulation of 
money, gifts, photographs, and publicity materials under conditions of global war.  In total, their 
efforts attracted donations from four continents in at least thirteen currencies—one of the first 
truly “global” humanitarian fundraising campaigns.  It was primarily after WWII that new 
transnational aid organizations founded by European and American missionaries began utilizing 
the adoption plan to fundraise for their own child welfare work in China and across Asia.  As the 
case study of the adoption plan makes clear, humanitarian aid organizations did not simply 
expand their focus from Europe to Asia.  To a considerable extent, the post-WWII global 
humanitarian order was historically constituted through Asia and its diasporas—which included 
but were not limited to Europe and North America. 
Moreover, my dissertation asks how the global history of humanitarianism might appear 
differently by focusing on those who received help in addition to those who provided it.  By the 
“recipients” of humanitarian aid, I refer broadly to the people and institutions that were its 
intended beneficiaries.  In the case of the adoption plan, these include the China branch offices of 
transnational humanitarian organizations, the child welfare institutions they funded, individual 
“foster children,” and the Chinese government agencies that had their social welfare burdens 
lightened by aid from abroad.  To answer this question archivally, I researched the adoption plan 
across five distinct but overlapping levels: 
1) The headquarters of the transnational aid organizations that coordinated the adoption 
plan in cities like New York, Richmond (Virginia), and Wellington (New Zealand). 
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2) The China branch offices of these organizations in cities like Shanghai, Guangzhou, 
and Chongqing. 
3) The specific child welfare institutions across China funded by the adoption plan. 
4) Individual “foster parents” and the children they sponsored. 
5) Local and national government agencies in China that regulated humanitarian aid. 
This multi-sited archival research reveals the disagreements, disjunctures, and communication 
delays that characterized global humanitarian work.  It is worth noting that I found little evidence 
of fraud.  Rather, people across all levels of the adoption plan—from the executive secretaries of 
enormous transnational organizations to the amahs who cared for orphanage children at below-
subsistence wages—generally appear to have been committed to the shared goal of providing 
food, shelter, and education for children in need.  Nevertheless, if the adoption plan was first and 
foremost about caring for children, it was always also about something else—and the political 
significance attributed to the adoption plan varied widely among actors at different levels of the 
global humanitarian project.  Specifically, I argue that the recipients of aid on the ground in 
China shaped the symbolic meanings and practical uses of the adoption plan for their own 
purposes.  More broadly, I use the case study of the adoption plan to suggest a new approach to 
the history of humanitarianism that incorporates the significant ways in which the recipients of 
aid in the non-Western world shaped the practices and politics of the global humanitarian order. 
 
 
Wartime China and the World 
 
This dissertation illustrates the shifting political uses of global humanitarianism in 
modern China.  It traces how the practices of Christian humanitarianism developed under 
Nationalist rule were briefly reinvented as “revolutionary humanitarianism” in the early PRC—
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until the Korean War ultimately led the Chinese Communist government to cut off all aid from 
abroad, ushering in a new age of Cold War humanitarianism.  All of this took place against the 
ubiquitous backdrop of war: the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-1945), the Chinese Civil 
War (1945-1949), and the Korean War (1950-1953).  In recent years, China’s mid-century wars 
have received renewed scholarly attention.  Historians such as Rana Mitter and Hans van de Ven 
have argued for the centrality of China to the overall Allied war effort as well as for the 
significance of war as an instrument of politics in modern Chinese history.27  Recent studies have 
likewise called attention to the complex social effects of these wars in China, including 
environmental degradation, mass refugee flight, and the rise of internment and labor camps as a 
powerful tool for disciplining society.28  Among the most important consequences of the 
outbreak of full-scale war in 1937 was an unprecedented outpouring of private philanthropy and 
state-sponsored relief aid.29  Some historians have argued that these efforts demonstrate the 
Nationalists’ genuine commitment to the Sisyphean task of mitigating the human toll of total 
war.30  However, such philanthropic ventures were also an attempt to instrumentalize groups 
                                                
27 Rana Mitter, Forgotten Ally: China’s World War II, 1937-1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013); Hans 
van de Ven, China at War: Triumph and Tragedy in the Emergence of the New China (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2018); John B. Thompson, “The People’s War,” Los Angeles Review of Books, June 18, 2018.  
Available at: https://chinachannel.org/2018/06/18/china-at-war/.  
28 For example, Micah Muscolino, The Ecology of War in China: Henan Province, the Yellow River, and Beyond, 
1938-1950 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Keith R. Schoppa, In a Sea of Bitterness: Refugees 
During the Sino-Japanese War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011); Klaus Mühlhahn, Criminal Justice in 
China: A History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
29 Nara Dillon, “The Politics of Philanthropy: Social Networks and Refugee Relief in Shanghai, 1932-1949,” in Nara 
Dillon and Jean C. Oi (ed.), At the Crossroads of Empires: Middlemen, Social Networks, and State-building in 
Republican Shanghai (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008). 
30 Rana Mitter and Helen Schneider, “Introduction: Relief and Reconstruction in Wartime China,” European 
Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2012), 179-186. 
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such as war orphans and rural women into service and sacrifice for the state.31  Moreover, as 
Hans van de Ven reminds us, “China was at war not just with Japan but also with itself.”32  As a 
result of this fragmentation, Margaret Tillman argues, war “diversified the political significance” 
of competing child rescue projects in locations such as Nationalist Chongqing, Communist 
Yan’an, and Japanese-occupied Shanghai.33  In line with broader historiographical trends, 
scholarship on China’s relief programs has helped rehabilitate the wartime record of Chiang Kai-
shek’s Nationalists while also highlighting the instrumentalization of wartime suffering for state-
building projects. 
At the heart of this new historiography on wartime China are two questions that are often 
considered side-by-side but rarely fully integrated.  How did the experience of war change 
China?  And, what was China’s role in the global story of WWII and the Cold War?  In contrast, 
the case study of the adoption plan reveals the extent to which the far-reaching transformations 
that occurred within China during the wartime years shaped competing efforts to define China’s 
significance to these global conflicts.  While the adoption plan began as a United Front effort to 
mitigate the suffering wrought by war with Japan, it quickly transformed into a way for both the 
Nationalists and Communists to secure resources, attract international support, and mobilize 
marginalized populations for their violent struggle to control China’s postwar future.  The 
Chinese child welfare institutions supported by the adoption plan sought to transform war 
orphans into modern citizens capable of building a new China out of the ashes of war—and into 
                                                
31 M. Colette Plum, “Lost Childhoods in a New China: Child-Citizen-Workers at War, 1937-1945,” European 
Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2012), 237-258; Helen Schneider, “Mobilising Women: The 
Women’s Advisory Council, Resistance, and Reconstruction During China’s War with Japan.” 
32 Van de Ven, China at War, 4. 
33 Margaret Mih Tillman, Raising China’s Revolutionaries: Modernizing Childhood for Cosmopolitan Nationalists 
and Liberated Comrades, 1920s-1950s (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 80. 
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“people’s diplomats” capable of molding international opinion of China at a grassroots level. 
Wartime humanitarianism created an essential link between domestic political mobilization and 
international soft power that has remained an important facet of Chinese politics to the present. 
 
Global Humanitarianism’s Intimate Turn 
The rise of international adoption and child sponsorship played a key role in transforming 
the emotional logic of humanitarianism to meet the new material conditions of the post-WWII 
international order.  Since the eighteenth century, the emotional underpinnings of humanitarian 
action had been sympathy, compassion, and pity for the plight of distant others—a feeling of 
moral obligation to help suffering strangers for no other reason than their shared humanity.34  
Before the mid-twentieth century, when specific humanitarian appeals were relatively few and 
far between, human sympathy was sufficient to motivate significant numbers of people to action.  
However, the rapid proliferation of humanitarian causes after WWII rendered human sympathy 
insufficient as an impetus to humanitarian action.  When countless tales of human suffering 
arrived simultaneously from different corners of the world—each luridly documented and 
promoted as desperately urgent in newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and radio broadcasts—
sympathy with the suffering of one’s fellow humanity provided little guidance on where to direct 
limited emotional and material resources.  In part for this reason, in the United States private 
humanitarian giving decreased in the immediate post-WWII period: an early instance of the now-
familiar phenomenon of “compassion fatigue.”  Once humanitarianism “went global,” human 
sympathy no longer offered a compelling reason to donate to any specific humanitarian cause. 
                                                




 At this moment when overall humanitarian giving was in precipitous decline, the 
adoption plan flourished by appealing to intimacy in addition to sympathy as a driver of 
humanitarian engagement.  From 1945-1947, the total revenue of American private voluntary 
organizations fell by fifty percent.35  Yet during this same time period, the largest U.S.-based 
international child sponsorship organization, China’s Children Fund, saw its total revenue more 
than double.36  What explains the extraordinary fundraising success of the adoption plan in the 
midst of what was otherwise a time of sharply declining humanitarian giving?  The adoption plan 
differed from previous humanitarian work by utilizing improved transportation and 
communications technologies to foster personal relationships among the givers and receivers of 
humanitarian aid.  The fictive kinship ties created by the exchange of photographs, gifts, and 
letters created a sense of personal obligation—a reason to donate to one specific child despite the 
near-infinite number of worthy causes competing for donors’ attention.  Put differently, the 
foster parent who wrote a check every month to support a Chinese war orphan did so not simply 
because the child was human, but because the child was hers.  The adoption plan remained 
essentially humanitarian in the sense that any suffering child—regardless of race or nationality—
was a potential object of rescue.  But its emotional power derived from the idea that it was the 
formation of a personal connection that provided the moral impetus to help.  By appealing to the 
desire to forge an intimate bond with a specific child, the adoption plan helped transform 
humanitarian fundraising for the new global information environment of the post-WWII world.  
 
                                                
35 The total revenue of U.S.-based private voluntary organizations fell from US $2.8 billion to US $1.4 billion 
between 1945 and 1947 (measured in 2005 dollars).  Rachel M. McCleary, Global Compassion: Private Voluntary 
Organizations and U.S. Foreign Policy since 1939 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 20. 
36 Larry E. Tise, A Book About Children: The World of Christian Children’s Fund, 1938-1991 (Falls Church: 
Hartland Publishing, 1993), 301. 
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Intimate Relations and International Relations  
 The personal relationships forged between the givers and receivers of transnational 
philanthropy in turn transformed the political possibilities of global humanitarianism.  Prior to 
WWII, donors to international humanitarian causes were unlikely to know who specifically 
benefitted from their contributions, let alone receive any communication from them.  Under such 
circumstances, the recipients of humanitarian aid had little opportunity to shape how donors 
understood the political significance of their philanthropy.  The adoption plan changed that. 
In the context of WWII and the Cold War, different organizations sought to mobilize the 
economic and emotional bonds forged through the adoption plan in service of a diverse set of 
often competing political and religious projects.  The American transnational aid organizations 
that utilized the adoption plan often imagined that by fostering close, affectionate relationships 
between individual Americans and Asian children, the adoption plan would be more effective 
than other humanitarian programs in promoting values such as Christianity, democracy, and anti-
Communism it was assumed that foster parents embodied.  Nevertheless, it was generally left to 
the China branch offices of these organizations, which employed almost exclusively Chinese 
staff, to determine which specific child welfare institutions to fund, guide children writing their 
letters, and translate the correspondence going both ways.  In this context, organizations such as 
the PLAN China Branch could systematically transfer PLAN funds to Communist-affiliated 
institutions such as the Yu Tsai School while encouraging children like Feng-ming to write 
letters describing in intimate detail how they had suffered under the American-allied Nationalist 
Party but were now thriving under the Communists.  Moving beyond interpretations of global 
humanitarianism as a vector of Western influence, I argue that the adoption plan was also a 
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powerful tool deployed by local actors to secure funding and build international support for their 
own political and social projects. 
 The adoption plan’s political potency was dependent upon the maintenance of close, 
affectionate relationships between children and their foster parents.  For contemporary readers, it 
may strain credulity to imagine that many children felt a sense of intimacy with foreign strangers 
whom they almost never met in person.  And, of course, the actual extent of intimacy developed 
through the adoption plan varied enormously.  Nevertheless, a significant number of children 
wrote letters that went far beyond the generic requirements imposed upon them in expressing 
their depth of feeling toward their foster parents.  One letter from a boy named Cheng-ho to his 
foster father Gerald provides a window into the significance he attached to the adoption plan: 
I miss you all very much.  Every day when I have nothing to do I take out your picture 
and look at it, and I always wish that I could talk to you in person.  Or I take out the 
letters you’ve sent and read through them again…I hope that you will write me often.  
Will you do that?37 
 
One motif that recurs periodically in children’s letters is meeting foster families in their dreams.  
A boy named Da-shin wrote to his foster family to describe a dream in which they had come to 
China to visit him: 
Yesterday I dreamed that you all came here to visit me.  I was so happy!  I invited you 
into our living room to sit.  After we ate some candy, I took you to visit our different 
workrooms.  I even knitted a pair of socks for you to see.  You encouraged me to study 
hard so that in the future I can establish myself in society.  You praised the different 
flowers, so I picked a bunch of beautiful flowers to give to my little brothers to play with, 
and I also took them to play on the slide.  I stopped paying attention for a moment, and 
little brother fell down from the top of the slide.  I was so scared, but it turned out to be a 
dream.  Isn’t that funny?38 
 
                                                
37 Letter from Cheng-ho, July 8, 1949, Box 115, Folder 84, FFP. 
38 Letter by Da-shin, July 6, 1949, Box 115, Folder 87, FPP; Case File #C230, Box 47, Folder 42, FPP.   
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The adoption plan could also leave children feeling jealous, lonely, and confused.  While 
children were required to write at set intervals, their foster parents only wrote when (and if) they 
pleased.  One letter from a boy named Jin-chun to his foster father Marvin divulged both the 
intense joys and deep anxieties he felt regarding their relationship: 
Why haven’t you written to me in so long?  I really miss you very much, and I often feel 
frustrated because I don’t get letters from you.  Even if you sent a letter writing just one 
sentence or even one word it would make me so happy that I would jump for joy.  
Because it was written with your own hand.  I would feel your love and care for me from 
the letter.  I still remember how happy I was when I received the letter that you wrote me 
before and all the things you sent…Sometimes I also feel afraid to write you letters, 
because I don’t know what it is that I’m supposed to write to you.  What do you want to 
know?  What would make you happy to know?39  
 
By investigating how these intimate expressions of love, longing, anxiety, and frustration 
intersected with the explicitly political goals of the adoption plan, my dissertation contributes to 
our understanding of how global politics have shaped intimate relationships, and how intimate 
relationships have in turn reshaped global politics. 
The rise of global intimacy through international adoption and child sponsorship was 
historically conditioned by the long history of what Ann Stoler calls “colonial intimacy,” a 
descriptor for the particular set of intimate relationships formed between colonizers and 
colonized.  As Stoler argues, “a racially coded notion of who could be intimate with whom—and 
in what ways” was “a primary concern in colonial policy.”40  The regulation of colonial 
intimacies in Asia was central to reproducing the structures of colonial rule by maintaining clear 
demarcations between the colonizers and the colonized.  For example, in colonial French 
Indochina, a whole body of paternity law limited the ability of the métis children of French men 
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and local women to claim French citizenship.41  In early twentieth-century China, American 
women missionaries worried about their children’s relationships with their Chinese domestic 
servants, describing with serious disapprobation how their children spoke Chinese better than 
English, preferred Chinese to Western food, and liked to play with Chinese rather than American 
dolls.42  Fears of transracial mixing were also expressed through Asian exclusion laws that 
sharply restricted the global mobility of Asian laborers and widespread anti-miscegenation laws 
explicitly prohibiting white-Asian intermarriage.43 
In this context, international adoption and child sponsorship flourished in large part 
because they offered a vision of transracial intimacy without transracial mixing.  Anxieties over 
transracial intimacy were often less about transracial intimacy per se than about the products of 
transracial intimacy—especially mixed-race children and what Ann Stoler has called “cultural 
defection.”44  It was not the presence of racial difference but the prospect of eliminating racial 
hierarchy that made transracial intimacy so threatening.  Rooted in sentiment but not in sex, the 
adoption plan allowed for transracial intimacy without transracial people.  Likewise, because 
young children (and especially Asian children) were often viewed as racially malleable, adoptive 
parents in the global North believed that they could be seamlessly integrated into mainstream 
                                                
41 Emmanuelle Saada, Empire’s Children: Race, Filiation, and Citizenship in the French Colonies (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2012). 
42 Jane Hunter, The Gospel of Gentility: American Women Missionaries in Turn-of-the-Twentieth Century China 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984). 
43 On the global history of Asian exclusion, see Adam McKeown, Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the 
Globalization of Borders (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).  On the history of anti-miscegenation laws 
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white society without threatening its fundamental character.45  By promising to maintain firm 
racial hierarchies between donors in the global North and the Asian children they sought to uplift, 
international adoption and child sponsorship authorized very particular forms of global intimacy 
in the context of exclusionary immigration laws, taboos against interracial sex, and the 
stigmatization of mixed-race children.  By putting international adoption and child sponsorship 
into conversation with research on topics such as transnational migration, miscegenation, 
prostitution, and domestic labor, the concept of global intimacy seeks to foster interdisciplinary 
inquiry into how and why national, racial, and cultural boundaries facilitate certain forms of 
intimacy while excluding and stigmatizing others. 
As Viviana Zelizer has argued, intimate relationships are almost always inseparable from 
issues of power and money.46  While normative accounts often treat “intimate relations as a 
world apart from the economy,” commentators such as the prominent “law and economics” 
champion Richard Posner have argued the opposite, that “intimate transfers—be they of sex, 
babies, or blood—operate according to principles identical with transfers of stock shares or used 
cars.”  Treating intimate relations as related but not reducible to forms of coercion and payment, 
Zelizer suggests that we ask not whether money and power shape intimate relationships but 
rather how people “adopt symbols, rituals, practices, and physically distinguishable forms of 
money to mark distinct social relations.”47  The global inequalities that underpinned the transfer 
of large quantities of monetary aid from donors across the global North to Asian children 
likewise structured the relationships they formed through the adoption plan.  While the adoption 
                                                
45 On American views of the “racial flexibility” of Chinese children in the context of international adoption, see Sara 
K. Dorow, Transnational Adoption: A Cultural Economy of Race, Gender, and Kinship (New York: New York 
University Press, 2006). 
46 Viviana Zelizer, The Purchase of Intimacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).   
47 Viviana Zelizer, “The Purchase of Intimacy,” Law & Social Inquiry, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2000), 817-848. 
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plan could be used as a form of soft power to influence international donors’ views of China, 
Chinese children and the institutions that housed them ultimately remained economically 
dependent upon the emotional satisfaction of their international sponsors.  Participation in the 
adoption plan also made Chinese child welfare institutions complicit in constructing the global 
North’s relationship to China as paternal, benevolent, and humanitarian.  These unequal relations 
of power and money inherent to global humanitarianism proved a consistent challenge for those 
who sought to utilize the adoption plan in service of the anti-imperialist agendas of the War of 
Resistance Against Japan and the Chinese Communist Revolution.  Those who had participated 
in the adoption plan were also left vulnerable to attack when, in the context of the Korean War, 
the Chinese Communist government turned sharply—and sometimes violently—against global 
humanitarians and those who relied on them. 
 Due to the high stakes involved, children in the adoption plan were rarely free to write 
whatever they wanted to the sponsors upon whose continued donations their livelihood depended.  
Rather, both the transnational aid organizations that coordinated the adoption plan and the child 
welfare institutions they funded devoted considerable resources to ensuring that children wrote 
letters that furthered their philanthropic and political goals.  By turning to the ways adults shaped, 
translated, and sometimes censored children’s letters, we can unravel the specific roles played by 
children in the larger project of cultivating global intimacy to influence global politics. 
 
Can the Chinese Child Speak? 
In 2008, Peter Stearns wrote in the inaugural issue of the Journal of the History of 
Childhood and Youth that the “granddaddy issue” facing historians of childhood involves “the 
virtually unprecedented problems of getting information from children themselves as opposed to 
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adult perceptions and recommendations.”48  This issue has been especially acute in the field of 
modern Chinese history.  Beginning in the late nineteenth century, generations of Chinese 
philosophers, scientists, educators, and activists singled out the child as a central figure of 
modernization upon whom rested the fate of the nation.49  The famous final words of Lu Xun’s 
1918 story “Diary of a Madman” (Save the children!) were both a rallying cry and a paradox: 
How can children be saved by adults always already tainted with the Confucian culture 
modernizing reformers hoped to replace?50  In recent years, a small body of scholarship has 
emerged to address the central place of children in the discourses and practices of Chinese 
modernity by examining topics such as child welfare institutions, childhood education, children’s 
literature, child labor, and youth groups.51  However, citing a lack of sources, these works rarely 
incorporate the voices and perspectives of children themselves.52  As a result, historians have 
focused primarily on adult prescriptions for children rather than children’s actual experiences—
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what Margaret Tillman terms “the discursive construction of modern childhood and the 
institutional mechanisms used to construct it.”53  In other words, while we’ve learned much 
about conceptions of childhood in modern China, we know less about actual children.  Children 
are central characters in the story of modern Chinese history, but historians have yet to give them 
a speaking role. 
My dissertation utilizes a variety of previously overlooked source materials to 
extensively incorporate the words written by children into my analysis.  It is the first work of 
scholarship to significantly incorporate the childhood voices of Asian war orphans into the 
history of the transnational humanitarian projects carried out on their behalf.  I rely primarily on 
four genres of sources that were either written by children, contain transcriptions or summaries 
of children’s speech, or provide detailed biographical and behavioral information about 
individual children: 1) letters children wrote and received through the adoption plan; 2) 
children’s case files at child welfare institutions; 3) records of children’s psychological 
examinations; and 4) excerpts of children’s speech in internal reports and publicity materials. 
At the heart of my analysis is a collection of 546 letters exchanged between Chinese 
children and their foreign foster parents that I compiled through research across China and the 
United States.  While the letters exchanged between Chinese children and their foreign foster 
parents were not systematically copied or archived, many have nevertheless been preserved in 
ways both deliberate and accidental.  I found caches of sponsorship letters in places ranging from 
Chinese state archives to a storage closet in the basement of the ChildFund International 
headquarters in Richmond, Virginia.  Generally speaking, sponsorship letters were archived for 
one of several reasons.  Some letters were donated back to child welfare organizations by the 
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descendants of foster parents after they passed away.  Others appear to have been returned to aid 
organization because they were unable to be delivered.  In certain instances, letters were copied 
for administrative reasons or so that they might be reproduced in publicity materials.  While 546 
letters constitutes only a small fraction of the many thousands sent and received through the 
adoption plan, it is nevertheless a sizeable source base for analysis. 
Several other genres of sources provide important insights into the children who 
participated in the adoption plan.  Upon sponsoring a Chinese child, foster parents were typically 
sent a case file providing (to the extent known) the child’s name, age, interests, progress in 
school, family history, and a brief biography often written in the first person.  In many cases, it is 
possible to cross-reference children’s letters against their case files, offering insights not only 
into the biographies of child letter-writers but also into how child welfare institutions curated 
biographical information to provide to foster parents.  Child psychology records provide yet 
another key source of information about children who participated in the adoption plan.  
Specifically, in 1943 the Nationalist government’s Central Hygiene Laboratory Mental Health 
Office conducted extensive psychological examinations of institutionalized children—many of 
whom resided in institutions funded by the adoption plan.  The records of their examinations 
include psychologists’ summaries of one-on-one interviews with particular children as well as 
children’s responses to personality-assessment questionnaires.  The starkly different ways in 
which children described their experiences in psychological assessments as compared with the 
letters they wrote to their foster parents offer a humbling reminder of the epistemological caution 
necessary when working with children’s sources. 
Like all historical records, sources purporting to represent children’s words, thoughts, and 
emotions raise a fundamental methodological question: How do we read them?  It would be 
29 
 
naïve to assume that children’s letters provide unmediated access to their experiences of the 
world-historical events unfolding around them.  However, it would be equally speculative to 
dismiss them as nothing but a cynical attempt by adults to put their own words into the mouths of 
children for financial and political gain.54  How to navigate this impasse?  Searching for 
children’s “agency” in sources like letters and psychological assessments risks guilelessly 
ignoring the highly mediated nature of such materials.  Moreover, attempts to recover children’s 
agency in the small acts of resistance sometimes apparent in such sources implicitly deny the 
agency of the many children who tended to behave in line with adult expectations.55 
Furthermore, traditional notions of agency as being expressed through autonomous public 
actions driven by rational, informed choices, which were theorized primarily to describe the 
contributions of adult male bourgeois subjects, often cannot encapsulate the ways in which 
children shape history.56  To this extent, the problems of interpreting the sources of children’s 
history can be seen as specific manifestations of methodological issues that also confront 
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scholars attempting to write histories from the perspectives of slaves, women, colonial subjects, 
and the working class.57 
 Children’s sources that engage with explicitly political themes—as so many of the 
sponsorship letters I have collected do—require yet additional layers of caution.  Writing about 
childhood testimonies of the Algerian War of Independence, Alexis Artaud de la Ferrière argues 
that “when childhood testimonies enter the public sphere—either in books, news items, in film, 
or as illustrations in policy documents—they have been editorialised by adults.”  Children’s 
accounts of wartime suffering have been so widely circulated precisely because they elicit an 
emotional response in readers that tends to divert attention away from the political motives 
behind their production.  Therefore, Artaud de la Ferrière argues, historians must analyze not 
only the content of children’s testimonials but also the “conditions of production and 
distribution” through which they are “politically instrumentalised.” 58  On the other hand, 
encountering polemical speech attributed to children tends to arouse suspicions of adult 
manipulation.  As Margaret Tillman noted, “the incongruence of childhood innocence and adult 
politics” both lends such sources their charm and demands rigorous skepticism of whether they 
represent the “authentic voices of children.”  Yet Tillman also cautions against assuming that 
such sources are entirely the result of adult manipulation.59 
The letters Chinese children wrote through the adoption plan provide a rare opportunity 
to treat the ways in which adults edited, shaped, and censored children’s writing as an object of 
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analysis rather than an obstacle to analysis.  The archives of the organizations that coordinated 
the adoption plan contain voluminous discussion of how to guide children in their letter writing 
and numerous specific examples of adult intervention.  In order to ensure children’s letters were 
consistent with their philanthropic and political goals, aid organizations developed highly 
detailed guidelines for the content and form of children’s letters.  These regulations covered 
issues such as how often children should write and at what length, suggested and forbidden 
topics of discussion, detailed rules on formatting, and advice on how to elicit the sympathies of 
foreign sponsors.  The imprint of these prescriptions is clearly visible in the generic quality of 
many children’s letters.  Nevertheless, reading actual children’s letters against agency 
regulations, it is apparent how difficult it was to enforce rigid rules on children writing from 
institutions dispersed across China under highly unstable conditions of war and revolution.  
Every one of the letters I have read is unique, and many diverged sharply from prescribed topics 
and forms.  As one PLAN China Branch internal report bluntly put it, “We do not have enough 
control over the children’s letters.”60  In the gaps between what transnational aid agencies 
wanted children to write and what they actually wrote, it is clear that these organizations required 
the active participation of children in order to achieve their charitable and ideological aims. 
 If aid agencies feared that the content or tone of a child’s letter threatened their 
philanthropic or political goals, they utilized the necessity of translation as an opportunity to edit 
or even censor children’s letters.  When foster parents received their adoptees’ letters, they 
typically received both the handwritten Chinese original as well as a typewritten translation.  In 
the vast majority of cases, I have been able to locate both the Chinese originals and English-
language translations of children’s letters—oftentimes still stapled together in the archives.  As 
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the majority of sponsors did not read Chinese, if children’s letters included content that their 
sponsoring organizations found problematic, the translators often simply removed the offending 
portion from the English translation.  In some cases, translation was used to smooth over 
discrepancies in how Chinese children and their foster parents expressed familial intimacy.  In 
other instances, letters were censored for overtly political reasons.  By systematically comparing 
the translations of children’s letters with the Chinese originals, I reverse engineer the logics of 
cultural mediation and political censorship through which aid organizations mediated the 
interactions between children and their foster parents.   
In sum, by setting aside the often unanswerable question of whether children’s writings 
accurately reflect “authentic” children’s voices, I instead use this unique cache of sources to 
inquire into the historical significance of children’s writing itself.  My specific case study asks: 
What role did children’s letters to their foster parents play in reconfiguring the politics of global 
humanitarianism during the WWII and Cold War eras?  To answer this question, I proceed along 
two lines of analysis.  In addition to close reading children’s letters to unpack the particular ways 
they narrated their experiences to foreign audiences, I also investigate the specific ways in which 
transnational aid organizations and Chinese child welfare workers participated in the writing and 
translation of their letters.  While Chinese war orphans—those quintessential “victims” of the 
humanitarian imagination—played an active role in shaping the significance of the aid they 
received, their voices were sometimes silenced or spoken over. 
 
Chapter Précis  
This dissertation is organized into five chapters.  Chapters one and two collectively 
examine how the rise of the adoption plan for international child sponsorship in WWII-era China 
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precipitated a broader “intimate turn” in global humanitarian practice.  Chapter one focuses on 
the National Association for Refugee Children, the largest child welfare organization in wartime 
China, which fundraised via a global fundraising campaign called “the adoption of warphans by 
foreign nationals.”  The NARC mobilized far-flung networks of elite diasporic Chinese who 
utilized their multicultural knowledge and transnational social networks to promote and 
coordinate the adoption program on a global scale.  The chapter analyzes the discursive and 
material practices—and global administrative structures—through which Chinese children and 
their foreign adopters attempted to build meaningful “adoptive” relationships across national, 
racial, and linguistic divides under conditions of global war.  Nearly two decades before the first 
systematic programs for legal international adoption, the NARC popularized the idea of adopting 
Asian children as a distinct form of humanitarian rescue and transnational family formation. 
In the years following WWII, American transnational child welfare organizations 
dramatically expanded the adoption plan to fundraise for their own child welfare work in China 
and across Asia—transforming the practices of global intimacy developed in WWII China into 
central features of the global humanitarian order.  Chapter two focuses on how an American 
Christian philanthropy named China’s Children Fund (“CCF”) built the adoption plan into one of 
the most successful humanitarian programs in postwar Asia by unabashedly commoditizing 
Chinese children.  In the United States, the CCF marketed the adoption plan by innovatively 
weaving together the discourses of universal Christian love, American responsibility to Asia, and 
the moral imperative of motherhood.  At the same time, the CCF’s overseas headquarters in 
Guangzhou could only meet the unprecedented demand for high-quality photographs, detailed 
information, and substantive letters from adopted children through the mass production of 
standardized documents and rigid adherence to administrative procedures—a paradoxical 
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phenomenon I call the “bureaucracy of global intimacy.”  The chapter concludes by tracing the 
CCF’s expansion to Japan and Korea, where it played a crucial role in developing the first 
systematic programs for legal international adoption during the 1950s.  
The Chinese Communist Revolution of 1949 was among the most important events in the 
global history of humanitarianism.  When the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949, 
rather than dismiss the adoption plan as a tool of the reactionary Nationalist Party and their 
American imperialist allies, they instead sought to transform it into the centerpiece of a new form 
of “revolutionary humanitarianism.”  Chapter three uses the case study of the PLAN China 
Branch to examine how Chinese child welfare workers mobilized the sentimental ties between 
children and their foster parents to meet the new ideological and material needs of the revolution.  
Under the rubric of “people’s diplomacy,” the PLAN China Branch channeled funding to 
“progressive” child welfare institutions while encouraging children to write personal narratives 
of how they had suffered under the American-allied Nationalist regime and were now thriving 
under the Communists.  By showing their foster parents a very different side of the Chinese 
Communist Revolution from what they read in the newspapers, children’s letters could secure 
urgently needed funding while helping to build ideological support for the revolution abroad.  
Nevertheless, during the Korean War the Communist Party ultimately decided to 
dismantle all foreign humanitarian work in China.  Rather than transforming children into 
“people’s diplomats,” in the context of the Korean War the adoption plan instead appeared to 
have created a sizeable cohort of children both emotionally and economically indebted to 
China’s greatest ideological and military enemy—the United States.  Tracing the efforts of the 
newly created People’s Relief Administration of China (“PRAC”) to uproot all foreign 
humanitarian activity in China, Chapter four analyzes how the intimate ties forged between 
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children and their foster parents became potent symbols of how humanitarianism functioned as a 
“cloak” for imperialist encroachment.  I argue that the Communist Party’s decision to cut off all 
foreign humanitarian aid to China fundamentally reshaped the geopolitics of humanitarianism in 
East Asia, foreclosing the possibility of a humanitarianism of international solidarity and 
ushering in a new age of “Cold War humanitarianism.”  Eventually forced to leave China, 
humanitarian organizations redistributed aid to East Asian Cold War hotspots such as Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, Japan, and Korea, where they reimagined the adoption plan as building 
sentimental bonds between the United States and its Cold War allies. 
After the dismantling of the global humanitarian project in early 1950s China, many of 
the Chinese and foreign humanitarian workers who had administered the adoption plan utilized 
their multilingual skills and transnational social networks to forge new careers in the burgeoning 
field of international propaganda.  Chapter five follows the careers of several of the most 
important figures from the transnational aid organizations that had formerly coordinated the 
adoption plan in China as they developed new careers in China’s international propaganda 
industry.  I argue that these figures played key roles in transforming practices of “people’s 
diplomacy” developed through the adoption plan—such as the transnational exchange of family 
letters, the iconography of suffering war orphans, and the cultivation of transnational intimate 
relations to ameliorate international relations—into hallmarks of international propaganda during 
the Mao era.  The chapter highlights an irony at the heart of Mao-period international 
propaganda: it relied upon missionary and humanitarian networks to propagate its critique of the 
missionary and humanitarian enterprises in China.  The conclusion briefly considers the 
contemporary phenomenon of legal international adoption from China to analyze the continued 




A Note on Names 
To avoid identifying children and foster parents whose names do not appear in published 
sources, I have either used personal names only (omitting family names) or otherwise changed 
their names.  I generally use the Pinyin romanization system for Chinese terms with the 
exception of proper nouns that are more familiar in English by other spellings (e.g., Madame 
Chiang Kai-shek).  I have also chosen to retain the romanized spellings of children’s (personal) 









On December 1, 1939 a woman named Gladys from the dairy farming district of 
Matamata, New Zealand wrote a letter to a Chinese boy named Chi Ming, whom she referred to 
as her “foster son,” although they had never met in person.  Her letter begins like this:  
It will be strange to you to receive a letter from New Zealand and you will wonder about 
the people who are writing to you.  Perhaps you know that friends in New Zealand are 
trying to help China and especially its boys and girls.  We are told that we can help 
you.  Your photograph has recently been sent to us so we know what you look like.  We 
do not know what part of China you come from or even where you are living…This, our 
first letter to you, is to welcome you into our family.61 
 
Gladys had donated £4 to “adopt” Chi Ming through a Chinese child welfare organization called 
the National Association for Refugee Children (zhan shi ertong bayou hui戰時兒童保育會; 
“NARC”).62  The largest child welfare organization in wartime China, the NARC was founded 
by a group of elite Chinese women—including the first lady of Nationalist China, Madame 
Chiang Kai-shek—to provide succor to the mass numbers of children rendered homeless after 
the outbreak of full-scale war with Japan in 1937.  Over the course of the war, the NARC funded 
and operated dozens of orphanage-schools (baoyu yuan 保育院), dubbed “warphanages” in 
English-language publicity materials, that provided food, shelter, and education to more than 
30,000 “warphans.”  In order to fund its ambitious child welfare program, the NARC launched a 
global fundraising campaign called “the adoption of warphans by foreign nationals” in which 
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private citizens around the world “adopted” individual Chinese children by paying their expenses 
at NARC warphanages on an annual basis.  Under the adoption model, foreign “adopters” were 
invited to build personal relationships with their Chinese “adoptees” through the exchange of 
photographs, gifts, and translated letters that used familial terms of address.  Gladys was one of 
thousands of individuals across the world, the majority of them women, who adopted a Chinese 
warphan through the NARC’s program. 
Gladys’s rather self-aware and sensitive letter makes explicit an aspect of the adoption 
program that often went unspoken: the utter strangeness of a Chinese child receiving a letter 
from a foreign stranger who knew little about him and yet claimed to be his foster mother.  And 
much as Gladys imagined, children at first often did find it befuddling—alarming, even—to 
receive such letters.  One boy named Kuo-hwa recounted his initial confusion upon receiving his 
sponsor’s first letter:  “When I was playing most happily, a child suddenly came in from outside 
carrying the letter and the lovely picture you gave me.  After I looked at them, at first I simply 
could not understand what was really going on.”63  Nevertheless, in many cases both children 
and their sponsors overcame this initial unfamiliarity to build meaningful adoptive relationships.  
By the end of her lengthy letter, Gladys had already come to feel deeply for Chi Ming.  She 
concludes, “Now we think of you as our foster-son and send you our love as we would if you 
were our son indeed and hope you are well.  We want you to try and forget the sadness of the 
past and to look forward with hope.  We shall be thinking much about you, and eagerly await 
news of you.”  Likewise, Kuo-hwa’s confusion upon receiving his foster mother’s letter was 
soon replaced with sheer joy: “After listening to many friends’ explanations, my mood 
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eventually started to improve slowly.  It turns out that you have already adopted me as your 
foster son.  This made me very delighted!  My dear foster mother!  I am so happy!”   
 
 
Figure 1.1.  Letter from Gladys of Matamata, New Zealand to her “adopted” child Chi Ming, 
December 1, 1939.  11-4238, 47, SHAC. 
 
 
What new humanitarian ideals and global administrative structures made it both desirable 
and feasible for women like Gladys to “adopt” children like Chi Ming during the WWII era?  
What practices of writing, translation, and gift exchange facilitated meaningful communication 
between Chinese children and foreign adults who came from societies with radically different 
(and rapidly changing) notions of charity, family, and intimacy?  Ultimately, how did the 
NARC’s adoption program enable perfect strangers to imagine themselves as part of 
transnational adoptive families across national, racial, and linguistic divides? 
This chapter uses the NARC’s adoption program as a case study to analyze the “intimate 
turn” in global humanitarian practice that emerged through the fundraising campaigns of 
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transnational aid organizations working with Chinese refugee children during WWII.  I examine 
how the NARC mobilized an extensive network of overseas Chinese elites who utilized their 
multicultural knowledge and transnational social connections to promote and coordinate the 
adoption program on a global scale.  Drawing from original letters exchanged between Chinese 
children and their foreign adopters, I explore the discursive and material practices through which 
they sought to build personal bonds across geographic and cultural boundaries under conditions 
of global war.  While the NARC worried about the high overhead costs involved in the adoption 
program, it also appreciated its value as a new form of intimate diplomacy that could bolster 
international support for China’s war with Japan, particularly in the years before Pearl Harbor 
when China fought essentially alone.  The NARC dissolved its operations shortly after WWII, 
but its popular adoption program helped establish the conditions for the rise of international 
adoption and child sponsorship as vast global phenomena in the postwar period. 
The NARC’s program for the adoption of warphans by foreign nationals sheds light on 
the histories of international adoption and child sponsorship as part of the emergence of a new 
global humanitarian order during and after WWII.  In line with the larger literature on the global 
expansion of Western humanitarian programs after WWII, previous scholarship has argued that 
the rise of international adoption and child sponsorship in Cold War East Asia served the foreign 
policy interests of Western powers.  In these narratives, Asia may serve as the setting for 
humanitarian action, and Asian children are often featured as objects of humanitarian rescue, but 
the key historical actors are typically Euro-American.64  This chapter shifts both the chronology 
and geography of this story.  Rather than a simple expansion of Western philanthropic practices 
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into China, the NARC’s adoption program combined both Chinese and Western charitable 
traditions and achieved global popularity through a far-flung network of overseas Chinese 
philanthropists and activists.  Specifically, I argue that the remarkable enthusiasm with which 
white, middle-class couples across the global North embraced the adoption of Asian children as a 
form of humanitarian rescue in the 1950s was in large part due to the work of the NARC in 
developing the practices of global intimacy that made it possible to imagine transnational 
adoptive families consisting of white parents and Asian children.  More broadly, I suggest that 
the post-WWII global humanitarian order was not simply the global expansion of preexisting 
Western practices, but rather incorporated diverse philanthropic traditions and institutions 
thrown into contact through imperialism, trade, migration, and war. 
 
Orphanage Competition: Global Humanitarianism and Local Charity in Late Qing China 
The intimate turn in global humanitarian practice that emerged during China’s WWII was 
conditioned by historical developments in both Western humanitarian and Chinese philanthropic 
practices dating to the mid-nineteenth century.  Humanitarian interest in China’s children 
followed quickly upon the Opium Wars that violently incorporated China into an unequal world 
system of commerce, violence, cultural exchange—and philanthropy.  After its defeat by Britain 
in the first Opium War, in 1842 the Qing Dynasty was forced to sign the Treaty of Nanjing, the 
first of the infamous “unequal treaties” that ceded Hong Kong to the British, granted 
extraterritoriality to British citizens, and opened five treaty ports to foreign trade.65  In short 
order, the United States, France, and other Western powers concluded similar treaties, all of 
which included “most favored nation” clauses ensuring that concessions granted to one imperial 
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power would be enjoyed by all.66  This system of unequal treaties enabled increasing numbers of 
Western travelers, missionaries, academics, and businesspeople to go to China, and among the 
many reports they sent home were tales of rampant female infanticide driven by poverty and the 
Confucian preference for sons over daughters.  These stories were often exaggerated, and 
infanticide and infant abandonment were also widespread problems in contemporary Western 
societies.  Nevertheless, it was this perception of female infanticide as a particularly Chinese 
problem that first made the Chinese child into an object of global pity.67 
Among the earliest large-scale transnational aid organizations, the French Holy 
Childhood Association (l’Oeuvre de la Sainte Enfance) was the most important in popularizing 
the cause of saving Chinese babies from infanticide across Europe and North America.  Founded 
in 1843 by the French bishop Charles-Auguste-Marie-Joseph de Forbin Janson, the Holy 
Childhood Association encouraged European children to donate small monthly sums to rescue 
and baptize infants in China.68  The association’s most popular fundraising technique were 
lotteries in which the winner would become the “godparent” of a Chinese baby with the privilege 
of choosing its baptismal name.69  Largely due to its ability to foster the sense of a personal bond 
between Western donors and Chinese children, the Holy Childhood Association achieved 
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extraordinary fundraising success—reaching an annual income of two million francs by 1869 
with membership across Europe and North America.70 
The north China famine of 1876-1879—among the worst famines in recorded human 
history with an estimated death toll of nine to thirteen million people—prompted another wave 
of humanitarian attention on China, much of it again focused on children.71  Missionary relief 
workers coordinated large-scale efforts to aid famine victims, and they frequently deployed 
images of starving children for publicity materials back home.72  For example, the China Inland 
Mission’s London-based publication, China’s Millions, published a letter entitled “For the 
Young: A Letter from Shan-Si” from the missionary A.F. Parrott that sought to cultivate 
sympathy among British children for their Chinese peers: 
I am sure all of you would pity the poor little boys and girls of this great country if you 
could but see all that I have seen.  They have no homes like most of you have, but live in 
houses built with mud and reeds; they live on rice, and wheat, and bread, and such things 
as many of you dislike, and do not get meat and nice cakes as you do; so whenever you 
hear boy or girl complaining of what they get to eat, just remind them of the poor 
children in China.73 
 
In addition to these international fundraising campaigns, Christian missionaries also founded 
orphanages on the ground in China.  An 1878 survey of Catholic orphanages conducted by Jesuit 
missionary Gabriel Palatre listed 101 orphanages established since the beginning of the treaty 
port system in 1842.74   
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However, the proliferation of foreign orphanages in China led to intense conflicts with 
local populations skeptical of their motives.  The most explosive of these conflicts erupted in 
Tianjin in the summer of 1870, when rumors spread that the Catholic orphanage was kidnapping 
children to gouge out their eyes and hearts for use in medicine.  After a heated confrontation with 
local officials, the French consul shot and killed a servant of the local magistrate, setting off a 
mass riot in which 20 foreigners and an unknown number of Chinese Christians were killed.75  
The Tianjin Massacre underscored the intense hostility of many local Chinese to foreign 
humanitarian efforts on behalf of Chinese children, providing urgency to efforts to develop 
native philanthropy to obviate the need for such foreign institutions. 
 During the late nineteenth century, private charity (yi zhen 義賑) gradually replaced 
government aid (huang zheng 荒政) as the primary source of disaster relief and social welfare 
provisioning in China.76  The historian Zhu Hu has argued that the challenge posed by the 
growth of Western charitable institutions was “the most fundamental reason” for the expansion 
of private philanthropy in China—a phenomenon Michelle King has called “orphanage 
competition.”77  Nevertheless, if competition from foreign orphanages precipitated the growth of 
private charities in late Qing China, the specific charitable practices they employed drew as 
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much from local philanthropic traditions in the Jiangnan region as from foreign institutions.78  In 
response to mass refugee flight during the Taiping Civil War (1850-1864), Jiangnan 
philanthropists coordinated trans-regional relief projects that utilized sentimental language and 
visual images of suffering to cultivate moral responsibility for social welfare beyond the local 
community.79  The renowned philanthropist Yu Zhi noted, “it is difficult to persuade people to 
donate, how much more difficult if they have not witnessed or heard the suffering in person.”80  
To solve this problem, Yu believed it was necessary for the donors and recipients of charity to 
“establish affective or communal connections that mirror those of family, lineage, and village.”81  
One way to achieve this was through the visual depiction of suffering children.  For example, 
Yu’s A Man’s Tears of Iron for Jiangnan contains vivid illustrations of infanticide, the selling of 
children, and destitute children begging for help.82  The specific content of Yu’s appeals drew 
from Chinese Buddhist representations of hell, Confucian morality texts, and traditional 
depictions of natural disasters in China.83  Nevertheless, much like the Holy Childhood 
Association, his appeals sought to foster emotional ties with needy children through familial 
metaphors and visual images of suffering. 
 Building upon these efforts, during the north China famine of the late 1870s elite 
Jiangnan philanthropists launched a national-scale relief effort unprecedented in scope that led to 
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further innovations in Chinese philanthropic practice.84  Perhaps the most groundbreaking feature 
of their fundraising campaigns was the use of the Chinese-language press to publicize the work 
of private relief organizations, encourage donations, and publish lists of contributors.85  Another 
highly significant fundraising innovation was the yuan (願) system of donation, in which a small 
sum of money was fixed as one yuan, and donors were encouraged to contribute as many yuan as 
possible according to their means.  Some charitable institutions even specified the number of 
yuan required to care for one child for one year.  For example, one charitable institution in 
Kunshan advertised: “Each yuan is 600 cash; six yuan saves one life.”86   While Zhu Hu argues 
that the highly popular yuan system possessed “Jiangnan characteristics,” the strategy of 
collecting small donations from a mass base of ordinary people again recalls the fundraising 
techniques of the Holy Childhood Association that were achieving widespread popularity around 
the same time.87  Although Western and Chinese charitable appeals remained very different in 
their specific discursive and visual strategies, both deployed sentimental language, familial 
metaphors, and images of child suffering to attract donors beyond the local community.  China’s 
involvement in the violent global conflicts of the twentieth century would give rise to a new crop 
of transnational aid organizations that drew from both of these philanthropic traditions as they 
sought to meet the unprecedented child welfare needs of the new century. 
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The Adoption Scheme 
 Among the most successful humanitarian fundraising techniques of the modern era, what 
is now called “child sponsorship”—in which a donor contributes the amount of money required 
to support an individual child for a fixed period of time—has antecedents in both Chinese and 
Western philanthropy.  Within China, philanthropic fundraising practices resembling modern 
child sponsorship date to the 1870s, when local infant protection societies (baoying she保嬰社) 
implemented a new fundraising strategy known as the “adoption system” (renyu zhi認育制) in 
which donors made monthly contributions to sustain the care of one or more babies.88  In 1873, a 
Rugao County gazetteer noted that at one foundling hospital (yuying tang育嬰堂) donors had 
“contributed funds to adopt from two or three to more than 10 babies.”  As a result, the number 
of infants the hospital could support increased from only 68 to more than 200.89  The adoption 
system was also popular in Taixing, where in 1871 the infant protection bureau noted, “Gentry, 
merchants, scholars, and commoners have according to their ability variously adopted (ren juan
認捐) from one or two to more than ten infants.”90  According to regulations issued by the 
General Infant Protection Bureau in Jiading, all people who participated in the adoption system 
                                                
88 Liang Qizi梁其姿 [Angela Ki Che Leung], Shishan yu jiaohua: Ming qing shiqi de cishan zuzhi施善與教化：
明清時期的慈善組織 [Charitable Works and Moral Education: Benevolent Institutions During the Ming and Qing 
Dynasties], (Taibei Shi: Lian Jing Chuban Shiye Gongsi, 1997), 200; Angela Ki Che Leung, “Relief Institutions for 
Children in Nineteenth-Century China,” in Anne Behnke Kinney, ed., Chinese Views of Childhood (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 260. 
89 Juegangchang yuying tang tongzhi qi nian dashi wang rujin chongxiu掘港場育嬰堂同治七年大使王汝金重修 
[Juegangchang Foundling Hospital Renovated by Envoy Wang Rujin in the Seventh Year of the Tongzhi Reign], 
Rugao xian xuzhi如皋縣續志  [Supplementary Gazetteer of Rugao County] (1873). 
90 Baoying ju guangxu yuan nian yiren zhu liancheng deng fushe pan gui pu ying tang zhangcheng 保嬰局光緒元年
邑人朱連城等附設攀桂鋪嬰堂章程 [Regulations of the Infant Protection Bureau Pan Gui Pu Infant Hall Founded 
by Townsperson Zhu Liancheng and others in the First Year of the Guangxu Reign], Taixing xian zhi泰興縣志 
[Taixing Gazetteer] (1885).  
48 
 
would have “a red label affixed to their home door announcing how many lives [they were 
sponsoring].”  The regulations further noted, “Recently this method has been widely used.”91  
 In the Western context, the earliest known child sponsorship programs were founded 
during and after WWI.  When American soldiers arrived in northern France in 1917, some 
spontaneously offered to become the “daddies” of the children of French soldiers who had died 
in the war by making monthly financial contributions to their widowed mothers.  Soon expanded 
into a large-scale initiative, by Christmas 1918 American soldiers had sponsored 3,444 French 
children.92  The following year, the British Save the Children Fund launched its first sponsorship 
program on behalf of German and Austrian children affected by the Allied blockade.  Referring 
to British sponsors as “foster parents,” its publicity materials promised, “When the child is put in 
touch with his adopter and letters are exchanged, valuable links are formed between land and 
land which…bear no unimportant part in realising the unity of the world.”93  Despite their 
internationalist rhetoric, however, these early sponsorship programs targeted white, male, 
Christian children of middle class origin—whom British and American sponsors believed were 
better “investments” because they were more likely to grow up to become productive citizens.94   
 The first transnational aid organization to attempt to use child sponsorship to fundraise 
for child welfare work in China was an American organization called China Child Welfare. 
Founded in New York in 1928, China Child Welfare raised money for the work of a Chinese 
organization called the National Child Welfare Association (zhonghua ciyou xiehui 中華慈幼協
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會; hereinafter “NCWA”).95  In its publicity materials, China Child Welfare often advertised that 
“Thirty dollars will provide adequate care for one child for a year.”96  However, in a spontaneous 
manner that resembled U.S. soldiers’ offers to be the “daddies” of French children during WWI, 
individual donors wrote to China Child Welfare hoping to establish personal contact with a 
Chinese child.  For example, a man named Thomas from Detroit, Michigan donated $10 but 
suggested that he would contribute $40-50 annually if he could receive a letter from the child 
benefiting from his contribution.97  One American couple read a newspaper account of a man in 
Shandong who had attempted to sell his son and sent China Child Welfare a check for $10 with 
the rather implausible request that it be used to save that specific boy.98  China Child Welfare 
forwarded such requests to the NCWA in China, acknowledging “all the additional work” they 
created but nevertheless insisting, “these friendship contacts will be most profitable through the 
years to come.”99  However, the NCWA does not appear to have responded to any of them.  
When Peggy Dougherty of China Child Welfare traveled to China to meet with NCWA leaders, 
she reported: 
The question of the adoption of the children by people in America was never understood 
by the Committee of the National Child Welfare Association of China.  When I explained 
to them that it did not mean locating a child and getting its history and picture, but that it 
meant simply selecting from those we were caring for the best looking one and taking his 
or her photo and getting a small history and sending those to you, and that you in turn 
would send the money to the Association to be used in paying the orphanage for the child 
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as designated funds instead of covering the support of such a selected child out of the 
general funds of the organization, they were quite satisfied. 
 
Nevertheless, Dougherty quickly realized the immense difficulties that would be involved in 
obtaining photographs of Chinese children.  Her report added, “It is not possible to get pictures 
in these localities.  The children run away from the camera and the adults drive the photographer 
off.  For these reasons I had no success in getting pictures though I tried it many times.”100  
International child sponsorship was becoming increasingly popular in Europe, and the financial 
“adoption” of children had proven a successful fundraising technique in localities across the 
Jiangnan region of China, yet as of the late 1920s it remained impossible to carry out such 
programs across the cultural and geographic divides separating Euro-American donors from 
Chinese children.  Within a decade, however, the outbreak of WWII would radically alter the 
possibilities for implementing humanitarian programs like the adoption scheme on a global scale. 
The outbreak of full-scale war with Japan in July 1937 caused a refugee crisis on a scale 
unprecedented in Chinese history, creating an effectively unlimited need for humanitarian relief. 
Estimates of the total number of displaced people vary widely, but it is likely that at least 80 
million Chinese people were forced from their homes at some point during the war.101  Although 
it is impossible to know the exact percentage of these refugees that were children, one survey of 
nearly 10,000 Hunanese refugees in Sichuan found that 34.1% were under the age of fifteen.102  
                                                
100 Peggy Dougherty, “Report of My Trip to China in the Interest of the China Child Welfare, Inc.,” H.H. Kung 
Papers, Hoover Institute (HHK). I would like to thank Margaret Tillman for calling my attention to and providing 
me with a copy of this source. 
101 Estimates of China’s wartime refugee population range from as Lloyd Eastman’s estimate of 3-4 million people 
to Ch’i Hsi-sheng’s estimate of 95 million people. See Stephen MacKinnon, Wuhan, 1938: War, Refugees, and the 
Making of Modern China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 47-48. More recently, historian Rana 
Mitter has used the figure of 80 million.  See Rana Mitter, Forgotten Ally: China’s World War II, 1937-1945 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013), 5. 
102 MacKinnon, 50-51. 
51 
 
If that survey is anywhere near representative of the national refugee population, then the 
number of child refugees was almost certainly in the tens of millions.  As heart-wrenching 
reports of child refugees circulated in newspapers and magazines, saving the nation’s children 
quickly became a national cause célèbre, framed both at the time and in popular memory as a 
way that women especially contributed to the war effort.  Women’s Life magazine (funü 
shenghuo 婦女生活) constantly covered Japanese atrocities against Chinese children.  One 
March 1938 article proclaimed, “Women especially should take up the responsibility and 
shoulder the burden of practical work. The large-scale child welfare movement can be used to 
organize refugee women and housewives to use collective scientific methods to care for the 
children.”103   
In the midst of these urgent rescue efforts, relief institutions for refugee children revived 
the adoption scheme pioneered by infant protection societies in the late-nineteenth century to 
fundraise domestically within China.  Founded in October 1937, the Shaanxi Branch of the 
Emergency Refugee Rescue Committee used the adoption method to support both child and 
adult refugees.104  Framing its adoption program in a tradition of Chinese voluntarism, the 
organization claimed that it had decided to “imitate the ancient ‘system of voluntary fostering’ 
(yi hu jiyang zhi義戶寄養制) and invite philanthropists from all around to voluntarily foster 
[refugees] on a long term basis.”  In contrast to nineteenth-century adoption programs, the 
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Emergency Refugee Rescue Committee went further in fostering the sense of a personal 
relationship between donors and refugees.  In a letter to a man named Liu Chunzhong who had 
agreed to “adopt” five people, the organization invited him to come visit the shelter where the 
beneficiaries were living.105  They also sent sponsors the name, sex, age, and hometown of the 
recipients of their donations.106 
 Other Chinese child relief institutions went even further in utilizing the adoption plan to 
foster a sense of familial intimacy between donors and children within China.  For example, as 
part of its broader fundraising campaign, the China United Council For the Rescue of Children in 
War Areas sought to “launch a sponsorship movement” on a national scale.107  According to the 
Council’s guidelines, “The sponsor designates the gender and age of the adopted child so that a 
photograph can be selected and mailed.  Once the child is selected, every semester a copy of the 
school report card will be sent.”  The Guizhou branch even invited sponsors to come to their 
office to personally select among the photographs of children available for “adoption.”  In 
language that resembled the advertisements of international child welfare organizations like Save 
the Children, their appeals emphasized that in addition to material help, sponsorship could also 
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provide “emotional comfort” (jingshen anwei 精神安慰) to children.108  At the Chongqing Relief 
Institute, donors were encouraged to “adopt” infants and commit to sponsoring them for five 
years.  Sponsors could have their adopted infant take on their surname, and at the end of the five-
year period they were encouraged to literally adopt the child into their homes.109  However, as 
the child refugee crisis deepened, relief institutions began to look beyond China’s borders for 
desperately needed funds.  It was in this context that the NARC experimented with expanding 
the adoption scheme overseas as a way to rekindle international interest in the far-away plight of 
China’s children.   
 
The National Association for Refugee Children 
The NARC was founded on March 10, 1938 at the Saint Lois School For Girls in Hankou 
in a ceremony attended by more than 700 people.110  The largest child welfare organization in 
wartime China, during its eight years of operation the NARC funded a total of 61 “warphanages” 
that cared for more than 30,000 “warphans.”111  Describing children as “the reserve army of the 
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nation’s liberation,” the NARC emphasized not only rescuing children but also providing them 
with the modern education and training necessary to become the brave soldiers and “new citizens” 
who would win the war and reconstruct the nation.112  While the NARC was a united front 
organization that included Nationalists, Communists, and those affiliated with neither party 
among its leadership, it was also deeply enmeshed within a network of Nationalist-led women’s 
relief organizations all headquartered in the wartime capital of Chongqing.113  Song Meiling 
(more popularly known as Madame Chiang Kai-shek, the first lady of Nationalist China) served 
as the organization’s president.  The charismatic, Wellesley-educated daughter of a prominent 
Chinese Methodist family, Madame Chiang was among the most famous women in the world, 
and she used her work with war orphans to cultivate her own global cult of personality as well as 
to bolster the international reputation of the Nationalist Party. 
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 Throughout the war, the most pressing problem facing the NARC was how to secure the 
funds necessary to shelter, clothe, feed, and educate the tens of thousands of children under its 
care.  Despite the Nationalist government’s sincere commitment to wartime relief work, it had 
limited resources with which to fund ambitious social welfare projects.  The Nationalists’ retreat 
from eastern China into the interior had cut off many crucial sources of state income, including 
duties collected by the Chinese Maritime Customs Service.  Between 1937 and 1939, annual 
government revenues fell by 63% while expenditures increased by 33%.114  From its founding in 
March 1938 through June 1943, the NARC received only approximately 26.3% of its funding 
from Chinese government sources, primarily via the newly created National Relief Commission 
(zhenji weiyuanhui振濟委員會) that served as the highest government body coordinating and 
funding wartime relief work.  The rest of the NARC’s funding—approximately 73.7%—came 
from private donations.115   
Especially during the early years of the war, the NARC attracted a significant portion of 
those donations from within China through its own domestic child sponsorship program.  In one 
widely published appeal, Madame Chiang Kai-shek called upon Chinese citizens to contribute to 
the relief effort by sponsoring children: 
The National Association for Refugee Children’s fundraising movement is now 
underway.  We estimate that to provide the most basic clothing, food, and shelter for one 
child for one year requires about 60 yuan.  We are now beseeching our compatriots: 
every person according to his or her ability assume the responsibility for paying the 
expenses to foster several children.  Our initial target is to foster 20,000 children.116 
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56 
 
In order to encourage wide participation in the sponsorship program, the leaders of the NARC 
personally “sponsored” large numbers of children: Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek 
sponsored 200 children, Guo Xiuyi sponsored 442 children, and Li Dequan sponsored 511 
children.117  Their promotional efforts achieved at least modest success.  As of 1939, at least 
3,240 people in China were sponsoring one or more children at the rate of 60 yuan per year.118 
 Nevertheless, the vast majority of donations to the NARC came from abroad.  From the 
outset, the NARC recognized the importance of international fundraising to its philanthropic and 
political goals.  A January 1938 article outlined the need to “expand international publicity” so 
that “our overseas compatriots and those people of all countries who stand for humanitarian 
justice” would “know the true brutality of our enemy, sympathize with us, provide us with 
practical aid, and also encourage their own governments to impose effective sanctions on our 
perverse and violent enemy.”119  Throughout the war, donations from abroad constituted the 
NARC’s single most important revenue source.  As Zhang Aizhen wrote in 1944, “flipping 
through the donation books, about seven or eight out of ten are sent from abroad (including 
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overseas Chinese).”120  Underscoring the global scope of NARC fundraising, its records show 
donations in 13 different foreign currencies.121 
 
The Adoption of Warphans by Foreign Nationals 
 At the heart of the NARC’s global fundraising campaign was an effort to expand its child 
sponsorship work overseas through the creation of a program called “the adoption of warphans 
by foreign nationals.”122  The adoption program sought to attract donors from across the world 
by offering them the opportunity to receive photographs, progress reports, and personal letters 
from the children they sponsored.  A set of 13 regulations governing the NARC’s adoption 
program that was distributed widely to potential donors included the following provisions:  
6. The Adopters shall continue to support the Adoptees for a period of five years at the 
least.  The expenses of this support may be paid in one lump sum or in several annual 
installments of not less than $20 (American currency) each… 
 
10. The Society shall send reports in English of the progress and condition of the 
Adoptees, together with photographs of them to the Adopters once a year. 
 
11. The Society shall ask all Adoptees to write to their respective Adopters once a year 
and these Chinese letters shall be translated and forwarded to the Adopters 
respectively.123 
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Although not always implemented to the letter, the NARC’s published regulations show how the 
adoption program was intended to operate so as to build personal relationships between adopters 
and the warphans in whom they had made significant, long-term financial commitments.   
In the early months after the founding of the NARC, Madame Chiang Kai-shek 
personally promoted the adoption program in cables and letters to prominent donors and relief 
organizations abroad.  On June 17, 1938, the United Council for Civilian Relief in China held a 
fundraising party in New York’s Chinatown attended by more than 10,000 people.  Madame 
Chiang sent a cable to be read out loud at the party in which she urged Americans to “vicariously 
adopt little Chinese children and thus acquire merit upon earth and Grace of Heaven.”124  From 
that point forward, the NARC often promoted the adoption program in its American publicity 
materials.  A 1940 “Christmas Message from Madame Chiang Kai-shek” asked, “Will you adopt 
or sponsor a war orphan?”125  One illustrated booklet titled “A Letter from Madame Chiang Kai-
shek to Boys and Girls Across the Ocean” likewise included photographs of smiling boys at play 
with captions such as “I’m happy now.  I’ve just been adopted!”126 
 However, it was in New Zealand where the NARC’s adoption program was implemented 
earliest and most enthusiastically.  On June 4, 1938, The Press ran an article that described the 
New Zealand people’s sympathy for the “many thousand Chinese children” orphaned by the war 
with Japan and noted that “a movement is now afoot to raise funds to ‘adopt’ a certain number of 
children by paying for their upkeep, the amount being computed at £4 a year for each child.”  
The article acknowledged that the idea of “adopting” Chinese children had reached New Zealand 
                                                
124 “25,000 Throng to Chinatown for Rice Bowl Party: Mme. Chiang, in Greeting, Appeals to Americans to Adopt 
Chinese Orphans to ‘Acquire Merit on Earth’,” New York Herald Tribune, June 18, 1938, 5. 
125 “A Christmas Message from Madame Chiang Kai-Shek” (1940). 
126 A Letter from Madame Chiang Kai-shek to Boys and Girls Across the Ocean (Chongqing: China Information 
Publishing Company, 1940). 
59 
 
through a letter that Madame Chiang Kai-shek had sent to the New Zealand Branch of the 
Chinese Women’s Relief Association: 
There are tens of thousands of war orphans who are destitute, homeless, and uncared-
for.  Our women here have undertaken, as a first step, to arrange to care for 20,000 of 
these little ones.  I am wondering whether it would be possible for women in New 
Zealand and their colleagues to raise funds for this project.  They might try to interest 
various towns and cities to ‘adopt’ a certain number of orphans by paying for their 
upkeep, and if such a plan could be carried out we shall be glad to send a group of 
photographs of the children “adopted”.127 
 
Three weeks later, on the evening of June 24, a collection of prominent New Zealand citizens 
gathered in Wellington to form the New Zealand Council for the Adoption of Chinese Refugee 
Children, tasked with “the organisation on a Dominion-wide scale of an appeal for funds to 
‘adopt’ Chinese refugee children by providing £4 a year for their upkeep.”  The Honorable W.E. 
Barnard, speaker of the New Zealand House of Representatives, was appointed chairman, and 
other executive officers were selected among prominent business, philanthropic, academic, and 
religious leaders.128  The Council was extraordinarily successful, raising more than £13,000 
through the adoption program during the course of the war.129  The New Zealand press was also 
instrumental in promoting its fundraising efforts.  Hundreds of articles in newspapers such as 
The Evening Post, The Press, The New Zealand Herald, and The Auckland Star offered highly 
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flattering depictions of the Council’s work.  The Evening Post even printed the names of 
contributors along with the amounts they had donated.130 
 Among New Zealand’s most prominent Chinese citizens, the Chinese Consul to New 
Zealand, Feng Wang, and his wife, known as “Madame Feng Wang,” the president of the 
Wellington Branch of the Chinese Women’s War Relief Association, played important roles in 
promoting the adoption plan across New Zealand.  On June 4, 1938 The Press published an 
interview with Feng Wang in which he expressed enthusiastic support for the adoption program:  
“The Association for War Refugee Children in China, which was sponsored by Madame 
Chiang Kai-shek, is now making a drive for funds.  They estimate that it will cost 60 
Chinese dollars, which is approximately £4 in New Zealand currency, to house, feed, 
clothe, and educate in a simple way one child for a year…The people of New Zealand, 
with their intense love of children and their strong sense of humanity, will naturally not 
fail to give a response to Madame Chiang’s appeal.”131   
 
Madame Feng Wang was appointed an ex officio member of the New Zealand Council for the 
Adoption of Chinese Refugee Children, and over the next two years she worked tirelessly on its 
behalf—promoting the adoption program via radio broadcasts and on a speaking tour across New 
Zealand.132  In a speech delivered on August 5, 1938, Madame Feng Wang implored: 
I am sure that, with the splendid efforts of the council and with the kind support of the 
people of this Dominion, New Zealand will play a leading part in the accomplishment of 
this great humanitarian work.  I am also sure that those who give towards the fund will be 
making a real contribution to the building up of a new generation in China, and, on the 
other hand, those little ones who have been “adopted” will not forget the great kindness 
that has been extended to them by their foster-parents in this fair Dominion.133 
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On November 22, 1939, an Evening Post article offered an appraisal of the impact of her efforts: 
“Madame Feng Wang’s lectures on behalf of the ‘adoption fund’ aroused enthusiasm throughout 
New Zealand, and were responsible for raising a good part of the £9000 donated in little over a 
year.”134  Madame Feng Wang also worked to forge connections between the NARC and 
fundraising groups in New Zealand.  She remitted funds on behalf of the Wellington Chinese 
Women’s Relief Association and wrote personally to Madame Chiang Kai-shek requesting 
signed photographs for the committee members of the New Zealand Council.135  She was one of 
many overseas Chinese leaders across the world that played a crucial role in promoting and 
coordinating the adoption program. 
 
Chinese Migrant Networks and the Globalization of the Adoption Program 
 The NARC relied upon elite diasporic Chinese to quickly build a global base of donors 
through the adoption program.  Between March 1938 and March 1940, the organization attracted 
at least 3,500 sponsors from across the United States, Europe, Southeast Asia, and Oceania.  As 
of March 1940, New Zealand was the adoption program’s leading source of donors (1,094), 
followed by Indonesia (879), the United States (436), British Malaya (421), France (376), the 
Netherlands (100), Australia (90), and England (54).136  In each of these locations, prominent 
overseas Chinese took the lead in forming “cooperating organizations” (xie zhu tuanti協助團體) 
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to publicize and coordinate the adoption plan.  The NARC sent photographs of warphans to each 
cooperating organization, which in turn found local adopters to sponsor the children and reported 
back to the NARC with the details of all new or discontinued adoptions on a quarterly basis.137   
One such cooperating organization was the Comité de Secours Aux réfugiés et blesses 
Chinois in Paris, France.  The Comité de Secours was founded by a group of some of the most 
prominent Chinese women in Europe, including Oei Hui-lan (the Chinese-Indonesian fashion 
icon and wife of Ambassador to France Wellington Koo), Liao Tsuifeng (wife of renowned 
author Lin Yutang), and Chen Suk-ying (wife of the President of the Legislative Yuan Sun 
Fo).138  Much like the New Zealand Council for the Adoption of Chinese Refugee Children and 
the New York-based United Council for Civilian Relief in China, the Comité de Secours first 
implemented the adoption program upon the personal suggestion of Madame Chiang Kai-shek.  
Oei Hui-lan wrote to Madame Chiang on June 8, 1938, “As regards your admirable suggestion 
about the adoption of orphans, I am striving to interest my friends in it and solicit their help.  I 
am glad to be able to report to you that already three persons whom I approached have already 
indicated their willingness to adopt two orphans by paying for their upkeep.”139  Utilizing the 
prestige and personal networks of its founders, the Comité de Secours quickly built the adoption 
plan into its primary fundraising method.  Liao Tsuifeng reported in October 1938, “We were 
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very happy to receive the 55 photographs of war orphans sent to this Committee.  Half of them 
were taken up immediately, and we have already sent you seventeen thousand francs (17,000fr.) 
on this account.  We are, however, only beginning to push this work ahead by circularizing an 
appeal to all our known friends and expect a great response.”140  By November, the Comité was 
signing up new adopters faster than the NARC could send photos. Liao wrote again in November 
concerning a delayed shipment of 300 photographs: “We shall be very happy if we can have the 
orphans’ photographs soon as there are many people waiting anxiously to see the pictures of 
their adopted children.  Please ask the person who is in charge of this work to send the 300 
photos to this Committee at once by Air-Mail.”141  
Chinese diasporic networks also facilitated the exchange of materials and information 
about the adoption program among individuals and coordinating organizations in far-flung 
locations across the world.  For example, the president of the Chinese Women’s Relief 
Organization of New York was Mrs. C.H. Wang, a friend and former classmate of Madame 
Chiang Kai-shek at Wellesley.142  She received 360 children’s photographs from the Comité de 
Secours in Paris, after which her organization began utilizing the adoption program for its own 
fundraising work.143  Wang Sheng Chih of the Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation in 
Singapore learned of the adoption program from publicity materials sent to him by his former 
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high school classmate C.T. Tseng, who was then working for the Hong Kong office of the 
Central Bank of China.  Wang published NARC’s regulations for the adoption of warphans by 
foreign nationals in the Singapore-based Malaya Tribune and took it upon himself to remit funds 
donated through the adoption program to the NARC.144  In Launceston, Tasmania, Ann Chung 
organized the city’s only two Chinese families to create an organization called the Chinese Relief 
Fund to Aid Victims of Japanese Aggression, which managed to facilitate at least ten adoptions 
through the NARC.145 
Not only were Chinese migrant networks crucial to coordinating the adoption program on 
a global scale, some overseas Chinese were also among those who contributed to the NARC 
through the adoption program.  Across Southeast Asia, overseas Chinese associations that had 
long contributed to charitable and political causes in China enthusiastically sponsored children.  
In May 1938, the Malacca Overseas Chinese Refugee Relief Committee Women’s Fundraising 
Group resolved that its members would sponsor children through the NARC according to their 
means and encourage their relatives and friends to do the same.146  In July 1939, the Kampar 
Chinese Merchants Association Club donated 1,200 yuan to adopt 20 warphans through the 
NARC and similarly vowed to solicit contributions from the overseas Chinese community.147  
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However, perhaps the most enthusiastic of all overseas Chinese adopters was Kuo-ching (“K.C.”) 
Li, the founder of the Wah Chang Trading Corporation in New York, who was dubbed “the 
richest Chinese in America.”148 In 1940 Li requested that the NARC identify 20 children “who 
appear to be endowed with unusual possibilities” whom he would pledge to support until they 
reached eighteen years of age.  Complying with his request, the NARC selected “twenty worthy 
warphans” who had “been tested and found to be comparatively higher in I.Q.” as the recipients 
of Li’s aid.149  In addition to the standard sponsorship costs, Li donated $1,600 annually to be 
held in trust on their behalf, “so that in the event things should turn out so that I cannot see them 
through some year, they would nevertheless be provided for.”150  In correspondence with the 
NARC over the years, Li exhibited considerable interest in the children, asking after their 
personal well being, offering input on their educational choices, and expressing delight upon 
receiving their letters.151  Of course, few people had the resources or inclination to participate in 
the adoption plan on such a grand scale.  Nevertheless, his case provides one extraordinary 
example of the overseas Chinese donors who sought to build personal ties with Chinese 
warphans through the NARC’s adoption plan.   
 Overseas Chinese philanthropists also utilized their multicultural knowledge to package 
the adoption plan for a global audience by articulating its significance in the languages of 
humanitarianism and Christian love.  For example, one report by the Hong Kong Branch of 
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NARC suggested that there was a universal moral imperative to aid suffering children common 
to both Confucianism and Christianity:  
Mencius has vividly described how any person, upon seeing an infant in danger of falling 
into a well, would instinctively become sympathetic and endeavor to do all he could to 
save it…  
 
Jesus also said: ‘Suffer little children to come unto me, for theirs is the Kingdom of 
Heaven.152  
 
Upon learning that some New Zealanders were hesitant to contribute to the NARC because many 
of the children were not exposed to Christianity, Madame Chiang Kai-shek replied by expressing 
her belief that “often people who are not professed Christians, and there are many such in China 
who have never heard of the teachings of Christ, put into practice the desire and spirit to serve 
mankind which characterize Christ’s teachings.”  She added, “I wonder whether it would do any 
good for you to point out to the small number of people who have refused to subscribe because 
not all of our children are receiving Christian training, the fact that the Good Samaritan never 
inquired what religion, if any, the wayfarer, who fell in the hands of the robbers, professed.”153  
Another New Zealand fundraising appeal circulated by Madame Feng Wang implicitly addressed 
such concerns by declaring the universality of humanitarian sentiment: “Nationality, politics, 
creed, these make no barrier to such a call for sympathy and help.”154  By skillfully crafting 
appeals to adopt Chinese children in terms of humanitarianism and Christian love, the NARC 
attracted widespread interest in the adoption program.  But convincing people to donate was only 
the first step.  Facilitating the exchange of meaningful correspondence between foreign adults 
and Chinese children would prove perhaps an even greater challenge. 
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Writing Global Intimacy 
The ways in which children comprehended and carried out the unfamiliar task of writing 
letters to foreign strangers who addressed them in familial terms was shaped by recent 
transformations of Chinese epistolary culture.  By the time the NARC implemented its adoption 
program in 1938, children’s letters had already become a well-established genre of writing 
within educated Chinese families.  As Danni Cai has shown, for the increasing number of 
children studying away from home in new-style schools during the early twentieth century, 
writing letters to family members and teachers was an important part of daily life.  As a result, 
letter-writing manuals for students (xuesheng chidu fanben 學生尺牘範本) proliferated during 
this period, many of which achieved great commercial success and underwent dozens of 
printings.155 
Republican era letter-writing manuals inculcated schoolchildren with the idea that letter 
writing was an important medium through which to demonstrate love and filial piety for parents 
and family members during times of physical separation.  In terms of content, the model “letters 
home” (jia shu 家書) contained in these manuals typically consisted of straightforward academic 
progress updates.  For example, a model letter to one’s father in the Practical Letter Manual for 
Students reported, “The school’s coursework is divided into numerous subjects.  Moral 
cultivation, Chinese, gymnastics, and math are the four most important subjects.  The teachers’ 
explanations are very detailed, and I can comprehend all of them.  If there is something I do not 
know, I can consult with my classmates.”156  The purpose of such letters, however, was not 
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simply to communicate information but also “to show familial love and concern for one’s family 
members and relatives”—what was often described in letter manuals as “the sentiment of 
familial admiration” (ru mu zhi qing 孺慕之情).157  Nevertheless, familial intimacy was not 
communicated through direct emotional expression.  Rather, children demonstrated sincere 
sentiment through the time and effort required to learn and follow formal epistolary conventions. 
 In some regards, the letters that children wrote to their foreign foster parents through the 
NARC’s adoption program resemble the model “letters home” contained in the letter-writing 
manuals for children popular at the time.  Republican era letter-writing manuals often included 
both literary (wen yan 文言) and vernacular (bai hua 白話) versions of model letters, “the one to 
model the original form, the other to go along with societal trends.”158  The letters that children 
wrote through the adoption program, however, were exclusively in the vernacular form.  
Nonetheless, in both form and content they were often quite similar to the letters their peers in 
other educational institutions were taught to write to their parents.  For example, the vernacular 
version of a model letter to one’s parents in the New Letter Writing Manual for Students reads:  
The conditions at school are not very different from last year, only the name of our 
“national literature” (guo wen 國文) class has been changed to “national language” (guo 
yu 國語).  I study very hard for national language.  After my classwork is finished, I play 
all sorts of beneficial games, like soccer, boxing, and “hop the iron bar,” all of which can 
help develop the body and invigorate the spirit.  After I started practicing, my body has 
felt well, and I am eating more than before.  These are all benefits of exercise.159 
 
Compare that to the letter a girl named Chia-chin wrote to her foster mother Helen in New 
Zealand in May 1941:  
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Now I will tell you about the situation at the orphanage.  Every day we have four classes, 
three classes in the morning and one in the afternoon.  There are three meals per day.  We 
eat rice for two meals and porridge for the other.  Our lives are very good.  On Sundays 
we can go out and play.  Now the orphanage is also giving us cotton-padded clothes.  I 
am currently in second grade.  My grades are very good.160 
 
Often written as life updates that focused on their academic curriculum and the material 
conditions of their daily lives, the letters that children sent their foster parents through the 
adoption program were in these respects not so different from the letters written by countless 
other Chinese students to their families back home. 
 Despite these similarities, the letters children wrote for the adoption program were 
sometimes characterized by an emotional exuberance that is decidedly absent from the model 
letters contained in instructional manuals.  For example, a boy named Hew Wei wrote to his 
foster mother Bethea, “I was so happy when I received your picture and letter.  I held your 
photograph in my two hands and stared at your happy face, and I could not stop myself from 
pressing it to my face over and over.  Although we are separated by rivers and mountains, at that 
moment it was as if I had fallen into your embrace!”161  A letter from a girl named Tao-chuan to 
her “Aunty Dolly” was equally emotive: “When I received your June 17th letter and learned that 
you have adopted me to be your niece, I was suddenly startled in my heart.  I thought to myself, 
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wow, there truly are kind and affectionate people like that in the world.  From now on, I am once 
again a lucky child.”162  
How did the children in NARC warphanages learn to write in such a highly sentimental 
style?  It is possible that the NARC explicitly instructed children to write with such unrestrained 
emotion to please their foreign sponsors, but I have not come across any instructions to this 
effect in the archives.  The NARC’s instructions regarding children’s letters that are available in 
the archives are brief and matter-of-fact.  For example, after receiving Bethea’s letter to her 
adoptee Hew Wei, the NARC office translated it into Chinese and forwarded it to the 
superintendent of the Guizhou Branch No. 4 Warphanage where Hew Wei resided along with the 
following directions: “Instruct [Hew Wei] to write a letter expressing gratitude as well as 
reporting on his personal experiences and the conditions of his life in the orphanage.  Send it 
back to this office (ensuring that it is written neatly) so that it can be translated and 
forwarded.”163  In internal communications, however, the NARC often stressed the importance 
of creating sentimental bonds between children and their sponsors through correspondence.  In 
one instance, the NARC headquarters wrote to the Sichuan Branch No. 5 Warphanage requesting 
that a child named I-cha write a letter to his foster mother in order to “strengthen the emotional 
connection between the two sides (lianluo shuangfang qinggan聯絡雙方情感).”164  Perhaps 
most significantly, the highly cosmopolitan women who operated the NARC and its affiliated 
warphanages—many of whom had spent significant time abroad—would have been familiar 
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with Western notions of familial intimacy and the types of “loving” letters most likely to attract 
and hold sponsors’ interest in their adopted Chinese children. 
 In letters to their Chinese adoptees, sponsors can also be seen groping for an appropriate 
language through which to express love and familial intimacy to children in a different cultural 
context about which they knew little.  In some cases, foster parents explicitly acknowledged their 
uncertainty about what and how to write.  One woman from Auckland, New Zealand began by 
admitting her ignorance of Chinese epistolary customs: “Please forgive me if I have not begun 
my letter to you in the way to which you are accustomed—the peoples of different countries do 
many things differently, but can be very good friends in spite of that!”165  A woman named Joan 
from Paeroa, New Zealand frankly acknowledged that so much time had passed between letters 
that she was unsure what to write: “I was very pleased to receive your letter with its translation 
this week.  It took a long while to reach N.Z. but I am sure we are very lucky to receive letters at 
present.  It is such a long time ago since I first wrote to you that I am not quite sure what to write 
about.”166  How then did sponsors write letters to foster the sense of a meaningful adoptive 
relationship with children about whom they knew little, and who knew little about them?  
 While sponsors’ letters vary in both tone and content, distinct patterns nevertheless 
emerge, suggesting a loosely coherent set of writing practices characteristic of global intimacy.  
One of the most common strategies that foster parents used to create a sense of familial intimacy 
with their adopted Chinese children was writing in extraordinary detail about their families and 
hometowns—as if offering a correspondence course in all the information a child in their family 
would know.  While children’s letters were typically one or two pages in length, sponsors’ letters 
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often stretched on for five, six, or even seven handwritten pages.  After confessing that she was 
“not quite sure what to write about,” Joan went on to write at length about everything from the 
history of New Zealand (“Exactly 100 years ago N.Z. became part of the British Empire”) to 
indigenous culinary tastes (“the Maoris eat humaras (sweet potato) and they are very fond of fish, 
especially the head of the fish”) to native bird species (“The most famous of N.Z. birds is 
perhaps the Kiwi”).167  Other sponsors wrote at length about their children and relatives, 
explaining to their new adoptees precisely how they fit into their new foster families.  A woman 
named Alice described her six children (five daughters and one adult son) in considerable detail 
before adding, “I am so glad that my adopted child is a boy—because I always wanted another 
boy.”168  Her description of their idyllic family life struck a chord with her foster son, who, after 
all, had been separated from his family amidst the horrors of war.  He replied: 
After I read your letter, I felt so many interesting things, like having such an admirable 
brother and six dear little sisters living in one family, playing together every day with all 
those lively animals in the pasture.  I wish I could grow wings and fly over to also enjoy 
such amazing good fortune.169 
 
In another poignant example, a woman named Dorothy from Wanganui, New Zealand wrote to 
her adopted son Chen-chia, “I have no little boy or girl of my own, but have often wished I had, 
so I am getting the next best thing by adopting some.”170  For both sponsors and their adopted 
children, reading and writing about home and family helped make their adoptive relationship 
meaningful despite cultural, linguistic, and geographic barriers. 
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Found in Translation 
The NARC relied on the necessity of translation as means to smooth over discrepancies 
in the ways Chinese children and their foster parents expressed familial intimacy.  By carefully 
comparing original letters with the translations prepared by the NARC staff in Chongqing, it is 
possible to reverse engineer the logic of the translational practices undergirding the adoption 
program.  For the NARC, translation was not an impediment to intimate communication but 
rather a technology of translingual intimacy through which their cosmopolitan staff members 
provided not only linguistic but also cultural mediation for children and their sponsors.   
To be sure, many small discrepancies between the original and translated versions of 
letters appear to be innocent translation mistakes on the part of NARC staff who were fluent but 
non-native English speakers.  To take just one amusing example, Dorothy wrote to her adopted 
child, “I am not very fond of the camera myself but will get one of my nieces to take a 
photograph for you.”  The Chinese translation renders this sentence, “It’s a pity that my camera 
is not very good, but I will ask one of my nieces to take a photograph for you.”171  Apart from 
such instances, most significant translation discrepancies appear to be deliberate attempts to 
remove or alter statements that would seem inappropriate or awkward outside of their original 
cultural and linguistic context.  For instance, in his February 1941 letter Hsio-djen wrote, “In the 
morning we have four hours of classes, and in the afternoon we have four hours of sewing.  I 
only regret that I am slow-witted by nature and that my progress in both my studies and work 
lags far behind.”  While such comments could be construed as appropriately humble in a Chinese 
context, in English they are at best awkward and at worst might cause his foster parents to 
wonder why their funds were being used on a child with so little natural aptitude.  As a result, the 
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offending sentence is simply omitted from the corresponding section of the English-language 
translation: “We have classes all morning and we learn sewing in the afternoon.  I hope you will 
pray for our progress.”172  The letters that foreign sponsors wrote to their Chinese adoptees were 
similarly massaged in translation.  For instance, in her first letter to her adopted child, a woman 
named Leska from Sherman, Texas concluded with the line,  “I like your picture very much—I 
keep it on my desk because I love you.”  In an American context, this statement can be read as 
warmly reassuring a war orphan that he is, in fact, loved.  In Chinese, such a bold declaration of 
love (the word “love” is thickly underlined in the original letter) from a foreign stranger in her 
first communication would likely come across as uncomfortable and overbearing.  Instead, the 
translator softened the sentiment by subtly altering it to read, “I like you and your picture, so I 
put your picture on top of my writing desk.”173  On one level, we might understand the necessity 
of translation as limiting the extent of intimacy possible through the adoption program.  After all, 
children and their sponsors could not communicate with each other in their own words.  On 
another level, however, the NARC’s translational practices made the letters they exchanged both 
linguistically comprehensible and culturally legible.  In their roles as translators, NARC staff 
performed necessary work for facilitating the adoption program across conflicting regimes of 
family and intimacy. 
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Figure 1.2.  Transcription of Chinese-original and English-language translation of letter from 
Hsio-djen.  The NARC utilized translation as a means to smooth out discrepancies in the ways 
Chinese children and foreign sponsors expressed familial sentiment.  11-4231, 118, 121, SHAC. 
 
“A Shock Much Too Great for Their Immature Minds to Comprehend” 
In her classic 1983 book, The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling, 
Arlie Hochschild coined the term “emotion work” to describe the effort required “to induce or 
suppress feeling in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of 
mind in others.”174  Put simply, emotion work describes the labor of managing one’s own 
emotions out of deference to the feelings of others.  As Kristine Alexander has argued, emotion 
work can be a helpful concept for studying the affective labor often demanded of children (girls 
in particular) to make adults feel happy by properly displaying emotions such as love and 
gratitude.175  Emotion work is likewise a useful analytical tool for understanding the emotional 
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labor children performed to secure their livelihoods through the adoption program.  Especially 
considering the trauma so many of them had experienced, children’s letters to their sponsors 
were remarkably upbeat, and they were almost universally positive in their descriptions of life in 
the warphanages.  A letter from a boy named Ya-lo at the Guizhou Branch No. 3 Warphanage 
near Zunyi is prototypical: 
Our warphanage is in Taoxi Temple Village a few li outside the city.  The scenery is very 
beautiful, and there is not a danger of air raids.  In the orphanage we study for half the 
day and learn a craft for half the day.  In third grade I study the War of Resistance Reader, 
and I am learning handicrafts.  We also have medical facilities.  I think for refugees to get 
such comforts, it is truly a paradise outside this world!176 
 
As the NARC understood well, children’s letters were also fundraising appeals with the purpose 
of attracting and sustaining sponsor interest.  By painting the warphanages as idyllic spaces 
where children could learn and grow happily in safety and comfort, such letters inspired 
confidence that donors’ funds were put to good use. 
 Nevertheless, other types of evidence reveal that children in NARC warphanages were 
plagued by severe psychological problems and often harbored deep grievances against the 
institutions in which they lived.  In 1943 the Central Hygiene Laboratory Mental Health Office 
(zhongyang weisheng shiyan yuan xinli weisheng shi中央衛生實驗院心理衛生室) conducted 
an examination of the psychological well-being of children in NARC warphanages.  As part of 
their examination, they administered a questionnaire to 99 warphans adapted from the famous 
Woodworth Personal Data Sheet developed by Columbia University psychologist Robert 
Woodworth in 1917 to test whether military recruits might be prone to nervous breakdowns 
during enemy bombardments.177  The version of the survey developed by the Mental Health 
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Office included 56 yes-or-no questions, each of which had a “normal” (chang tai 常態) as well 
as an “abnormal” (bian tai 變態) response.  Questions ranged from “Do you make friends easily?” 
(Normal answer: yes) to “In addition to the world you see, is there another world within your 
innermost being?” (Normal answer: no).  The more questions answered normally, the higher a 
child’s “emotional stability” (qingxu wending xing情緒穩定性) was rated.178  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the study found that children at NARC warphanages were far less emotionally 
stable than their peers at other educational institutions.179 
The psychological examinations of warphanage children also included unstructured one-
on-one interviews in which they were asked to narrate their experiences to investigators.  While 
the letters that children sent to their foster parents almost universally described their happy lives 
at the warphanages, the psychological exam records tell a very different story.  For example, 
children’s letters often remarked about how well they got along with their peers.  Tao-chuan 
wrote,  “Our class has several dozen students who all closely look after each other.”180  In 
contrast, their psychological interviews were rife with complaints of bitter interpersonal conflicts.  
The story of an eleven-year-old girl named Le-hua who was blind in her left eye was recorded by 
her interviewers as follows: 
When she entered the warphanage, some of the older female students would often 
humiliate her.  The dorm leader and the student in charge of cleaning would often abuse 
their authority.  Whenever they saw her enter the dormitory, they would force her to 
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kneel on a bamboo rod and squeeze her head into the chamber pot to smell the foul 
odor.181  
 
The disturbing findings of the Central Hygiene Laboratory Mental Health Office investigation 
into the emotional health of children at NARC warphanages provide sobering context to the 
sunnily optimistic letters they wrote to their foster parents abroad.  After all, as Madame Chiang 
acknowledged in a letter to the Victorian Chinese Women’s Relief Committee in Melbourne, 
Australia, “Some of the children need years of care as the effect of seeing their parents, relatives, 
and homes destroyed and desolated has been a shock much too great for their immature minds to 
comprehend.”182  Nevertheless, to ensure the emotional satisfaction of the sponsors upon whose 
donations they depended, the children selected for the adoption program had to do the emotional 
labor of performing gratitude and optimism while suppressing any grievances or self-doubts. 
  
The Intimacy of Objects  
 While the adoption program sought to build sentimental ties between Chinese warphans 
and their foreign adopters, its success depended upon the transnational exchange of physical 
objects—letters, photographs, and gifts—in a time of global war.  In the absence of any physical 
contact between sponsors and their adoptees, these objects could take on immense significance 
as the only physical traces of a correspondent across the ocean.  The adoptive relationship was 
officially initiated when sponsors received a photograph of their adoptee, and for many sponsors 
simply possessing a child’s photograph was enough to foster a sense of personal connection.  
After receiving the photograph of her adoptee Dung Ngao, a woman named Lillias wrote to the 
NARC, “I like the look of him very much indeed and very likely if I saw all your little boys and 
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girls he would be the one I would choose to have for my little boy.”183  Sponsors often treasured 
such photographs and displayed them prominently within their homes and communities.  A 
woman named Maria from Tauranga, New Zealand wrote to her foster son Ren, “Your 
photograph looks so nice in a little round silver frame, on my bedroom changing piece.”184   
Others exhibited their photographs in more public ways.  A woman named Esther wrote, “We, in 
Nihotupu, are so glad to have your photograph—we are going to put it in a frame and keep it in 
our church and every day we will be asking the dear Lord Jesus to have you safe in his 
keeping.”185  She even sent her adopted son a picture of the small, wooden church where she 
kept his photograph.186  
 In addition to their photographs, the letters that sponsors received from their adoptees 
were significant not only for their written contents but also as physical objects produced by the 
children themselves.  When children wrote letters to their foster parents, the NARC would send 
sponsors both the handwritten Chinese original as well as a typewritten translation.  Although 
most sponsors could not read the original letters, they attached profound significance to them as 
material testaments to their relationships with their Chinese adoptees.  Bethea from North Otago 
wrote to her foster child Hew Wei, “You have made me so happy and satisfied, having your 
photo, and now a letter written by your own hand.  I am feeling rich indeed.”187  Upon receiving 
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another letter from Hew Wei a year later, she was so moved that she physically embraced the 
letter as a totem of the child she would never hold in person: “I am ever so glad to get your dear 
loving letter.  I just held it close to me in sheer delight.”  Bethea kept Hew Wei’s photograph 
with her when she knelt for her twice-daily prayers, and the physical presence of his photograph 
enabled her to sense his spiritual presence.  She wrote, “Every morning and night when I kneel 
down to pray you are there and oh so near.”188 
Some foster parents went beyond the exchange of photographs and letters that was 
standard in the adoption program by sending handmade gifts to their adopted children.  In a letter 
to her foster son Chen-shih, Gladys described her four-year-old daughter Sally’s penchant for 
arts and crafts: “We gave her a small pair of blunt-end scissors and she cuts out amazingly well 
for a small child.  Here is a tiny shoe she has cut out!”  She included both the paper cutout shoe 
as well as a photograph of Sally with the letter.189  In his response, Chen-shih wrote, “Now I am 
sending a photograph of when the children in our warphanage put on a play to give to the little 
sister who can cut out shoes.”190  Other foster parents made clothes for their adopted children.  
Dorothy initially sponsored two children, one boy and one girl, and she sent them each different 
items of clothing.  To the boy Chia-cheng she wrote, “I am sending you some clothes which I 
hope you will like.  The boys in N.Z. wear suits like that in the summer time.”191  Several weeks 
later, she wrote to the girl Tao-chuan to tell her that she was making her a dress and asked, 
“Would you let me know whether the dress fits + whether it is the right length?”192  Tao-chuan 
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replied, “I feel so grateful that Auntie made clothes for me.  It made me feel an indescribable joy.  
Although I have not received it yet, I am sure that it will suit me.”193  On one hand, Tao-chuan’s 
letter poignantly expressed her gratitude for her sponsor’s personal efforts on her behalf.  On the 
other hand, the fact that Tao-chuan had not yet received the dress suggests how the difficulties of 
wartime international transport constrained the possibilities for material exchange through the 
adoption program. 
In fact, some of the gifts that sponsors sent their adoptees never arrived at all.  The 
prolonged saga that ensued when Bethea attempted to send Hew Wei a scrapbook provides an 
illustrative example.  On May 24, 1940, Bethea sent the NARC a scrapbook with instructions to 
forward it to Hew Wei.194  On July 1, 1940, she wrote to Hew Wei himself to inform him that 
she had sent a parcel so that he might look out for it.195  She received no reply until May 8, 1941, 
when the NARC wrote to Bethea to tell her that the package “never arrived and so we presume it 
has met with misfortune enroute—perhaps by bombing either in your country or ours.”196  By 
this time, however, the package had already been returned to Bethea in New Zealand, “the reason 
given being the closing of the Burma Road.”  Finally, on May 21, 1941, almost one year after 
she first mailed the scrapbook, Bethea posted it once again, writing to Hew Wei: “I sincerely 
hope it reaches you this time…I’ll be thinking of you, and trying to imagine I see you getting the 
parcel.  It is filled with the love I send to you, and all the good wishes.”197  Here the archival 
records of Bethea and Hew Wei’s relationship trail off.  It is unclear whether he ever received the 
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scrapbook.  To avoid such costly and demoralizing affairs, the NARC began discouraging 
sponsors from sending packages, asking them instead to send extra money that could be used to 
buy gifts for children locally.  As the NARC put it bluntly to one sponsor, “Packages, however, 
are very difficult to get through these days of war.  Money, therefore, would be much better.”198   
 
A Wrinkle in Time 
 In attempting to build adoptive relationships that relied on international postal service, 
foreign foster parents and their Chinese adoptees confronted a problem of temporality inherent to 
all epistolary relationships but exacerbated by the difficulties of interlingual communication and 
the conditions of global war: namely, how to accommodate the months-long gaps between when 
a letter was written, translated, and read.  In navigating these long periods of silence and waiting, 
sponsors developed subtle—perhaps even subconscious—practices of writing through which 
they sought to make a distant child into an adopted son or daughter.  One noteworthy example is 
a particular usage of the word “now” that appears across numerous letters.  For example, in her 
first letter to her adopted child, Alice from Matamata opens with the dramatic lines, “You are our 
adopted Chinese son, and I am your New Zealand mother.  Now we are introduced to each other 
are we not.”  And after concluding a detailed description of her children, she added, “Now isn’t it 
fun being one of such a lovely big family.”199  In these letters, the word “now” means both “now 
that I have written this” and “now that you have read it”—fusing those distant moments into a 
shared temporality in which strangers could become kin.  But while it was one thing to 
                                                
198 11-4236, 102, SHAC. 
199 11-4237, 33-43, SHAC.  Emphasis added. 
83 
 
rhetorically erase the months that inevitably passed between when letters were written and when 
they were read, in the real world of wartime China a lot could happen in a few months. 
 The rapidly shifting lines of Japanese occupation and the omnipresent threat of air raids 
in the interior made keeping track of children who were part of a highly mobile refugee 
population spread out across dozens of warphanages a difficult and sometimes impossible task.  
The persistent logistical problems of coordinating the adoption program on the ground in 
wartime China can be gleaned through the intertwined efforts of Gladys and Alice—two women 
from New Zealand whose letters have been quoted above—to adopt children at an NARC 
warphanage.  Gladys and Alice were friends and neighbors living on the dairy farms surrounding 
the town of Matamata on North Island, New Zealand.  In 1939, they decided that they would 
each adopt a child through the New Zealand Council for the Adoption of Chinese Refugee 
Children.  They hoped to adopt boys who lived at the same orphanage so that their adopted 
children would become friends who could talk about New Zealand together while swapping the 
illustrated magazines they sent them.  Gladys first wrote to her adopted child Chi Ming on 
December 1, 1939.  Her letter mentioned the friendship she hoped he would form with Alice’s 
adopted son Kwang Foo: 
We have just sent you an illustrated paper and hope it will get through to you safely.  It 
will give you some idea of New Zealand.  A friend of ours, living near us, Alice, has sent 
another lad of thirteen—Kwang Foo, another illustrated paper and has just written to 
him.  Is he in your camp?  It would be interesting if you knew him and talked about New 
Zealand together.200 
 
On the same day, Alice wrote to Kwang Foo, likewise mentioning that she hoped he would 
become friends with Chi Ming: 
                                                
200 11-4238, 46-59, SHAC. 
84 
 
A friend of ours in Matamata also has adopted a boy of your age.  His name is Chi 
Ming.  Perhaps you will know him and be able to share books, for he is to receive one 
too, but not the same as yours.  His adopted mother is Gladys.201  
 
As it turns out, however, neither Chi Ming nor Kwang Foo ever received the letters 
intended for them.  On April 13, 1940, the NARC sent the following letter to Gladys: 
Your lovely letter written to Chi-ming has been safely received (also illustrated paper) 
and translated into Chinese.  However, Chi-ming, you will be glad to know, has already 
been able to be reunited with his family.  We are always glad when members of a family 
succeed in finding each other and are able to live together.  Consequently, we are holding 
your letter and if you and your husband are willing, we shall substitute for Chi-ming, 
little Chen-shih now thirteen years of age.202 
 
On June 14, 1940, the NARC sent a similar letter to Alice, informing her that Kwang Foo had 
been “restored to his own parents” and asking if she would be willing to substitute fourteen-year-
old Hsio-djen instead:  “In one way this will be a disappointment for you for you have already 
come to love him very much.  We can realize that from your good letter to him.  But in a bigger 
way, we believe you will rejoice with him and with us in the reuniting of his own family.”203 
 Only one of the two letters was true.  NARC notes on Alice’s original letter to Kwang 
Foo confirm that he was in fact “taken back” (ling hui 領回) by his family.204  Chi Ming’s case 
was not so simple.  Gladys’s letter had been received by the NARC headquarters in Chongqing, 
translated into Chinese, and forwarded to the Sichuan Branch No. 6 Warphanage where Chi 
Ming resided.  However, on March 14, 1940, the warphanage superintendent wrote to NARC 
headquarters with the following reply:  “As that child fled the orphanage on October 13, 1939, 
and we remain unaware of his whereabouts, we are unable to deliver the translated letter and 
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photograph to him.  Therefore we are returning the original documents to your office along with 
this letter.”205  Rather than deliver the uncomfortable truth that Chi Ming had run away from the 
warphanage, the NARC instead chose to tell Gladys that he had been reunited with his family.  If 
their goal in telling such a falsehood was to ensure they would not lose Gladys as a sponsor, the 
gambit worked.  On June 30, 1940, she wrote back to the NARC: “My husband and I were so 
glad to get your letter of April 13th and are very happy to know that Chi-ming has found his 
family—that is indeed wonderful news…Yes, we shall be only too glad to “adopt” little Chen-
shih in Chi-ming’s place.”206  
The quick turnover rates at NARC warphanages, in combination with the unreliability of 
wartime communications, made it extraordinarily difficult to build and sustain transnational 
intimate relationships through the NARC’s adoption program.  NARC records document 
numerous similar cases in which sponsors were asked to accept a different child because their 
original adoptee had left the orphanage.  Whenever a child left under tragic or embarrassing 
circumstances, the NARC simply invented a happy ending rather than risk losing the confidence 
(and annual contributions) of their overseas donors.207  Nevertheless, the NARC persisted in its 
efforts to make the adoption program work for its sponsors.  On May 27, 1941, almost eighteen 
months after they had first written to Chi Ming and Kwang Foo, the NARC forwarded both 
Gladys and Alice letters from their new adoptees, Chen-shih and Hsio-djen.208  While the NARC 
appears to have always asked for sponsors’ permission before substituting children, the practice 
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itself implied that Chinese children were interchangeable as objects of their foster parents’ 
affection.  A stark symbol of this interchangeability can be found on the copy of the Chinese 
translation of Alice’s letter preserved in the Second Historical Archives in Nanjing.  The name 
“Kwang Foo” has simply been crossed out at the beginning of the letter, and the name of her new 
adopted child, “Hsio-djen,” squeezed into the margin beside it.209   
 
Figure 1.3.    Chinese translation of letter from Alice of New Zealand.  The name of its original 
intended recipient, “Kwang Foo,” has been crossed out at the top right of the page, and the name 
of her new adopted child, “Hsio-djen,” squeezed into the margin beside it.  11-4237, 39, SHAC. 
 
“Every Cent Must be Spent on the Children Themselves” 
 Not only was sustaining personal relationships between the givers and receivers of 
humanitarian aid under conditions of global war logistically difficult—it was also expensive.  
Without question, the adoption program had been very successful in attracting global 
humanitarian interest in China’s children.  As the Chairman of the New Zealand Council for the 
Adoption of Chinese Refugee Children wrote in an August 15, 1938 letter to Madame Chiang 
Kai-shek, “The establishment of personal contact between the New Zealand person helping, and 
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the child helped, is in my opinion—which is shared by the members of the Executive—of very 
great importance to the success of our endeavors.”210  For the NARC, however, such enthusiasm 
for its adoption program proved a double-edged sword.  As requests to adopt Chinese warphans 
poured in from New Zealand and elsewhere, the NARC’s overhead expenses skyrocketed.  
Replying to Barnard on May 3, 1939, Madame Chiang sought to illustrate the enormous costs 
that would be involved if the adoption program were to be carried out on an even larger scale: 
 [T]he money which would have to be spent on a staff to keep control of the registering, 
the photographing, and the answering of letters would use up a large sum of money 
which could be employed for the upkeep of many orphans.  For instance, if only one 
letter from each of the 4,000 children was written and posted at ordinary mailing rates the 
postage cost would be Ch.$1,000.00.  A lot of orphans can be kept for 
Ch.$1,000.00.  Then would come the cost of overhead, and what is more frightening is 
the fact that when one year is up if ‘adopters’ did not continue, the whole of that 
registration would have to be scrapped.211 
 
The necessity of translation was yet another labor-intensive task for the NARC’s overworked 
staff: “You probably know that none of these little children can read or write English…So, you 
can understand the difficulties that would be entailed in an endeavor to translate letters from 
these little ones.”212 
 In order to reign in the rapidly ballooning overhead costs of the adoption program, in 
1940 the NARC began informing new donors that they could only provide photographs of 
“adopted” children and could no longer facilitate the exchange of letters.  For example, on March 
5, 1940, the NARC wrote to the Central Committee for Relief of the Civilian Population of 
China in Amsterdam: “We are very sorry but only the photo can be given; no exchange of 
letters.  This is because of the enormous staff necessitated to carry such on, and the expense of 
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postage, etc. involved. Instead, every cent must be spent on the children themselves.”213  A 
month later the NARC wrote similarly to Wang Sheng-chih of the Oversea-Chinese Banking 
Corporation who was helping to coordinate the adoption program in Singapore:   
It has been found quite impossible with our many scattered warphanages and frequently 
disrupted communications due to the war, and without a special staff to attend to all the 
translations—to say nothing of postal costs—to carry on correspondence between 
adopters and children, and to send reports of school grades.214 
 
The costs of carrying out the adoption program were beginning to outweigh its benefits, and the 
NARC hoped that people would continue to make annual contributions even without the 
opportunity to correspond with their “adoptees.” 
However, having previously dangled the promise of personal connection with an adopted 
Chinese child, the NARC found it difficult to continue to attract sponsors without facilitating at 
least some correspondence.  W.E. Barnard replied to Madame Chiang’s concerns proposing a 
compromise solution in which the New Zealand Council would not encourage correspondence 
with Chinese warphans, but if people took the initiative to write their adoptees, the NARC would 
ensure they received a response.215  Perhaps reluctantly, the NARC agreed to make a “special 
exception” and ensure that sponsors in New Zealand who wrote their adopted children would 
continue to receive replies.216  The persistence of correspondence between New Zealanders and 
Chinese warphans, dutifully translated by the NARC, shows that they generally honored this 
agreement.  Just two days after the NARC had informed a group in Amsterdam that there could 
be no correspondence with adopted children, it wrote to a New Zealand woman to assure her that 
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“the annual letter from the ‘adopter’ and the child will gladly be translated at Headquarters.”217  
In fact, archival records show that the agreement reached between the NARC and the New 
Zealand Council was not such a “special” exception after all.  Letters exchanged between 
Chinese warphans and sponsors in the United States can also be found from well after the NARC 
announced it would no longer facilitate correspondence as part of its adoption program.  The 
NARC’s inability to sustain international donations without providing for the exchange of letters 
suggests the power of forging personal connections between the givers and receivers of 
humanitarian aid as a fundraising tool.  However, Madame Chiang Kai-shek and the NARC also 
had additional reasons for continuing to facilitate correspondence between Chinese children and 
their foreign foster parents in places like New Zealand and the United States. 
 
Intimate Diplomacy  
 
 During the nearly four-and-a-half years that elapsed between the outbreak of full-scale 
war between China and Japan in July 1937 and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 
1941, China fought the powerful Japanese military virtually alone.  In this context, attracting 
international support for the war effort was the Nationalist government’s most pressing foreign 
policy objective.  While Japanese atrocities received significant coverage in the international 
press, the adoption program made the Japanese occupation personal for foreign sponsors who 
received letters from their own “adopted” children describing how they had suffered at the hands 
of the Japanese.  It offered an opportunity to circulate intimate narratives of Japanese cruelty to 
private citizens across the world—who, the NARC hoped, might in turn pressure their 
governments to provide greater aid to China in its struggle against Japan.  
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 Virtually all of the children in the NARC’s adoption program had been rendered 
homeless by war, and their letters often narrated their personal experiences of violence and 
dislocation for their foreign sponsors.  On May 27, 1941, a girl named Han at the Sichuan 
Branch No. 7 Warphanage wrote to her foster mother Karen in New Zealand:  
Ah! I think about my home, which is still being trampled by the enemy in a city in the 
occupied area.  The scent of the fields and gardens in my lovely hometown has now been 
replaced by the stench of the smoke and fire of war, suffocating the innocent people.  I 
think even more about my dear mother and my younger brothers and sisters, who must 
bow their heads and endure the life of a slave, living amongst those who don’t treat 
people as people.  Every day they see the ferocious faces and vicious eyes of those 
animals and hear their murderous screams.  Their lives have no freedom.  How painful!  
Such unreasonable oppression…I hate the Japanese bandits.218 
 
Other letters contributed to the international prestige of Madame Chiang and the Nationalist 
Party by emphasizing her personal role in rescuing children from the Japanese invaders.  A boy 
named Cheng Zur wrote to his foster mother Katherine: 
Because the enemy occupied our native home, I had to leave my family.  But friend, my 
luck is not so bad!  Do you know that in China we have a great mother, Madame Chiang?  
She established many warphanages to take in child refugees.  I was sent to the No. 2 
Warphanage where I have the opportunity to attend school.219 
 
And in fact many sponsors appear to have been inspired to contribute to the adoption program by 
the heroic image of Madame Chiang Kai-shek as the great “mother” of all China’s warphans.  A 
woman named Kate from Wellington, New Zealand wrote to her adopted son that she was 
adopting him through “that wonderful scheme where you are now cared for through the kindness 
+ generosity of those great + noble people the Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek + Madame.”220  
Children’s letters offered a unique opportunity for the NARC to simultaneously expose Japanese 
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atrocities and bolster the reputation of Madame and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek before a 
wide international audience. 
 While many children’s letters employed a simple narrative structure of tragedy at the 
hands of the Japanese and redemption through the NARC, others adopted a more explicitly 
political tone in denouncing Japanese brutality.  For example, in December 1939, the children of 
Class A at the Kemper Hall Boarding School for Girls in Kenosha, Wisconsin raised funds to 
adopt seven children through the NARC’s adoption program.221  The letters they received from 
their sponsored children—most of whom were about 12 years old and in the more advanced 
grades at NARC warphanages—are striking for the highly polemical tone with which they 
describe China’s War of Resistance against Japan.222  A sixth-grade boy named Chung-ya wrote:  
Rather than suffer oppression under the iron hoof of the Japanese bandits, we children 
would rather roam about the interior, enduring untold hardships.  Fortunately, through the 
great benevolence of Madame Chiang Kai-shek, we were rescued from our hopeless 
plight and brought to the interior where we live a fine life and receive a good 
education.  It can truly be said that we have been resurrected from death and given new 
life.223 
 
Fifth-grader Chiu-fang concluded his letter as follows, “The only way we can repay your 
kindness is to study hard so that in the future we can overthrow Japanese imperialism!”224  Such 
letters reframed the adoption program not simply as humanitarian aid to needy children but as a 
political statement in support of China in its War of Resistance Against Japan. 
 While letters that children sent through the adoption program often only reached their 
individual sponsors, the NARC also utilized other types of publicity materials to cultivate 
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political support for China’s war effort on a broader scale.  For example, the NARC asked one 
warphan to write a message to the “children of America” for a United China Relief radio 
program to be aired in New York on June 6, 1941.  Much like the individual letters children sent 
to their foster parents, this message to the children of America combined harrowing accounts of 
child suffering with gratefulness for the work of Madame Chiang and the NARC:  
We are a group of more than 20,000 children from all of the occupied parts of China 
raining down with artillery fire…Although we have met with the cruel tragedies of 
broken homes, dead family members, and wandering about as refugees, now we have 
made it to the interior, where we rely on Father Chiang (Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek), 
Mother Chiang (Madame Chiang Song Meiling), the NARC leaders, and all the 
warphanage superintendents and teachers, to take us in and provide us with a good 
education.  Because of this, we are still able to grow up healthy and strong beneath the 
bombings of enemy planes.  This is so lucky!225 
 
In the letters she wrote to promote the adoption program among prominent individuals and 
charitable organizations abroad, Madame Chiang also took the opportunity to recount examples 
of Japanese barbarism that she felt received insufficient international attention.  In a December 
1938 letter to Madame C.T. Loo of the Comité de Secours in Paris, Madame Chiang noted, 
“Everywhere we have been Japanese bombers have been active destroying villages, towns, and 
cities.  The utter ruthlessness is indescribable.  They report all the time their aerial ravages, but 
the press of the world seems to have become blasé, or, for some reason, do not now publish what 
is going on.”226  In letters to the New Zealand Council for the Adoption of Chinese Refugee 
Children, Madame Chiang wrote as if providing them with talking points to criticize neutrality in 
the Sino-Japanese War:   
We are fighting not only for our own salvation but also for all those principles which the 
democratic governments espouse.  Sad it is to say, however, that the democratic 
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governments show no disposition to help China materially, not even to uphold the 
principles of the League of Nations which the democracies profess to maintain.227 
 
These materials were often effective in convincing both powerful politicians and ordinary 
citizens of the need to provide greater assistance to China.  W.E. Barnard, the Speaker of the 
New Zealand House of Representatives, responded to one of Madame Chiang’s letters to admit:  
In reference to the latter parts of your letter, I wish to say (unofficially) that I appreciate 
the painful truth of your observations.  China is indeed fighting a battle not merely for her 
own preservation but for the democracies of the world.  I sincerely trust that your nation 
will not be left to struggle on without the aid which you so badly need and to which you 
are justly entitled.  One generous New Zealand contributor wrote, somewhat crudely but 
with truth, that ‘China is saving our skins.’228 
 
In a letter to the NARC enclosing money for the adoption of one warphan, the organizing 
secretary of the Texas State Committee of the Church Committee for China Relief, wrote, “I 
hope and pray I may be of more and more help to you and China.  We feel very proud and 
hopeful of dear China.  We must win grandly.  We shall.”229 
By fostering intimate relationships between the Chinese children who received aid and 
the foreign sponsors who provided it, the NARC’s adoption program transformed the political 
possibilities of humanitarian aid.  The letters that children wrote to their foreign foster parents 
offered intimate narratives of Japanese brutality, Chinese heroism, and international apathy.  For 
the NARC and the Nationalist Party, the adoption program was not only a means of securing 
humanitarian aid but also a new form of intimate diplomacy through which it could build 
international support for its war effort.  The Nationalist-affiliated NARC was among the first 
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organizations to fully appreciate how the adoption program enabled the recipients of 
humanitarian aid to shape its political uses.  They would not be the last. 
 
Conclusion 
 Through the NARC’s program for the “adoption of warphans by foreign nationals,” 
thousands of people across much of the world “adopted” Chinese children with whom they built 
personal relationships through the exchange of photographs, gifts, and translated letters.  
Through widespread publicity campaigns initiated by overseas Chinese diplomats and 
philanthropists, the NARC’s adoption program enabled sponsors to envision transnational 
adoptive families consisting of white, middle-class parents and orphaned Asian children.  Nearly 
two decades before systematic legal international adoption began in Korea, the NARC’s 
adoption program had already popularized the idea of adopting Asian children as a form of 
humanitarian rescue.  Anticipating these developments, donors sometimes wrote to the NARC 
hoping to legally adopt the children they sponsored into their homes.  In 1938, a woman named 
Sophie in London, who was already sponsoring twelve children though the NARC, offered to 
adopt four children (“two boys and two girls, under the age of five”) whom she promised to 
support and educate at her own expense if their transport to England could be arranged.230  Such 
offers were common enough that the NARC felt compelled to specify in its regulations for the 
adoption program: “The Adopters are to be thanked for their financial support only.  Adoptees 
cannot be taken away from the Society and shall remain in the charge of the Society.”231 
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Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and the outbreak of the Pacific War on December 7, 1941 
only exacerbated the logistical difficulties and high overhead costs of the adoption program, 
finally rendering it impossible to sustain.  In an April 1943 letter to a donor in California, the 
NARC explained the multitude of factors forcing it to discontinue its adoption program in 1942:  
Films for picture taking are now unobtainable, war prices for the support of the warphans 
so high, and office staff already so overworked that our ‘adoption’ system has since last 
year been forced to cease.  We would like to have continued—but for the sake of the 
children decided that every cent must instead go to the feeding of them.  When we started 
our warphan work, US$20 was sufficient to support a child for a year; now over US$200 
is necessary!—to say nothing of other difficulties.  Hence I must reply that we could not 
do as before; we could not send photos or assign individual children…232 
 
Yet while NARC’s adoption program was forced to close prematurely, the intimate turn in global 
humanitarian practice that it set into motion was just beginning.  Coincidentally, at around the 
same time that the NARC decided to stop its adoption program, an American organization 
named China’s Children Fund decided to start fundraising for its orphanages in China via its 
own version of the adoption scheme.  China’s Children Fund would dramatically expand the use 
of the adoption model of international child sponsorship—first in China and eventually across 
Asia.  In doing so, it would transform the practices of global intimacy that first took shape in 
WWII China into central features of the post-WWII global humanitarian order. 
 
  
                                                









The Reverend Dr. J. Calvitt Clarke had a secret.  By day, Clarke was the founder and 
executive chairman of the China’s Children’s Fund (meihua ertong fulihui美華兒童福利會; 
“CCF”).  Founded in Richmond, Virginia, in 1938 to provide emergency relief to Chinese 
children displaced by the Sino-Japanese War, the CCF quickly became one of the most 
significant humanitarian organizations working in China.  The CCF fundraised for orphanage-
schools throughout China via its own version of the “adoption plan” for international child 
sponsorship.  By 1949, the CCF’s adoption plan supported approximately 5,113 children in 42 
institutions across China.233  During the 1950s, the CCF expanded the adoption plan across East 
Asia and much of the world, and by 1961 it supported 36,000 children in 50 different 
countries.234  Now called ChildFund International, the organization Clarke founded remains one 
of the largest child sponsorship agencies in the world today—making Clarke, in the judgment of 
one biographer, “one of the twentieth century’s foremost and beloved figures in philanthropy.”235  
But unbeknownst to all but a few of his closest confidantes, Clarke also moonlighted as a prolific 
author of racy romance novels under the secret penname Richard Grant.  His many books 
included titles such as Office Wife (“Her boss believed in taking liberties!”), Man Bait (“She 
bartered love for vengeance!”), and Eurasian Girl (“Her blood ran hot with mingled fires!”).236  
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While Clarke’s novels were primarily intended to sell copies by titillating readers, they also 
provide insight into the particular mixture of humanitarianism, Christianity, and Orientalism 
animating his career in transnational philanthropy. 
 From the perspective of his work with CCF, the most interesting of Clarke’s novels was 
his 1935 book Eurasian Girl.  The titular character, Selene Ramsey (“She combined the exotic 
lure of an oriental geisha girl with the lovely, long-limbed appeal of an American debutante!”), 
had been raised in Singapore by white American parents before her family moved back to their 
home on Long Island.  When Selene is made to believe that she is the illegitimate daughter of a 
Chinese prostitute, she becomes deeply depressed and loses her self-respect.  While Selene had 
always rebuffed her many male suitors to save herself for marriage, upon learning that she is 
“Eurasian,” she comes to believe that submitting to the sexual advances of unserious men is the 
closest thing to love to which she has a right.   “I am only a Eurasian girl,” Selene thinks to 
herself.  “I’ll take the crumbs that are left for me in love.”237  The novel’s happy ending comes 
when Selene finds out that in fact she had been adopted by her uncle when her biological father 
(a white American) and his Chinese wife tragically passed away.  Secure in the knowledge that 
her Chinese mother was a “most cultured” Christian woman, Selene eventually marries a white 
American man who had also grown up in Singapore as the child of missionaries.238 
 Eurasian Girl encapsulates a contradictory mixture of racial, sexual, and political 
ideologies.  On its surface, the novel offers an anti-racist message that reaffirms the possibility of 
love across racial boundaries.  “You listen to me,” Selene’s adoptive father says in the novel’s 
climactic scene.  “Yellow, red, white, black—or green, for that matter—these hues make no 
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difference.  They are skin deep.  The blood underneath is always red!”  The novel even endorses 
a eugenic argument in favor of racial mixing: “Every scientist knows that the hybrid is the 
stronger breed.”239  Nevertheless, Eurasian Girl exhibits a profound uneasiness about the 
presence of sexualized Asian bodies in white American society.  The entire plot depends upon 
the hypersexualization of Asian women, and Selene’s very existence poses a threat to social 
order.   As one male suitor tells her, “You could make any man unfaithful to his spouse I 
believe.”240  At the same time, the novel also expresses an American moral responsibility to 
Asia—and to Asian children in particular.  It is the American couple that adopts Selene, an 
orphaned Chinese girl, and raises her as their own that serve as the novel’s moral compass. 
The tension in Eurasian Girl between the sexually tinged fear of Asian migration and 
American moral responsibility to Asia highlights a paradox of U.S.-East Asia relations at the 
dawn of WWII.   When Clarke published Eurasian Girl in 1935, exclusion laws still prohibited 
the vast majority of Asian migration to the United States, and 15 U.S. states had anti-
miscegenation laws prohibiting marriage between whites and Asians.241  At the same time, many 
Americans continued to feel a moral responsibility to China rooted in the two nations’ supposed 
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“special relationship.”242  Granted extraterritorial privileges and the right to proselytize 
throughout China by the unequal treaties signed in the aftermath of the Opium Wars, thousands 
of American missionaries had traveled to China to build orphanages, schools, and hospitals.  
Although almost always discussed separately by historians—exclusion falling under the purview 
of American history and extraterritoriality under the purview of Chinese history—exclusion and 
extraterritoriality worked as a single regime to structure the field of possible relationships 
between Chinese and Americans.  Allowing American money, missionaries, and military 
personnel into China while excluding Chinese migrants from the United States, the regime of 
exclusion and extraterritoriality functioned as the legal architecture enabling Americans to 
“help” China while keeping actual Chinese people at bay.   
The CCF’s adoption plan—which enabled individual Americans to form intimate ties 
with Chinese children without bringing them to the United States—was a form of humanitarian 
rescue tailor-made for this particular moment in U.S.-China relations.  Like Selene’s parents in 
Eurasian Girl, ordinary Americans could rescue Chinese orphans through “adoption.”  But 
unlike in the novel, they could do so without provoking the racial and sexual anxieties raised by 
the prospect of Asian bodies on American soil. 
This chapter uses the case study of China’s Children Fund to examine how the practices 
of global intimacy developed in China during WWII became defining features of 
humanitarianism in East Asia during the postwar period.  During the war, the NARC had 
pioneered the adoption plan as a popular but shortlived program for emergency child rescue 
work in China (Chapter One).  In the postwar period, the CCF built the adoption plan into one of 
the largest and most culturally significant humanitarian programs across East Asia and much of 
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to China: A History of Sino-American Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 115-147. 
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the world.243  Moreover, as the CCF expanded to new locations such as Japan and Korea during 
the 1950s, it also played a crucial role in facilitating the first systematic programs for legal 
international adoption.  By the end of the decade, the CCF ranked among the United States’ 
largest private voluntary organizations by total revenue—and other “adoption plan” agencies 
were not far behind.244    
Historians of the United States who have studied international adoption and child 
sponsorship in East Asia have conceptualized these programs as forms of “Cold War 
Orientalism” and “Christian Americanism.”245  While these terms are helpful for explaining 
American interest in international adoption and child sponsorship, they say less about how these 
programs were actually implemented on the ground in East Asia.  In contrast, this chapter 
combines an analysis of how the CCF’s Richmond headquarters attracted American donors with 
an investigation into how its offices in China, Japan, and Korea built the capacity to facilitate the 
adoption plan and international adoption on an unprecedented scale.  I argue that the CCF built 
the adoption plan and international adoption into prominent humanitarian programs in post-
WWII East Asia by engaging in the unabashed commodification of children.  In the United 
States, the CCF created “demand” for the adoption plan by appealing to the intertwined 
                                                
243 On the CCF’s activities in South China in the post-WWII period, see Zhu Aiqin [朱愛芹], Meihua ertong fulihui 
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imperatives of universal Christian love, American moral responsibility to Asia, and the 
fulfillment of maternal desire.  It marketed the adoption plan as an ideal way for ordinary 
Americans to participate in molding the next generation of a Christian, democratic, and 
American-allied East Asia—without the prospect of mass Asian migration to the United States.  
However, the CCF’s fundraising success in turn required that its China office in Guangzhou 
generate the requisite “supply” of children through the mass production of high-quality 
photographs, detailed case files, and substantive letters.  In order to facilitate personal 
relationships between Americans and Chinese children on such a large scale, the CCF needed to 
translate the adoption plan into standardized documents and routinized administrative 
procedures, a paradoxical phenomenon I call the “bureaucracy of global intimacy.”  This 
simultaneous personalization and standardization of humanitarian rescue continues to shape the 
practice of humanitarianism today. 
 
“A Barbershop in Chambersburg”: The CCF Origins Story 
 The CCF’s accounts of its own early history emphasize two facets: the individual 
heroism of its North American male founders and its claim to have “invented” the concept of 
child sponsorship.  According to institutional lore, J. Calvitt Clarke was inspired to create the 
CCF one afternoon in the summer of 1938 when he was chatting with an old friend and fellow 
aid worker named Stewart Nagle in a barbershop in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.  Their 
conversation turned to the suffering children in China, and Nagle offered Clarke the following 
challenge: “Why don’t you do something about it?”246  Clarke squared his jaw and replied, “All 
                                                
246 Versions of this story were often repeated in CCF’s own internal histories.  See for example, Edmund Janss, 
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Enemies of America Abroad (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1961), 27-28; John C. Caldwell, Children of 
Calamity (New York: The John Day Company, 1957), 32-33. 
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right, I will.”  And just like that, the CCF was incorporated in Richmond, Virginia on October 6, 
1938, and Clarke was elected Executive Secretary.247  Prominent in accounts of the CCF’s early 
days in wartime China are the derring-do tales of Verent Mills, a Canadian missionary who 
became the CCF’s Overseas Director in China, and Erwin Raetz, the CCF’s General 
Superintendent of Orphanages in China.  When Japanese advances threatened an orphanage in 
Taishan, Mills evacuated a group of 142 children, leading them on a months-long trek that 
covered hundreds of miles before delivering them safely to the CCF-funded Pu Kong Orphanage 
in Shaozhou, Guangdong.248  Not to be outdone, when Raetz was travelling to China in early 
1945 his ship was sunk by a submarine in the Indian Ocean, and he narrowly escaped by diving 
into one of the few remaining lifeboats just as it was being lowered down to sea.249  These heroic 
tales, which have been repeated in CCF publicity materials for decades, were also emphasized in 
its Chinese-language promotional materials.250  
 The CCF’s historical accounts also sometimes claim that Calvitt Clarke invented the 
adoption plan as a humanitarian fundraising strategy.  ChildFund’s website lists “the sponsorship 
model” as one its “innovations” and states that Clarke “started the ‘child sponsorship’ concept 
                                                
247 “Minutes of First Meeting of Executive Committee of China’s Children Fund, Incorporated,” Dec. 9, 1938, Box 
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we know today.”251  However, the first reference to the adoption plan in the CCF’s archival 
records appears in April 1941, when the CCF agreed to send funds to the National Child Welfare 
Association of China to support 120 “adoptions.”252  At a meeting of the Executive Committee in 
July, Clarke argued for continuing to use the “adoption plan” for CCF fundraising, and by 
January 1942 the executive office had become “a clearing house for all of the mail going both 
ways.”253  Especially considering the strikingly similar language of their advertisements, it seems 
improbable that the CCF would have been unaware of the “adoption program” the NARC had 
been using to fundraise in the United States and elsewhere since 1938. 
 What is most significant about the CCF’s origins story is not what it embellishes but what 
it omits.  While the CCF’s historical literature focuses on the high drama of the wartime period, 
it was not until after Japan’s surrender in August 1945 that the CCF’s adoption plan exploded in 
popularity.  In the first year after the end of the war, the CCF’s contributions to China more than 
doubled, from US $128,607 in 1944-1945 to US $372,217 in 1945-1946.254  This is even more 
remarkable considering the precipitous drop in overall humanitarian giving the accompanied that 
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end of WWII.255  It was neither the creative genius of Clarke (the adoption plan had already been 
used in China for several years) nor the heroic exploits of Mills and Raetz (brave as they may 
have been) that explain the extraordinary popularity of CCF’s adoption plan in the postwar 
period.  Rather, it was through the much more mundane labor of redesigning publicity materials 
to appeal to American sponsors and building a transnational bureaucracy capable of processing 
massive quantities of paperwork that the CCF helped transform the adoption plan into one of the 
most prominent humanitarian programs in East Asia. 
 
The CCF and Global Christianity 
The rise of the adoption plan as one of the most prominent and successful forms of 
humanitarian fundraising in the post-WWII period emerged out of broader changes within the 
project of global Christianity.  As Christian missionaries expanded their global reach during the 
early twentieth century, China emerged as one of their most significant destinations.  At its peak 
during the 1920s, there were approximately 8,000 Protestant missionaries working in China, 
making it the largest Protestant missionary field in the world.256  Although the number of 
missionaries in China dwindled over the ensuing decades, about 4,000 Protestant missionaries 
remained in China on the eve of the Chinese Communist Revolution in the late 1940s.257   
The history of the global missionary movement during the first half of the twentieth 
century was marked by two dominant patterns: indigenization and secularization.  In the 
aftermath of WWI, Western missionaries around the world entered a period of profound self-
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105 
 
reflection in which they questioned their connections to imperialism and colonialism and began 
advocating for adapting Christianity to local cultural practices.258  In China, this position was 
forcefully argued by the prominent American Protestant missionary Frank Rawlinson, whose 
1925 book, The Naturalization of Christianity in China, called for “synthesizing” Christianity 
and Chinese religious practices.259  Although the extent to which Christian missionaries actually 
implemented such changes was uneven at best, the idea of indigenization gained widespread 
currency as the best path toward building Christianity in China and elsewhere.260  Influenced by 
the social gospel movement prominent within American Protestantism, missionaries also 
expanded the scope of their activities to include social welfare and philanthropic work such as 
building schools, hospitals, and orphanages.  Among the most famous missionaries in the world, 
the China-born Pearl Buck strongly articulated the social gospel critique of the missionary 
movement in a well-publicized 1932 speech titled “Is There a Case for Foreign Missions?”  Buck 
concluded her controversial speech: 
Above all, then, let the spirit of Christ be manifested by mode of life rather than by 
preaching.  I am wearied unto death with this preaching.  It deadens all thought, it 
confuses all issues, it is producing, in China at least, a horde of hypocrites, and in the 
theological seminaries a body of Chinese ministers which makes one despair for the 
future, because they are learning how to preach about Christianity rather than how to live 
the Christian life.  Let us cease our talk for a time and cut off our talkers, and let us try to 
express our religion in terms of life.261 
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Buck’s criticism of missionaries who arrogantly preached the gospel of Jesus Christ but failed to 
embody the Christian value of selfless service exemplified the increasingly liberal, modernist 
outlook of ecumenical Protestantism during this period.262 
 Both of these trends—indigenization and secularization—shaped the CCF’s work in 
China during the post-WWII period.  Founded by a Presbyterian minister, featuring longtime 
missionaries as the superintendents of many of its orphanages, and yet dedicated to the secular 
task of child welfare, the CCF was emblematic of the broader turn from proselytizing to social 
welfare work.  The CCF also strongly emphasized indigenization to promote its work in China.  
Among the many dedications (ti ci 題詞) published in the CCF’s Chinese-language magazine 
Blessed Children (Fu’er 福兒) were classical Confucian phrases such as “benevolence toward 
children” (ci you 慈幼), “treat all children as one’s own” (bu du zi qi zi不獨子其子) and “the 
young have the means to grow” (you you suo zhang 幼有所長).  By interspersing such phrases 
among the magazine’s many articles on Christianity, the CCF linked its Christian humanitarian 
program to traditional Confucian ideas about societal obligations to children.  The CCF’s 
commitment to indigenization was also reflected in the incorporation of elements of traditional 
Chinese familial practice into life at CCF-supported orphanages.  For example, the Morning Star 
Orphanage in Guangzhou published its own “family precepts” (jia xun 家訓)—a traditional 
genre of Chinese literature in which the patriarch of a family wrote moral exhortations for 
younger generations.263  As Clarke told the assembled children during a 1946 speech at the 
Morning Star Orphanage, “The reason China’s Children Fund is now helping you is not at all so 
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that you will learn to become Americans, but rather so that you will learn to become good 
Chinese people.”264   
 
“The Most Economical and Efficient Investment a Christian Can Make” 
 While the CCF’s Christian humanitarian program was influenced by decades-long trends 
toward indigenization and secularization, its adoption plan also offered a new vision of global 
Christianity rooted in direct, personal bonds between ordinary American Christians and the 
children of the non-Christian world.  Rather than evangelize through traditional missionary work, 
the adoption plan incorporated everyday Americans into the project of Christianizing China by 
allowing them to serve as foster parents to individual Chinese children who would feel 
themselves a part of Christian families.  In its fundraising materials, the CCF explicitly promoted 
the adoption plan as a new means of spreading Christianity.  As one typical CCF advertisement 
stated, “As the contributor receives school reports, letters and perhaps occasionally an example 
of the child’s school work, he gets to know the child and through exchange of letters can assist 
the child in Christian living.”265  CCF publicity materials also frequently noted that it required all 
of the orphanage-schools it supported to offer Christian instruction to the children.266  Therefore, 
the CCF argued, its adoption plan was the most effective way to spread Christianity in China: 
Emphasis needs to be given, however, to the most effective method of bringing Christian 
ideals to China.  In the orphanage schools of CCF children today are being taught by 
word and by example the Christian way of life.  During their plastic years these children 
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are learning Christianity at its best.  The future pillars of the native Christian churches of 
China are securing their instruction and inspiration in CCF orphanages.  The most 
effective evangelism of China is the nurture of her children in the Christian faith.  Dollar 
for dollar the investment in a child’s life is the most economical and efficient investment 
a Christian can make.267 
 
Despite its Christian character, the CCF encountered resistance from conservative 
missionary circles.  The Foreign Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Convention was among 
the CCF’s harshest critics.  Especially because the CCF operated out of the Southern Baptist 
stronghold of Richmond, the Foreign Mission Board feared that its fundraising would “drain” 
money and resources from the fundamental task of proselytizing.  On February 20, 1939, Charles 
E. Maddry, the Executive Secretary of the Foreign Mission Board, wrote to J.R. Saunders, a 
Southern Baptist missionary and the superintendent of the CCF-supported Pu Kong Orphanage: 
“I fear that this gentleman [Clarke] working in Richmond in the Child Relief Work for China is 
going to stir up trouble throughout the South…I do wish so much that everybody would stick to 
their knitting and that all Baptists would stick to our plan of work and send the money through 
our regular channels.”268  Several months later, Maddry wrote to Saunders again to reproach him 
directly for his involvement with the CCF: 
This committee, working out of Richmond, is using your name and, according to your 
own letter here, you encouraged them in setting up this organization…I am sorry that you 
gave them the least bit of encouragement…If our missionaries, supported by this Board 
through all the years, would give themselves wholeheartedly to the program of Southern 
Baptists, without setting up these independent organizations that drain off the funds that 
ought to go through our regular channels, I think we would get a great deal further with 
our missionary program in China.269   
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By the 1940s, Maddry had gone public with his crusade against the CCF.  For example, in April 
1944 he published an article in the Baptist Record noting that the CCF did not have “the consent 
or the approval” of the Foreign Mission Board.270 
 In response, Saunders and the CCF developed explicitly religious justifications for the 
adoption plan.  Responding to Maddry, Saunders focused on the opportunity to convert and 
baptize children, noting that “about half” of the baptisms he had recently performed were of 
children at the CCF’s Pu Kong Orphanage.  Saunders further argued that raising children at CCF 
orphanages provided an opportunity to train future leaders of the native church: 
“More results come to our church at Shiu Chow in a religious way from our Orphanage 
than all the other work that we do there including…the evangelistic work.  I think in this 
great family of little children whose tender lives are wholly in our hands year by year we 
have the greatest opportunity to do a great work for Jesus Christ than we have in any 
other kind of work that we are doing at Shiu Chow.271  
 
At least tactically conceding the Foreign Mission Board’s argument that conversion was the 
ultimate end of Christian work in China, Saunders contended that the CCF’s adoption plan was 
more effective than traditional proselytizing in achieving this goal.  Saunders also frequently 
deployed biblical passages that he interpreted as proving “the fundamental emphasis God’s word 
places on children.”272  Among his favorites was Matthew 25:45: “Inasmuch as ye did it not to 
one of the least of these, ye did it not to me.”  For Saunders and the CCF, Chinese orphans stood 
in for “the least of these”—the most pitiful and helpless members of world society.  The best 
measure of the progress of world Christianity was, therefore, the extent to which Christians 
extended material and spiritual help to these “least” members of the global community.  
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The Adoption Plan as Bo’ai 
 In addition to promoting the adoption plan to American donors as a way to participate 
directly in spreading Christianity in China, the CCF also sought to teach Chinese children to 
understand the adoption plan as part of a global Christian movement.  In particular, the CCF used 
the traditional concept of Christian love—translated into Chinese using the classical phrase bo’ai 
博愛 (literally, “universal love”)—to explain the very untraditional practice of forging familial 
ties across national boundaries.  In official government documents, CCF-supported orphanages 
often defined their institutional mission as “spreading Jesus’s spirit of bo’ai among children.”273  
Moreover, through its Chinese-language children’s magazine Blessed Children, the CCF taught 
children that bo’ai was the core principle of Christianity.  For example, one August 1947 article 
titled “Jesus’s Bo’ai” explained, “If we want to know Jesus, we must first understand Jesus’s 
bo’ai.”274  In May 1948, the Pu Kong Orphanage held a speech competition in which the first-
prize winner, a middle-school student named Haoxin, spoke on the topic of “Jesus Christ’s Spirit 
of Bo’ai.”275  For Haoxin, bo’ai referred specifically to humanitarian love that crossed national 
boundaries.  He recounted the story of Jesus offering help to “the Samaritan woman from a 
different country” as evidence that the spirit of Christian love meant providing aid across 
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national boundaries.276  Haoxin’s speech suggests the extent to which the CCF trained children to 
understand the help provided to them by foreign sponsors as an expression of Christian love.  
 Reflecting the Christian education provided at CCF orphanages, the language of Christian 
love also infused the letters that children wrote to their foster parents.  For instance, Ting Sun 
wrote to his sponsor: 
Through we are far away from each other, I feel we meet each other when your letter 
come.  I always think of you because you are loving me.  How can I repay you?  I must 
pray that God will help me do…Over 60 of our Home-mates have been baptized.  I am 
one of them.  I am very happy to be a Christian.  Your supporting me is the special 
kindness of God.277 
 
Ting Sun’s letter explicitly connects his sponsor’s love to his own conversion to Christianity.  
Quoted in CCF publicity materials, it served as evidence that by building close relationships with 
Chinese children through the adoption plan, American foster parents were helping to build a 
Christian China.  Likewise, in February 1949 a girl named Chau Ho at the Kiu Kong orphanage 
wrote to her sponsor: 
I remember two weeks before Christmas a classmate received from her foster mother a 
very loveable doll.  I thought to myself, how nice it would be if I were to have one like it.  
But who would have thought that I should receive one from you so very similar.  I also 
received your letter, and the other things with the doll—a lovely pair of sleeping pyjamas, 
several small dresses.  Thanks to God for His love which has given to me your loving 
heart and let me have these lovely things.278 
 
Chau Ho’s letter frames her sponsor’s love as a manifestation of God’s love.  Nevertheless, 
recalling the familiar stereotype of “rice Christians” who professed to believe in Christianity to 
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obtain material benefits, she ultimately sees both God’s and her sponsor’s love as manifest in the 
“lovely” gifts she has received. 
 
 
Figure 2.1.  Hand-colored Christmas card from the CCF-supported Rennie’s Mill Camp in Hong 
Kong.  Christmas cards were a regular feature of the adoption plan at CCF orphanages, where 
Christianity was a mandatory part of children’s education. J. Calvitt Clarke Box 2, CCF. 
 
To be sure, the CCF did not introduce the notion of bo’ai as Christian love into China.  In 
fact, the idea of Christian love—long translated as bo’ai—had emerged during the Republican 
period as one of the most broadly resonating aspects of Christian doctrine in China.  As unlikely 
a figure as Chen Duxiu, one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party, had strongly 
endorsed the concept of bo’ai as one of the most important things Chinese people could learn 
from Christianity.  In his 1920 essay “Christianity and the Chinese People,” Chen wrote, “The 
root teachings of Christianity are only faith and love; the others are just leaves and twigs.”  
Crucially, Chen believed that equality was key to the idea of Christian love, which he sometimes 
referred to as “the equal spirit of bo’ai” (平等的博愛精神).   If Christ loved all of humanity, 
then all of humanity was equal under Christ’s love.  Or as Chen put it, paraphrasing Genesis, 
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“All humanity are brothers” (人與人是兄弟).279  In light of Chen Duxiu’s emphasis on bo’ai as 
a relationship of equality, the hierarchal dimensions of the CCF’s reinvention of bo’ai through 
the adoption plan are all the clearer.  For Chen Duxiu, the proper familial metaphor for Christian 
love was brotherhood.  For the CCF, Christian love was expressed through the paternalistic 
relationship of “adoption”—in which American Christians were the “parents” and Chinese 
Christians their adopted children.  It was through this deeply paternalistic recasting of universal 
love that the CCF’s goal of spreading Christianity melded with its aim of projecting American 
international influence in the post-WWII period. 
 
“Un-ugly Americans” 
 For the CCF, the mission of spreading Christianity was so closely related to the goal of 
promoting American influence in China that the two projects were often indistinguishable.  In 
CCF publicity materials, the terms “Christianity,” “democracy,” and “America” are deployed as 
interchangeable synonyms.  For example, one article in the CCF’s English-language newsletter 
China News explained,  
“No one can visit China today without being forcibly impressed with the number of 
leaders in that country who are Christians.  If that were not true, there would be far less 
hope of China’s survival on the side of democracy.  The churches of America have 
poured many millions into China…Even if we look at it from a purely selfish point of 
view, they have still been the best investment America has made in China.”280 
 
In this regard, the CCF’s religious-political appeals for the adoption plan constituted an early 
example of what Arissa Oh calls “Christian Americanism.”  Defined as “a fusion of vaguely 
Christian principles with values identified as exceptionally ‘American’…Christian Americanism 
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encapsulated the prevailing attitude that equated being a good Christian with being a good 
American.”281  To promote Christianity was also to promote democracy, and a Christian, 
democratic China was presumed to be in the “selfish” interest of the United States.   
During WWII, the NARC had utilized the adoption plan as part of an explicitly political 
program to attract international support for China’s war effort and enhance the prestige of the 
Nationalist Party abroad.  After WWII, the CCF began to consider how the adoption plan could 
also be used to promote American influence in China.  The CCF staunchly supported the 
Nationalist Party and believed that a Nationalist China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, 
who had been baptized as a Methodist in 1930, constituted the best hope for a Christian, 
democratic, and U.S.-friendly China.  But while the NARC had emphasized how the adoption 
plan could influence Americans’ views of China, the CCF placed much more emphasis on how 
American foster parents could influence their adopted Chinese children’s views of the United 
States.  In later decades, the CCF would begin referring to foster parents as “un-ugly Americans” 
engaged in a form of personal diplomacy to bolster the image of the United States abroad.282  By 
participating in the adoption plan, the CCF believed that these un-ugly Americans would not 
only demonstrate American benevolence and moral authority in China, they would also 
transform the United States into a place more worthy of emulation. 
The CCF’s publicity materials emphasized how its adoption plan fostered feelings of 
gratitude toward American sponsors, thereby helping to create a positive image of the United 
States as China’s liberator and benefactor.  In the fall of 1943, China News quoted T.S. Chen of 
China’s National Child Welfare Association—which supported more than 2,000 children 
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through the CCF’s adoption plan—as saying, “The influence of these ‘adoptions’ is deeply felt 
among our people.  They tackle Sino-American friendly relations at the core—namely, in the 
very hearts of friends far away, unseen but so real.”283  In the summer of 1945, China News 
published a lengthy article written by F.C. Liu, also of the National Child Welfare Association, 
in which he explained how the exchange of gifts and letters through the adoption plan had 
“warmed the hearts of China’s children toward America.”284  The CCF’s overtly political appeals 
in turn influenced how other transnational aid organizations promoted their work in China.  In 
1947, J.R. Saunders left CCF to found his own organization, the American-Oriental Friendship 
Association (zhongmei youyi xiehui 中美友誼協會; hereinafter “AOFA”), which also fundraised 
for orphanages in China via the adoption plan.  Saunders’ AOFA promoted its adoption plan in 
even more explicitly political terms.  For example, one April 1949 newsletter claimed, “It is far 
more profitable to spend a few millions building peace, cooperation, and love between the 
children and youth of the East and West than it is to spend billions on atomic bombs and battle-
ships.”285   
The CCF circulated examples of children’s letters as evidence of how the adoption plan 
helped spread American influence in China.  For example, in 1944 it published a letter from a 
boy named Min Kei to his foster mother Maggie in which he wrote, “My teacher told me that 
you wrote your letter to me on George Washington’s Birthday.  I know who he is.  I have heard 
stories about him.  In China, we also have a General Washington.  He is our Generalissimo!  He 
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is also as brave as your Washington.”286  Taking George Washington as a model against which to 
compare Chinese leaders, Min Kei’s letter suggested how the adoption plan encouraged Chinese 
children to see the United States as a model for China’s future.  The cumulative effect of all the 
personal relationships forged through the adoption plan, the CCF argued, would be a generation 
of Chinese children deeply grateful to the United States.  The CCF circulated one story about a 
Communist cadre who visited a CCF orphanage in Guangzhou to lecture the children about 
Russia’s help to the Chinese people.  But when the cadre asked the children which country had 
helped China the most, they nevertheless responded, “America!”287  
 
“All the Frustrated Motherhood Suddenly Released” 
 CCF built the adoption plan into one of the most successful humanitarian fundraising 
programs of the post-WWII period by connecting it to the wider projects of spreading 
Christianity and American influence abroad.  However, the CCF also tailored its publicity 
materials to appeal to more specific constituencies within American society.  Among the groups 
the CCF targeted in particular were childless women.  As Elaine Tyler May has argued, the 
cultural ascendancy of the nuclear family in the post-WWII period constituted a form of 
“domestic containment” in which the “traditional” family was imagined as a safe haven from 
anxieties about nuclear war and subversive social forces.288  In this context, “procreation took on 
almost mythic proportions” and childlessness came to be viewed as “deviant, selfish, and 
pitiable.”  For women in particular, “motherhood was the ultimate fulfillment of female sexuality 
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and the primary source of a woman’s identity.”289  However, this idealized version of family life 
was not attainable for all segments of society.290  As the postwar baby boom enhanced the social 
stigma of childlessness, infertile couples increasingly turned to adoption as a means of attaining 
the child-centered family ideal.  But the demand for healthy adoptable babies quickly 
overwhelmed the “supply.”  In 1955, Senator Estes Kefauver testified, “There has been a 
tremendous increase over the last 10 years in the demand for children for adoption.  As a result, 
the demand has far exceeded the number of babies available.”291  For the CCF, the pressure on 
women to perform the social role of motherhood constituted a distinct marketing opportunity. 
 The CCF often advertised its adoption plan as a way for childless women to experience 
the joys of motherhood.  In the fall of 1947, China News published a testimonial from a female 
doctor who praised the adoption plan for enabling “old maids” like herself to experience the joys 
of motherhood: 
I am surprised at the thrill I had when I said to my mother and my friends, “I have a son 
in China.”  All the frustrated motherhood suddenly released, did surprise even me—in 
spite of the hundreds of babies I have delivered.  It was so different to say “My son!”  I 
recommend the experience for all the “old maid” school teachers, editors, saleswomen, 
etc., that you can reach.292 
 
The author focuses not on the experience of sponsoring a Chinese child but rather on the 
experience of telling her mother and friends about her “adopted” Chinese son.  She promotes the 
adoption plan not so much as an alternative form of motherhood but rather as a way to relieve the 
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social pressure to have children.  Other CCF advertisements made emotional appeals for the 
adoption plan as a last chance for the childless to leave their mark on posterity:  
Some of us, for one reason or another, have never had a child of our own.  Others of us 
have had and lost them.  Some of these adopted children will be brought to America 
eventually by their foster parents but if your closest contact to “your” child is only by 
letter, the child still will feel he belongs.  You will be the only parent that child has.  And 
you may find that you belong, too, and that in your child you are building up something 
that will live on after you are gone.293 
 
On one level, such advertisements testify to the normative power of the nuclear family ideal in 
postwar America.  On another level, the CCF’s advertisements appropriated the symbolism of 
the nuclear family to legitimize a very different type of “adoptive” relationship that crossed 
national and racial lines, overflowed the boundaries of the domestic home, and was rooted in 
intimacy rather than biology.  The extraordinary popularity of the adoption plan in postwar 
America suggests that even during the apex of the nuclear family ideal, alternative forms of 
family making were beginning to acquire widespread legitimacy. 
 
“Selling” Children  
 As the adoption plan grew in popularity during the post-WWII period, the CCF was 
confronted with the task of facilitating the circulation of an ever-expanding volume of publicity 
materials, photographs, gifts, and letters on a transnational scale.  To manage this unwieldy 
process, the CCF developed and implemented standard practices regarding how these materials 
were produced, what information they contained, and along what routes they traveled.  The 
CCF’s efforts to standardize the adoption plan began with creating a uniform set of publicity 
materials to introduce potential American donors to the idea of adopting a Chinese child.  
Somewhat paradoxically, the CCF’s boilerplate advertisements promised a substantive, deeply 
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personal relationship that approximated the intimacy of the parent-child bond.  For example, one 
typical appeal in China News emphasized foster parents’ role in providing “guidance” for their 
adopted children: 
Even more than a child’s dependence upon an adult for food and shelter, is his 
dependence upon him for ideals and visions.  A child is but plastic clay in an adult’s 
hand—to be moulded into evil or good.  The homeless, hungry children of the Orient 
need more than food or shelter.  They need guidance by those who are true friends of 
children. 294 
 
CCF advertisements often included rows of pictures of children available for adoption, detailing 
the different available payment plans and recommending that prospective sponsors indicate a 
backup choice in case their preferred child had already been adopted.295  The CCF explicitly 
embraced the commodification of children implicit in such fundraising strategies.  In the 1944 
issue of China News, Clarke relayed the following story: “Once a stranger on a train asked me 
what I sold.  He looked surprised when I answered—‘Children.’  After I had explained to him he 
said thoughtfully, ‘I think you sell the finest article in the world’.”296  Another CCF publicity 
article bluntly stated, “Put a child on your shopping list.”297  In an era in which consumer choice 
increasingly defined the ideal family life, a “real son or daughter” could be placed on a shopping 
list without apparent contradiction.298 
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Figure 2.2.  An advertisement for the CCF’s adoption plan in China News invited sponsors to 
select among six children based on their photographs and brief descriptions of their personalities.  
The advertisement recommended that sponsors designate both a first and second choice in case 
their preferred child had already been “adopted.” China News Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 1946), 3. 
 
 
Nevertheless, reading through the internal correspondence of the CCF, one thing that 
emerges clearly is the depth of Clarke’s personal commitment to making the adoption plan live 
up to its promise of fostering meaningful relationships.  As Clarke wrote to Verent Mills in 
September 1946, “We want our adoption plan to be real and not just a sort of fake scheme for 
raising funds.”299  Clarke was tireless in his attempts to impress upon the staffs of CCF 
orphanages the stakes of making the adoption plan as satisfying as possible for sponsors.  He 
concluded one memo with the all-caps declaration:  
THE INVESETMENT IN TIME AND EFFORT, BOTH ON THE PART OF 
ORPHANAGE STAFFS IN CHINA AND OF THE CCF OFFICE STAFF IN 
AMERICA, IN KEEPING THESE “MOTHERS” AND “FATHERS” INFORMED 
ABOUT THEIR CHILDREN, WILL BE SUPREMELY WORTHWHILE—BOTH IN 
POINT OF THE PRACTICAL HELP THEY ARE ANXIOUS AND WILLING TO 
RENDER IF WE MEET THEM HALF-WAY, AND IN VIEW OF AN INIMITABLE 
SERVICE IN THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS WHICH THE 
ADOPTION PLAN INVOLVES.300 
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Yet Clarke often complained that the almost exclusively Chinese staffs of CCF orphanages did 
not put sufficient effort into the adoption plan.  He confided to Mills, “We have great difficulty 
in getting reports from some of our workers.  I know they are busy and that they do not realize 
the job it is to finance our program.”  Moreover, even when Clarke did receive the materials he 
requested from CCF-funded orphanages, he was not always pleased with their contents: 
Some of our workers, in making reports on the children, state that the boy or girl is lazy, 
or that the parents threw the child out, or that the child is not very bright, etc.  We 
certainly do not want our workers to be untruthful but wish they could tell the better 
things about the child.  You would be surprised how often, especially the Chinese, our 
workers send information about the child that would have a tendency to discourage the 
child’s sponsor from continuing the child’s support.301 
 
The CCF’s solution to the problem of how to create deep, personal relationships between 
children and their sponsors was to standardize procedures for carrying out the adoption plan and 
build a well-oiled transnational bureaucracy to implement them.  There was thus an unspoken 
irony at the heart of the CCF’s adoption plan: the unique, personal relationships forged between 
American sponsors and Chinese children were based on formulaic documents and routine 
procedures that were both rigidly enforced and meticulously hidden from view. 
 
The Paperwork of Global Intimacy 
 After responding to one of CCF’s advertisements with a commitment to adopt a child for 
at least one year, sponsors received what the CCF referred to internally as an “assignment 
report”—including the adopted child’s name, photograph, and personal history as well as 
information about the orphanage where the child lived.302  The CCF’s China office in 
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Guangzhou provided detailed instructions to its affiliated orphanages on how to prepare every 
element of the assignment report.  For each newly accepted child, orphanages were required to 
provide two half-body photographs measuring one cun (approximately 3.3 centimeters) in 
length.303  They placed particular emphasis on the quality of the photographs: 
Individual pictures should present each child to best advantage and should be as clear and 
flawless as possible in order to lend themselves to reproduction and enlargement.  All 
children receive the greatest sympathy but it is only a human trait expressing itself when 
sponsors evince particular gratification in helping bright, neat, attractive, promising 
looking children.304 
 
The CCF’s meticulous attention to the quality of photographs reflected its understanding of their 
deep importance to the success of the adoption plan.  One foster mother wrote to the CCF after 
receiving her adopted child’s photograph, “I think you chose the right boy for me.  I like his 
looks and, from my method of diagnosis, he seems to have the appearance and personal qualities 
for success and leadership.”305 
 Besides the photograph, the other essential aspect of the assignment report was a 
“personal history” that provided sponsors with information about their adopted child’s biography 
and personality.  The CCF provided orphanages with standard forms listing various categories of 
information to be included, such as family background, progress in school, interests, and a 
personal message for the child’s sponsor.  In practice, however, the level of detail provided in 
these forms varied considerably across the different CCF-sponsored orphanages.  The Canaan 
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Home (jianan gu’er yuan迦南孤兒院) in Beijing provided especially detailed information.  For 
example, the sponsor of a boy named “Asaph” would have received a wealth of information 
about his family background, personality, and life at school: 
Asaph’s father and mother are dead.  His father was a rickshaw puller.  He had two 
uncles, two younger sisters, and an older brother.  This boy likes to study and he is 
preparing to take the examination for entrance into Yenching Industrial School.  This is a 
fine opportunity and will enable him to learn useful trades…The boys also learn to cook, 
and are taught to keep the rooms and the yard very clean.  In the summertime they go 
swimming and fishing in the clear stream from the Jade Fountain which is 
nearby…Asaph, in milking and caring for the goats, was found to do his work faithfully 
and well. 306   
 
On the other hand, the sponsors of a boy named Dai Gang at the Foochow City Orphanage may 
have been disappointed to read that he had “no particular message for sponsor.”307  Despite its 
best efforts to control the initial portrait of children presented in the assignment reports, the CCF 
remained dependent upon the orphanages it funded to furnish information about the children. 
 
Figure 2.3.  Personal history from the CCF-supported Foochow City Orphanage. Personal 
histories were provided to sponsors as part of the “assignment report” they received after 
committing to sponsor a child through CCF. 
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After the receipt of the initial assignment report containing the adopted child’s 
photograph and personal history, the adoptive relationship consisted primarily of the exchange of 
letters.  Children were required to send their foster parents two letters per year as well as 
additional thank-you letters whenever they received a gift from their foster parents.  Of 
paramount importance to the CCF was ensuring that these letters were (or at least appeared to be) 
the authentic work of the individual adopted child.  In an official letter to all CCF-sponsored 
orphanages, the CCF office in Guangzhou emphasized that it was “absolutely not permitted for 
one child to write out letters for several children.”  The letter explained that some sponsors had 
adopted multiple children in the same orphanage, and although they generally could not read 
Chinese, they would be able to recognize if letters purporting to be from different children were 
written in the same hand.308  For similar reasons, the CCF also insisted, “Every time the children 
write letters, each must write according to his or her own ideas.  It is absolutely not permitted for 
several children’s letters to use the same ideas or language.”  Beyond requiring that children 
wrote in their own words and with their own hand, the CCF also established meticulous 
requirements regarding the appearance of each letter.  One set of instructions from the CCF 
office in Guangzhou specified that “for the sake of standardization” (yi zi huayi 以資劃一), 
“from now on when any child writes a letter, regardless of whether it is an ordinary letter or a 
thank-you letter, they should use the letter paper prepared by this organization for each 
orphanage.”309  To avoid the jarring experience of foster parents receiving a letter from a name 
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they did not recognize, CCF guidelines further stipulated that the letters must spell children’s 
names exactly in accordance with the romanizations provided to each orphanage by the CCF.  
The CCF even codified such minute details as the requirement that children use the same ink 
they used to write the original Chinese letter when signing their romanized name.310   
Beyond regulations designed to ensure that children’s letters appeared authentic, the CCF 
also maintained an ever-expanding list of items children were prohibited from writing in their 
letters.  Some of these rules were geared toward preventing children from writing anything that 
implied the lack of a meaningful relationship with their foster parents.  For instance, children 
were not allowed to write that they do not recognize their sponsor’s name and address.  They 
were also prohibited from writing anything that might suggest they were exploiting their foster 
parents for money.  For example, children were not allowed to complain “like a beggar” about 
things they lacked in the orphanage.311   They were further forbidden from asking for additional 
money or material goods unless their sponsors specifically asked them for gift ideas.  More 
surprisingly, children were instructed not to date their letters.312  There were often long delays 
between when children wrote their letters and when their sponsors received them—to the extent 
that some orphanages had children write Christmas cards in August to ensure they reached their 
foster parents on time.313  To avoid calling attention to these lengthy temporal gaps, the CCF 
simply asked children not to date their letters. 
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In order to make its adoption plan work smoothly, the CCF not only instructed children 
on what not to write, it also had to teach them what to write.  To this effect, the CCF’s monthly 
Chinese-language magazine Blessed Children included articles designed to provide children with 
guidelines for epistolary communication with their American foster parents.  For instance, in the 
March 1948 issue Calvin Lee, the Director of the CCF’s South China District Orphanages 
Association, published an article titled “The Art of Letter Writing” that sought to teach children 
to effectively communicate their gratitude to their foster parents.  Lee’s article begins by 
expressing his appreciation for what a difficult and odd task it was for Chinese children to write 
letters to American adults: 
China’s Children Fund’s currently requires every child to write to his or her foster parent 
twice per year.  This is not an easy task!  It’s not easy for adults to cultivate the habit of 
letter writing, let alone for ordinary children! …It’s not easy to pick up our pens and 
write letters to friends and family in China, let alone to find the words to say to foreign 
friends!”   
 
According to Lee, the fundamental difference between American and Chinese epistolary style 
was that while Chinese letters relied on a vast store of conventional expressions, American 
letters were frank in tone and specific in substance: 
In their letters, Americans always describe things in great detail.  For example, if they 
know that a friend has headaches, then they will go ahead and ask after the friend’s 
headaches—which is not at all like quite the conventional phrase we would be 
accustomed to use: “I have heard recently that your honorable body is indisposed.”  
While expressions in books like Letters from Autumn Water Retreat or Letters from Snow 
Swan Retreat are elegant and refined, they are not even appropriate for modern Chinese 
correspondence, let alone for use in foreign languages!314 
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Lee instructed CCF children to adopt the American way of letter writing, which he summarized 
as “Call a spade a spade – and sprinkle in a little humor.”  As an example, he described thank-
you notes written by children at one CCF orphanage to a sponsor who had sent bags of sweets: 
Recently there was a sponsor who sent each child a bag of sweets.  In our thank-you 
letters, we especially brought up that among all the countries on earth China gets to enjoy 
candy the least.  On average Australians enjoy the most candy, about 100 pounds per 
year.  But Chinese people only have about two pounds per year.  Writing in this way not 
only demonstrates how much we appreciate the sweets that we received, it also lets the 
giver know how precious his gift was!”315 
 
Echoing New Culture Movement intellectuals who argued that China must replace the “dead” 
language of classical Chinese with a modern, vernacular writing style in order to engage with the 
twentieth-century world, Lee argued that Chinese children would have to learn to express 
themselves in frank, direct prose in order to build personal relationships across national and 
cultural boundaries. 
 In a translingual twist on the popular letter-writing manuals for students consisting of 
exemplary letters for children to imitate, Blessed Children also published Chinese translations of 
American children’s letters for use as models.  A January 1949 article titled “What Kind of 
Letter to Write?” included a Chinese translation of a letter an American boy wrote to the Chinese 
child his family sponsored through the adoption plan.  Praising the letter for its clarity and wealth 
of detail, the article offered it as a model for CCF children to imitate when writing back to their 
foster families:  
I am in seventh grade in school, and now I am 12 years old.  I have been studying in this 
school since I was five years old.  I have a little brother who is nine years old.  Right now 
it is summer vacation.  My brother goes to the recreation center and I go to the 
YMCA.  We have all kinds of different activities there.  On Wednesdays and Fridays we 
go on field trips, and on Tuesdays and Thursdays we have day camp.  At 9AM we leave 
home with our lunches packed and go to the camp.  We stay there all afternoon, and in 
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the evening do exercises and swimming.  This is my fourth year coming to this camp.  I 
plan to do many different things while I’m in the camp.316 
 
Beyond simply providing children with guidelines and templates for their own letters, the CCF’s 
efforts to cultivate global standards for epistolary communication suggest how it conceptualized 
the relationship between global intimacy and literary modernity in China.317  Only by replacing 
inherited habits of thought and speech with those favored in the modern West could Chinese 
children learn to cultivate meaningful relationships with people abroad.  At the same time, the 
very process of participating in transnational and translingual epistolary exchanges would expose 
a generation of Chinese children to new ways of writing and feeling that would prepare them to 
participate in the modern world. 
 
The Bureaucracy of Global Intimacy 
 In order to ensure compliance with its standards for children’s letters, the CCF built an 
expansive transnational bureaucracy dedicated to regulating, reviewing, tracking, and—if 
necessary—censoring children’s letters.  The first task of the CCF bureaucracy was to ensure 
that children wrote their letters at the appointed times.  An August 21, 1946 letter from the 
CCF’s Guangzhou office to orphanage directors reminded them, “Whenever any sponsored child 
receives a letter from their foster parents, you must immediately have them write a response.  
When the child has written a reply, it should be translated by someone at the orphanage and sent 
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along with the original to our office.”318  On May 25, 1947, the office sent a follow-up letter 
admonishing those orphanages with children who still had not written to their sponsors: 
The majority of the children supported by this organization have already been assigned 
their foster parents.  Now, in order to allow their foster parents to have a clear picture of 
their foster children’s living situations in the orphanages, we need to have each orphan at 
each orphanage affiliated with our organization send this information to their foster 
parents once per year.  You were already notified of this in an official letter dated August 
21, 1946.  While we have on record that many of these letters have indeed been sent to 
our office, as there remain a considerable number who have not yet complied with our 
regulations, we are again sending out this additional reminder. 319 
 
By 1948, the CCF was threatening to suspend funding to orphanages that did not send children’s 
letters on time.  In January the CCF wrote to orphanage directors, “Every orphanage must send 
Chinese and English sponsor letters by the end of February.  Those whose letters are delinquent 
will not receive funds for the month of March.”320 
 Each one of the thousands of letters children wrote each year then traveled a tortuous 
itinerary through the various levels of the CCF bureaucracy before finally reaching their foster 
parents in the United States.  At the CCF-supported Lingnan Industrial School, the head teacher 
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of each grade was responsible for collecting children’s letters by the appointed date.321  Once the 
letters were collected, it was the responsibility of each orphanage to provide English translations 
directly below the original Chinese on special letter paper provided by the CCF’s Guangzhou 
office.322  For tracking purposes, the orphanage was also required to mark each child’s letter with 
three separate identifiers: the child’s English name (following romanizations provided by the 
CCF), an orphanage number (yuan hao 院號), and an adoption number (renyang hao 認養號).323  
Each orphanage then sent the children’s letters to the CCF office in Guangzhou, which 
forwarded the letters to the CCF office in Richmond, which in turn forwarded them to their 
foster parents.  Children were prohibited from sending any correspondence directly to their 
sponsors, and orphanages would stop receiving CCF funds for any child found to have done 
so.324   Clarke explained the reason for this rule in a detailed set of instructions to CCF 
orphanages:  
It is very important that letters from children be handled carefully.  We have no wish to 
put a censorship on the children’s letters but, because several rather disgustingly begging 
letters (apparently inspired by adults outside the orphanage) have been received by 
Sponsors, we are now asking that all letters be supervised by the Superintendent of the 
orphanage and that they be sent to this office for forwarding—never direct to 
Sponsor.  We are sorry to be arbitrary about this but we do not want unscrupulous 
persons to destroy the fine relationships we are trying to build up.  Please impress on the 
children that they must not have an outsider write letters directly to Sponsors for them 
and that begging letters are apt to make them “lose face” with Sponsors. 
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By the time a child’s letter reached his or her foster parents, it had been reviewed by the head 
teacher of his or her grade, the orphanage staff member tasked with translation, the orphanage 
director, the CCF office in Guangzhou, and CCF headquarters in Richmond. 
Letters found to have violated the rules could be censored at multiple levels of the CCF 
bureaucracy.  For example, early in 1949 a young woman named Rui-tang, who had recently 
reached the age of eighteen and “graduated” from the Pu Kong orphanage, wrote to her foster 
parents with a special request: she planned to go to Guangzhou to continue her studies, and she 
asked that her foster parents send money to cover her travel.  Rui-tang had followed the CCF’s 
standard procedures in writing the letter: first writing out her letter in Chinese, having it 
translated into English by a teacher at Pu Kong, and then sending it to the CCF office in 
Guangzhou to be forwarded to the United States.  The Guangzhou office, however, refused to 
send the letter.  Responding to Rui-tang to explain their reasoning, they wrote, “This kind of 
letter of request does not conform to the rules of our organization’s American headquarters, as 
sponsored children are not permitted to write letters requesting any money or material goods 
from their foster parents.”  Therefore, they concluded, “We cannot forward the English letter for 
you.”325  Letters were also occasionally censored once they reached the CCF headquarters in 
Richmond.  For example, in February 1951, Helen Clarke flagged two especially political letters 
from children at the Pu Kong Orphanage: 
The children seem to be working for the government according to Chai Cheung with his 
story of being a tax collector.  Luk Sing Cheung’s letter sounds as if they may be getting 
some military training – with its “practice in shooting.”  Of course, this may only refer to 
darts, slings or other toys.  But anyone would question it now. 
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Received just as the CCF was evacuating from Communist China and refocusing on other parts 
of East Asia, Clarke decided not to send the letters to the children’s sponsors.326  As the CCF 
broadened its geographic reach, it would need to refine the bureaucratic procedures it developed 
in China in order to coordinate transnational intimate relationships on an ever-expanding scale. 
 
The CCF and Legal Adoption in China 
 From its earliest days in China, the CCF had fielded frequent inquiries about the 
possibility of legally adopting children.  For example, on September 5, 1948, a woman named 
Lucille wrote to the CCF to inquire about whether she and her mother might legally adopt “one 
or two Little Ones”: 
I am comfortably situated, with a modest income.  While I am not a Millionaire, I can 
afford to care for and to educate one or two children…I know the children are well taken 
care of at the various Orphanages but mother and I would, simply, adore having the 
companionship of one or two Little Ones.327 
 
The CCF leant some encouragement to such requests by hinting at the possibility of legal 
international adoption in its publicity materials.  One advertisement for the adoption plan 
claimed, “Some of these adopted children will be brought to America eventually by their foster 
parents.”328  Nevertheless, actually coordinating legal international adoption from China during 
the 1940s was all but impossible.  While the Chinese exclusion laws were repealed by the 
Magnuson Act in 1943, Chinese immigration to the United States remained restricted to a 
miniscule quota of only 105 people annually.329   In 1948, Clarke wrote to the Immigration and 
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Naturalization Service inquiring into the possibility of facilitating legal adoptions of sponsored 
children in China, but he was informed that “the adopted child of an American citizen is not 
entitled to nonquota or preference status in the issuance of an immigration visa.”330  As the 
Chinese immigration quota was already oversubscribed, adopting children from China was 
effectively impossible.  Clarke wrote to another woman who had requested to legally adopt two 
Chinese children: “[I]t so happens that their quota is filled for the next 10 years...I am sorry that I 
have to write this, what may seem to you to be a very disappointing reply, but the powers that be 
seem to have made it as hard as possible with government red tape.”331 
 Although the CCF could not yet facilitate international adoption to the United States, it 
did regularly arrange for domestic adoptions within China—both to extended relatives and to 
strangers looking to adopt a son to serve as their heir.  The practice of adopting a son to secure 
an heir has a long history in China.  Most commonly, men without a biological son adopted a 
boy from within their own lineage.  Although legal codes and other normative texts prohibited 
adoption from outside the surname group, in practice such adoptions were quite common.332  The 
near absolute need for an heir to continue the family line, along with high child mortality rates 
and the limited supply of legally and ritually suitable children for adoption, combined to create a 
strong need for adoption practices that bent the rules.  The adoption of an heir from outside the 
lineage was in turn justified by the view that sincere filial sentiment could make up for the 
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absence of biological kinship ties.  This view was often articulated with reference to a famous 
line from the Book of Poetry: “The wasp raises the offspring of the moth” (mingling you zi, 
guoluo fu zhi 螟蛉有子，果臝負之).  According to legend, the guoluo wasp would take 
mingling larvae to incubate as its own offspring while repeating, “Resemble me!” (lei wo 類我).  
After a period of time, the mingling larva would literally grow into a guoluo wasp.  By the late 
imperial period, children adopted from outside the lineage were often referred to as “mingling 
children” (mingling zi 螟蛉子)—a term that encompassed the view that nurture could triumph 
over nature when raising an adopted child as one’s own.333   
Research by anthropologists confirms the continued prevalence of adoption both within 
the lineage and across surname lines well into the twentieth century.  During his fieldwork with 
the powerful Man lineage in the New Territories, Hong Kong from 1969-1970, James Watson 
found 88 adoptions from within the Man lineage recorded in the lineage genealogy.  He also 
found evidence of 14 adoptions from outside the lineage and surname group.  Watson argues that 
one reason people adopted outside the lineage was to ensure a full break with the adopted son’s 
biological family, thereby avoiding intra-lineage rivalries and ensuring the undivided loyalty of 
the adopted son.334   
 It was in this context that local families often sought to adopt children from CCF 
orphanages in South China.  In a form letter sent to American sponsors in the event their child 
was adopted in China, the CCF explained, “Oftentimes relatives, now able to move about with 
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more freedom, find little kinfolk unexpectedly safe with us and, with true Chinese family loyalty, 
assume their responsibility.  Then there is always the quota of legal adoption.”335  The records of 
CCF-supported orphanages in South China are peppered with examples of “good” local families 
adopting children by paying back a portion of the funds the CCF expended in raising them.336  
For example, in March 1948 the Board of Directors of the CCF’s Happy Children’s Home in 
Hong Kong approved the adoption of a seven-year-old boy named Guo by a family named Chen 
that agreed to reimburse the institution for a year of his living expenses.337  The records of 
departures from the Morning Star Orphanage in Guangzhou likewise regularly list children as 
“taken for adoption by good family” or “adopted by Chinese family.”338  Oftentimes, the CCF 
facilitated adoptions to local people explicitly seeking to adopt a boy for the traditional purpose 
of securing a male heir.  In June 1949, a family surnamed Huang approached the CCF office in 
Guangzhou about adopting an heir (sizi 嗣子).  The CCF office in turn wrote to the Morning Star 
orphanage asking them to select an orphan “without any relatives” so that the two sides could 
meet and determine whether they were amenable to an adoption.339   
 In other cases, the CCF coordinated adoptions across national boundaries through 
overseas Chinese family networks spanning South China, Southeast Asia, and the United States.  
Many of the CCF’s South China orphanages were filled with the children of overseas Chinese 
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migrants whose transnational families had been torn asunder by the Pacific War.  After the 
Japanese surrender, as people sought to reconstruct families after years of war, some children in 
CCF orphanages were found and adopted by relatives who had survived the war overseas.  In 
January 1947 the CCF-supported En Kwang School in Kunming reported the departure of nine 
children, seven of whom had been adopted by relatives living in Burma.340  In August 1947, a 
boy named Tak Wa at the Morning Star Orphanage in Guangzhou was adopted by an uncle from 
Singapore.341  In another case, a woman requested to adopt her nephew, Yanhua, from the Kiu 
Kong Orphanage.  She explained that Yanhua’s older male cousin had gone to America and been 
very successful in business, and she planed to send Yanhua to the United States to work with his 
cousin.  She was permitted to adopt him after agreeing to pay 500 Hong Kong dollars as 
reimbursement for his living and educational expenses.  The records do not indicate whether he 
ever made it to America.342 
In some cases, the CCF even permitted children to be adopted by overseas Chinese to 
whom they were not related.  In February 1948, a Taishanese man named Shurong, who was 
working as a merchant in the United States, and his wife, who was living with her son-in-law in 
Guangzhou, asked the CCF to adopt a two-year-old boy “to carry on the family line as heir” (yi ji 
hou si 以繼後嗣).  The CCF agreed to the adoption on the condition that the boy would be raised 
as a Christian and educated in Christian schools.343  Combining the Chinese tradition of adopting 
                                                
340 Letter from Pearl C.Y. Hsu to Erwin Raetz, January 26, 1947, Kiu Kong Orphanage Folder, CCF. 
341 “Report of Children’s Form Orphanage and Substitutes, Morning Star, Canton,” Morning Star Orphanage 1948 
Folder, CCF. 
342 “Zhi qiaoquang yuan gonghan” 致僑光院公函 [Official Letter to the Kiu Kong Orphanage], February 16, 1949, 
零 18-44-11, GMA. 
343 “Baozheng shu” 保證書 [Letter of Guarantee] , February 25, 1948, 17-1-115, 6, GMA. 
137 
 
boys as heirs to continue the family line with the new American Christian practice of facilitating 
transnational adoptions in order to place children in Christian homes, the case symbolizes how 
the CCF served as a link between two very different historical eras of adoption in China. 
 
From the Adoption Plan to International Adoption 
During the 1950s, the CCF expanded its work to new locations such as Japan and Korea, 
where it also played a crucial role in developing the first systematic programs for legal 
international adoption.  In recent years, scholars have increasingly trained their attention on the 
historical origins of international adoption in Japan and Korea.  These works sometimes mention 
the adoption plan in passing as having helped popularize the idea of adopting Asian children in 
the United States.  For example, Catherine Choy notes that sponsorship programs helped foster 
“desires for international adoption,” and Arissa Oh likewise includes sponsorship programs as 
part of what she terms the “international adoption complex” in Korea.344  Nevertheless, the 
CCF’s central role in furnishing funds, facilities, personnel, and expertise to support the 
development of legal international adoption remains largely unknown. 
 Although the CCF promoted child sponsorship as a form of “virtual adoption,” 
international child sponsorship and legal international adoption aimed to achieve very different 
philanthropic and political goals.  As Sara Fieldston has argued, while international adoption 
aimed to transform the lives of individual children (and the American families that adopted 
them), child sponsorship programs had the “loftier” aim to “mold children, and, through them, to 
remake nations.”345  The CCF’s publicity materials made clear that it’s goal was to raise a 
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generation of Asian children who would transform their home countries into Westernized, 
Christian democracies.  For example, one CCF article employed the classic colonialist language 
of the “civilizing mission” in suggesting how the adoption plan could effect change in Japan: 
Unless a little child leads Japan to civilization she is forever doomed…If there could be 
planted in every Japanese child’s heart the seed of kindness we would solve the problem.  
Yes, it is as simple as that.  A religion of love could transform Japan.  The children of 
Japan could be taught it.  We would like to see a thousand China’s Children Fund 
orphanages and schools established in Japan.346 
 
Or as another CCF advertisement crudely put it:  “America has conquered Japan physically.  
Now, with God’s help, may we conquer her spiritually.”347  In a 1954 article for the Korea 
Times, the director of the CCF’s Korea program, Ernest Nash, explained that “the making of 
good Korean citizens out of homeless orphans is the primary aim of the many thousands of 
Americans” who participate in the CCF’s adoption plan in Korea.  Therefore, although the 
adoption plan created a “very near approximation of parent-child relationships,” Nash stated that 
the CCF’s “generous contributors consider that the Korean children they wish to help had best be 
left in Korea, and not adopted into homes in America.”348 
 Nevertheless, as the CCF expanded its operations in Japan and Korea, it became one of 
the leading organizations promoting legal international adoption as a solution to the particular 
“problem” posed by the sizeable populations of mixed-race children born to U.S. soldiers and 
local women.  At first, the CCF had simply sought to incorporate these children into its adoption 
plan.  In 1950, Verent Mills traveled to Japan, where he was impressed with the plight of these 
“GI babies”—as well as with their special claim on American help.  A CCF article describing 
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Mills’ visit emphasized the importance of incorporating these children into the adoption plan for 
the future of U.S. relations with Japan: 
There is a feeling in Japan—the Japan we are so anxious to impress with our American 
Way of Life and with our justice and fairness—that the children have a claim on 
America.  They did not ask to be born and deserted.  CCF is perfectly willing to assume 
this responsibility, if the American public will support such a program.349 
 
Before long, however, Mills and the CCF leadership became convinced that even if they were 
raised and educated in CCF institutions, these children faced bleak futures in Japan.  Rather than 
blame the plight of GI babies on the American fathers who abandoned them (or the U.S. military 
policy of discouraging marriages with Japanese women that all but encouraged them to do so), 
the CCF placed the blame squarely on Japanese racism: “The Japanese have been taught that 
their race is unusual in that it is ‘pure and unmixed for over 6,000 years’…so deeply ingrained is 
the legend that the mixed-blood child is unacceptable to the average Japanese.”350 
 In this context, the CCF somewhat reluctantly embraced the idea of U.S. couples legally 
adopting “mixed-blood” children from Japan and Korea.  Internally, Clarke acknowledged, 
“CCF will suffer losses in income when CCF children who are ‘adopted’ under our sponsorship 
plan are removed from our orphanages to be brought to the United States.”  Nevertheless, Clarke 
instructed the CCF offices in Korea and Japan to cooperate fully in facilitating international 
adoptions: “CCF cannot be selfish in this matter.  I realize that the life of a Korean GI [baby] will 
not be easy and if his or her life will be better in America, then I would be an insincere person if 
I did anything to discourage legal adoptions.”351  Overcoming this initial reluctance, CCF 
leadership soon began publicly promoting the mass adoption of mixed-race children from Japan 
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and Korea to the United States.  In 1952 Verent Mills called for the “mass adoption of GI babies 
by American families, widely separated so as to avoid over-concentration in any one area.”352  
Implicitly acknowledging that racism against mixed-race children might also become a problem 
in the United States, Clarke offered the alternative suggestion of shipping mixed-race children en 
masse to racially diverse areas like Hawaii or Puerto Rico: “There would be no racial problems 
in Hawaii.  For that matter, there would be none in Puerto Rico either, but Puerto Rico is already 
overpopulated.”353 
 In Japan, the CCF helped make the international adoption of mixed-race children possible 
through its financial support of Sawada Miki’s Elizabeth Saunders Home.  An heiress to the 
Mitsubishi fortune, Sawada Miki founded the Elizabeth Saunders Home in 1948 for the specific 
purpose of caring for Japan’s “mixed-blood children” (konketsuji 混血児).  Informed by a strong 
racial nationalism, Sawada actively sought to convince Japanese mothers to give their mixed-
race children over to the orphanage.  Once under her care, she helped arrange for many of the 
children to be adopted by American families.  (Sawada did not permit Japanese families to adopt 
children from the home).354  A very high percentage of the mixed-raced children in Japan who 
were adopted by American families during the 1950s came from the Elizabeth Saunders Home.  
As of 1957, an estimated 1,222 children from Japan had been adopted by Americans through 
special nonquota visas made available through the Refugee Relief Act of 1953.355  According to 
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Sawada, the Elizabeth Saunders Home alone had facilitated international adoptions for 
approximately 800 of these children.356  Sawada was able to carry out her program for mixed-
race children in large part due to the generous financial support of the CCF.  The CCF began 
supporting the Elizabeth Saunders Home through the adoption plan in 1950, and for the next two 
decades it remained the home’s most consistent source of financial support.357  By 1953, the 
CCF was sponsoring 101 children at the Elizabeth Saunders Home, which it provided with a 
greater monthly allocation of funds than any of the other 18 orphanages it supported in Japan.358  
The CCF took considerable pride in its role in facilitating the mass removal of mixed-race 
children from Japan to the United States.  In his 1961 book Yankee Si!, the CCF’s Edmund Janss 
declared, “The mixed-blood child in Japan has been taken to the heart of America.”359 
 However, it was in Korea where international adoption was first institutionalized on a 
large scale, and it was also in Korea where the CCF played the most active role in providing 
financial and logistical support to facilitate the adoption of mixed-race children by American 
families.  In 1956 the CCF agreed to construct a special annex at its Seoul Choong Hyun Babies’ 
Home to serve as a reception center for mixed-race children awaiting adoption into American 
homes.360  Opened on June 29, 1956 as the Lemnitzer-Doughty-Clarke Wing of the Seoul 
Choong Hyun Babies’ Home, by the fall of 1957, 44 children were residing in the reception 
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center as they awaited the processing of their adoptions.361  The CCF went to great lengths to 
prepare these children for their journey to the United States:  
Here they are clothed as American children, eat an American diet, and are in all things 
trained in American ways of living.  Their health is cared for by Western trained Korean 
nurses.  Ladies of Seoul’s international community volunteer their services to teach the 
children English and to play American games with them.  Thus the children who pass 
through our CCF home are conditioned to be suited to the environment of the homes in 
America to which they are going, and the task of the adoptive parents is made that much 
the easier…362  
 
In building and operating the reception center in Seoul, the CCF was also making a substantial 
financial commitment to facilitating international adoption.  The CCF invested US $7,000 in the 
construction of the new wing.363  Moreover, as children were generally removed from the 
sponsorship program once someone had committed to adopting them legally, the CCF estimated 
that it “would be out of pocket some US $4,000 to $5,000 annually” for the care of children in 
the reception center.364 
 Much like it had since its earliest days in China, the CCF received frequent letters from 
donors requesting to legally adopt the children they sponsored in Korea.  By the mid-1950s, 
however, the CCF could actually help make the legal adoption of Korean children a reality.  As 
the volume of requests grew (at one point Clarke estimated that the CCF received “a few 
requests” for adoptions every day), the CCF worked out standard procedures for handling serious 
inquiries into the adoption of specific children.365  For example, in 1958 an American couple 
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named the Kelloggs wrote to the CCF hoping to adopt a Korean girl named Chung Cha whom 
they had already sponsored for several years through the adoption plan.  Nash quickly referred 
the request to Hong Oak Soon, the director of Child Placement Services in Seoul, who in turn 
sent the following reply back to the Kelloggs: 
Enclosed are “Application for Adoption” form and general information which is self-
explanatory of our procedure in adoption process. 
 
While your home is being studied we will look into the condition of the child whether she 
is good enough for adoption and immigration and will let you know of it.366 
 
Although the outcomes of such requests depended upon both home evaluations of prospective 
adopters as well as medical examinations of the children they hoped to adopt, by the late 1950s 
the CCF’s adoption plan had become a common stepping stone to legal international adoption.  
As of July 1957, 69 children from the CCF’s adoption plan in Korea had been legally adopted 
into American homes.367 
  Nevertheless, the adoption plan and legal international adoption did not always coexist 
so easily.  One issue was that donors to the CCF’s adoption plan often specifically requested to 
sponsor GI children, who were in increasingly short supply because so many were in the process 
of being legally adopted.  As Clarke wrote in a letter to Nash, “This creates quite a problem 
because the sponsors are dissatisfied if the children assigned are not mixed-blood children.”368  
In one extraordinary case, a woman from Washington, D.C. was startled to see a Life magazine 
story indicating that a boy named Kang Yong, the very boy she sponsored through the CCF’s 
adoption plan, had been adopted into a home in the United States.  A CCF investigation revealed 
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that because of a problem with the paperwork when the boy left his Korean orphanage, they had 
failed to inform his sponsor of his departure.369 
  The CCF’s involvement in caring for children being processed for international adoption 
also caused it to become embroiled in a sharp controversy over “proxy” adoptions.  Under the 
proxy method, U.S. citizens designated an agent to adopt a child on their behalf in a foreign court.  
Popular independent adoption organizations like the Holt Adoption Program and Pearl Buck’s 
Welcome House favored the proxy method because it allowed for adoptions to be completed 
quickly and without the endorsement of a social service agency.  The International Social 
Service (“ISS”), on the other hand, vehemently opposed proxy adoptions and argued that 
professional investigations into the backgrounds of the child and the prospective adoptive parents 
were necessary to ensure the best interests of the child were protected.370  The CCF’s stake in 
this debate was financial.  The children in the CCF’s reception center were being processed 
through the ISS, and the longer its background investigations stretched on, the longer the CCF 
had to support the children at its own expense.  By early 1958, Nash was venting his frustration 
with the “financially painful” “stagnating” of children in the reception center.  In a rare critique 
of excessive bureaucracy, Nash wrote that the ISS was making “a fetish of its own procedures at 
the expense of the primary objective and intent of the law.”  On behalf of the CCF, he began 
advocating for greater use of proxy adoptions within the Child Placement Service Committee 
organized by the Korean Ministry of Social Affairs.371   
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The CCF had helped build a vast bureaucracy capable of coordinating both the adoption 
plan and legal international adoption across East Asia on a mass scale.  But as far as Nash was 
concerned, excessive adherence to bureaucratic procedure was beginning to hinder, rather than 
facilitate, the formation of transnational intimate relationships between Americans and Asian 
children as a form of humanitarian rescue. 
 
Conclusion 
In the short span of a decade, from the end of WWII to the mid-1950s, the CCF helped 
transform both the adoption plan and legal international adoption into central features of global 
humanitarianism in East Asia.  They accomplished this feat by linking the adoption of Asian 
children to the ideological projects of spreading Christianity and American influence in East 
Asia—and building a vast, transnational bureaucracy capable of facilitating these adoptive 
relationships on a large scale.  The moment in which the adoption plan could be advertised 
unabashedly as a tool of American influence in China, however, was short-lived.  Only four 
years after the end of WWII, the Chinese Communist Revolution of 1949 called the entire global 
humanitarian project in China into question.  But rather than dismiss the adoption plan as a tool 
of the American imperialists, the new Chinese Communist authorities instead sought to 
transform it into a new mode of “people’s diplomacy” that could secure ideological and material 
support for the Chinese Communist revolution abroad.  In the new People’s Republic of China, 
the practices of global intimacy developed by the NARC and the CCF would be put to use in the 










On July 1, 1949, a Chinese girl named Yin-ho, who lived and studied at the Yu Tsai 
School in the northern suburbs of Shanghai, wrote her monthly letter to her American foster 
mother, Esther, a high school teacher in Worcester County, Massachusetts.  Her letter begins: 
Dear Foster Mother: 
 
It is too bad that we cannot open our mouths and speak to each other directly but can only 
use this piece of white paper to say all that is in our hearts.  But this piece of paper is too 
small for me to say everything.  Would you like to hear more?  Let me tell you!372 
 
Esther paid all of Yin-ho’s expenses at the Yu Tsai School through the China Branch of an 
international child welfare organization called Foster Parents Plan for War Children (zhanzai 
ertong yiyanghui zhongguo fenhui 戰災兒童義養會中國分會; “PLAN China Branch”).  Opened 
in 1947, the PLAN China Branch followed the example of the National Association for Refugee 
Children and China’s Children Fund in utilizing the adoption plan to fundraise for child welfare 
institutions across China.  However, while the PLAN China Branch’s fundraising strategy was 
similar to these other transnational child welfare organizations, its political orientation was 
radically different. 
As it turns out, what Yin-ho wanted to share with her foster mother that day in July 1949 
were all the positive changes she had observed since the People’s Liberation Army had liberated 
Shanghai one month earlier.  Her letter continues:  
It has been one month since the liberation of Shanghai and we can see that things have 
changed.  For example, in the past nothing was ever given to the people in the villages, 
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but now they are given fertilizer and the poorer farmers also get rice.  Also the soldiers 
are never seen bullying the people. 
 
Her letter is also full of seething anger at the American-allied Nationalist Party, whose bombing 
of Shanghai had recently destroyed her classmate’s home: 
There is something else I want to tell you.  It’s that the day before yesterday the 
Nationalists sent planes to come and drop bombs.  They came in the morning as soon as it 
was light and dropped 16 bombs in one place until the whole area was a tragic sight.  We 
have a classmate whose home was bombed.  Luckily no one in the family was killed, but 
everything was destroyed.  The planes did not leave until the afternoon.  It was truly 
terrible! 
 
Yin-ho’s letter was one of thousands that Chinese children sent to their American foster 
parents through the PLAN China Branch’s adoption plan in the years surrounding the Chinese 
Communist Revolution of 1949.  Unlike almost any other source available to the American 
public at the time, these letters offered a child’s eye view of the revolution as it unfolded in real 
time.  For Yin-ho, the revolution meant the arrival of kind Communist soldiers who gave 
fertilizer and extra rice to farmers in her neighborhood.  It also meant that she and her classmates 
lived in constant fear of Nationalist air raids that were laying waste to large residential areas of 
Shanghai with planes supplied by the United States.  In many regards, Yin-ho’s letter was 
strikingly similar to those that children had written through the NARC’s adoption program 
during WWII, describing their harrowing experiences of Japanese air raids and praising the 
Nationalists for rescuing them.  In the summer of 1949, however, it was the American-allied 
Nationalist Party that was conducting the air raids, and the liberators whom Yin-ho described in 
such a favorable light were the Chinese Communists. 
This chapter traces how the PLAN China Branch’s adoption plan became a centerpiece of 
efforts to transform humanitarian practices inherited from the Republican period to meet the new 
ideological and material needs of the Chinese Communist Revolution.  Under the rubric of 
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“people’s diplomacy,” the PLAN China Branch channeled funding to “progressive” child 
welfare institutions while encouraging children to write their foster parents about how they had 
suffered under the American-allied Nationalist regime and were now thriving under the 
Communists.  The PLAN China Branch coordinated with the highest rungs of Chinese 
Communist leadership, but responsibility for carrying out its experiment in revolutionary 
humanitarianism ultimately lay in the hands of the Chinese foster children and their local 
caretakers, who were suddenly thrust into the role of “people’s diplomats.”  The Korean War 
forced the PLAN China Branch to shutter its adoption plan at the end of 1950, but the 
humanitarian networks and strategies it mobilized persisted to play important roles in mediating 
China’s relationship with the world throughout the Mao period.   
  
Between Two Worlds: The Founding of the PLAN China Branch  
The PLAN China Branch was founded in September 1947 as a unique partnership 
between two humanitarian organizations—the U.S.-based Foster Parents Plan for War Children 
(“PLAN”) and the China-based China Welfare Fund (Zhongguo fuli jijinhui 中國福利基金會; 
“CWF”).  While PLAN and the CWF had very different histories, they shared the view that 
officially non-political humanitarian work could serve as a useful means through which to 
advance leftist political causes.  This shared approach to managing the combustible mixture of 
humanitarianism and politics laid the foundation for the two organizations to collaborate on a 
bold experiment to reshape the politics of humanitarianism in the context of the Chinese 
Communist Revolution. 
 Founded by English journalist John Langdon-Davies in April 1937 as the Foster Parents 
Scheme for Children in Spain, PLAN initially worked to support hostels for refugee children 
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fleeing the fighting of the Spanish Civil War.373   PLAN’s founders strongly supported the 
Republicans against General Franco and the Nationalists, and they intended their work to bolster 
the Republican cause.  Nevertheless, they believed that framing PLAN appeals in strictly 
humanitarian terms would best serve its political aims.  The PLAN Board of Directors frankly 
acknowledged as much in its first official meeting on March 24, 1938: “although this Committee 
is created to aid the Loyalists…appeals to the public will be humanitarian, exclusively concerned 
with refugee children.”374  PLAN was chartered as an independent corporation in New York on 
July 13, 1939, and during the course of WWII it gradually expanded its activities to support 
children rendered homeless by war across Europe.  After the conclusion of the war, PLAN 
further expanded to open programs in Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, and China.375  When called upon to justify its continued work in China 
after the Chinese Communist Revolution of 1949, PLAN explained to donors that its “purely 
humanitarian” character required that it not discriminate against children in Communist countries 
for political reasons.376   
In much the same way that PLAN deployed humanitarian aid to support the Republicans 
during the Spanish Civil War, the CWF used its public commitment to politically neutral 
humanitarianism to justify providing aid to the Chinese Communist Party during the War of 
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Resistance Against Japan and the Chinese Civil War.  Song Qingling—better known in the West 
as Madame Sun Yatsen, widow of the Chinese revolutionary hero—founded the CWF as the 
China Defense League (baowei zhongguo tongmeng 保衛中國同盟) in Hong Kong in June 1938 
to raise money and medical supplies abroad for wartime relief work in China.377  While the CWF 
was officially neutral regarding conflicts between the Communists and Nationalists—who were 
then engaged in an uneasy alliance against Japan—it focused on directing aid to Communist-
controlled guerilla areas.  Song explained this logic in an open letter dated September 18, 1943:  
The reason we place our focus on the guerrilla areas is because although they have and 
continue to tie down nearly half of Japan’s military forces in China, yet for three years 
they have not received any military or financial assistance—or any of the medical 
assistance with which our work is particularly concerned.  The domestic political 
blockade has made it so that they do not have doctors, surgical equipment or medicine, 
and they cannot even receive those sent by friends abroad.  We do not demand that they 
be given preferential treatment, but we demand that they be given equal treatment.378 
 
Since most aid provided to China during WWII was given to the Nationalists, the CWF argued 
that the principle of humanitarian neutrality demanded that they rebalance the scales by focusing 
their own work on Communist-controlled areas.  It was not until the liberation of Shanghai in 
                                                
377 The China Welfare Fund has gone by three different names, corresponding to three different stages in its 
institutional history.  From its founding on June 14, 1938 until the end of WWII it was known as the China Defense 
League (保衛中國同盟).  After relocating to Shanghai in November 1945, it was renamed the China Welfare Fund 
(中國福利基金會) and expanded its work to focus on providing for war orphans and other impoverished children as 
well as establishing model medical facilities.  On August 15, 1950, as part of a broader reorganization, it was again 
renamed the China Welfare Institute (中國福利會) to reflect its shift away from fundraising for relief work to 
providing a range of child welfare services on a permanent basis. For clarity and simplicity, I will use the name 
China Welfare Fund (CWF) throughout this chapter.  See “Zhongguo fuli hui jianshi 中國福利會監視” [Brief 
History of China Welfare Institute], SMA: C45-1-25-1, SMA.  On the history of the China Welfare Fund, Xu 
Fenghua徐鋒華 Xu, Shenfen, zuzhi yu zhengzhi: Song Qingling he baomeng—zhongfuhui yanjiu (1938-1958) 身份、
組織與政治：宋慶齡和保盟——中福會研究 [Identity, Organization, and Politics: Song Qingling and the China 
Defense League—China Welfare Institute (1938-1958)] (Shanghai: Shanghai Shudian chubanshe, 2013). 
378 “Gei zhongguo zai haiwai de pengyoumen de gongkai xin 給中國在海外的朋友們的公開” [An Open Letter to 
China’s Friends Overseas], Song Qingling xuanji shang juan [Selected Works of Song Qingling] (Beijing: Renmin 
Chubanshe, 1992), 377. 
151 
 
May 1949 that the CWF abandoned its commitment to political neutrality and threw its support 
openly behind the Chinese Communist Party.379 
 The improbable partnership between these two geographically disparate humanitarian 
organizations was facilitated by an American named Gerald Tannebaum.  Born in Baltimore in 
1916, Tannebaum moved to Shanghai in the fall of 1945 to serve as the deputy director of an 
Armed Forces radio station.380  He quickly befriended Song Qingling, and it was during a dinner 
at Song’s home with future premier of China Zhou Enlai that the two Chinese leaders persuaded 
Tannebaum to remain in China to work for the CWF.  “To help Madame Sun Yatsen is to help 
the Chinese revolution,” Tannebaum recalled Zhou telling him.  Tannebaum agreed, and on July 
1, 1946 he began work as the CWF’s general secretary.381  On a brief visit to New York in 1947, 
Tannebaum met PLAN’s executive chairman Edna Blue, who hired him to help PLAN expand 
into China.382  Tannebaum opened the PLAN China Branch in Shanghai in September 1947 as a 
department within the CWF.383  He would personally serve as director of the PLAN China 
Branch while also continuing his duties as the CWF’s general secretary.  In addition to 
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Tannebaum, the PLAN China Branch hired nine additional staff members, all of whom were 
Chinese.384  
This partnership between Gerald Tannebaum and Song Qingling was briefly the subject 
of gossip that scandalized readers across the world.  On December 8, 1947, Drew Pearson’s 
infamous syndicated column, “Washington Merry-Go-Round,” claimed that Tannebaum and 
Song were engaged in a secret romantic relationship—what Pearson called “the greatest love 
story since King Edward VIII of England gave up the throne of England to marry Wally 
Simpson.”  The idea that Sun Yatsen’s widow—“the Martha Washington of modern China”—
had fallen in love with an American soldier 23 years her junior was so appalling, Pearson 
claimed, that their relationship had been “fearfully hushed up by the Chinese government.”  
Nevertheless, when Tannebaum was discharged from the Army, Song Qingling took the “daring 
step” of hiring him at the CWF so that he could remain with her in Shanghai.385  Covered in 
newspapers from Los Angeles to Shanghai to Mumbai, the story was lambasted as a baseless 
rumor by Tannebaum’s family and by Song Qingling herself.386  To be sure, the reports of Song 
Qingling’s romance with Tannebaum were but the latest in a decades-long string of blatantly 
sexist attempts to undermine her moral stature in light of her persistent criticism of the 
Nationalist Party.387  Regardless of their personal relationship, Gerald Tannebaum and Song 
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Qingling’s shared humanitarian and political commitments would underpin a highly productive 
professional partnership that lasted for decades. 
By the time of the Chinese Communist Revolution in 1949, the PLAN China Branch had 
become a critical humanitarian organization relied upon by dozens of child welfare institutions 
and thousands of children across China.  PLAN advertisements in major American newspapers 
invited readers to become “foster parents” for US $180 per year, payable in $15 monthly 
installments.388  As of 1949, PLAN foster parents had “adopted” 617 Chinese foster children 
who resided in 27 child welfare institutions throughout China.389  The PLAN China Branch did 
not provide cash grants directly to children but rather allocated money to each institution on a 
monthly basis.390  As PLAN-supported child welfare institutions used the funds for general 
expenses like food, clothing, and medicine that benefited all children at the institution and not 
only those in the adoption plan, the PLAN China Branch estimated that approximately 6,000 
children benefited from its support.391  In 1949 alone, the PLAN China Branch received 
donations totaling US $65,516.25 as well as relief supplies valued at US $5,813.21.392 
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Only two years after the founding of the PLAN China Branch, the Chinese Communist 
Revolution rendered the future of all humanitarian activity in China uncertain.  In this period of 
flux and instability, the PLAN China Branch’s status as part of two larger humanitarian 
organizations—one American, one Chinese—would provide both opportunities and liabilities as 
it sought to navigate the seismic shifts in local and global politics wrought by the revolution.   
 
 
The Rise of Revolutionary Humanitarianism 
 
After weeks of fierce fighting, on May 27, 1949 the People’s Liberation Army 
pronounced the city of Shanghai liberated.  For the PLAN China Branch—as for the rest of 
China’s largest, wealthiest, and most cosmopolitan city—the revolution had arrived.  In the 
ensuing months, the PLAN China Branch sought and received approval of its work from the 
highest ranks of the Chinese Communist Party.  In July 1949 Tannebaum traveled to Beijing to 
meet with high-level Chinese Communist officials about the future of both the CWF in general 
and the PLAN China Branch in particular.  While in Beijing, he managed to secure a meeting 
with Dong Biwu, who would soon become vice premier of the People’s Republic of China, and 
his old acquaintance Zhou Enlai.  While Zhou and Dong informed Tannebaum that it was too 
early to determine the long-term future of the CWF, they instructed him that it should continue 
all of its current work and even “increase its work if not limited by manpower and financial 
resources.”393  Tannebaum also met with personnel from the foreign affairs office ( waishi ju 外
事局) to discuss “the overall situation of organizations from different countries conducting relief 
                                                
393 “Zhongguo fuli jijin hui 1949 nian zongganshi nianbao 中國福利基金會 1949年總幹事年報” [China Welfare 
Fund 1949 Annual Report of the Secretary-General], C45-1-2-1, SMA. 
155 
 
work in China.”394  As of the summer of 1949, the PLAN China Branch had secured explicit but 
temporary approval from the highest echelons of the Chinese Communist Party. 
The Chinese Communist government allowed humanitarian organizations like the PLAN 
China Branch to continue operating without a determination on their long-term futures until 
April 1950, when it convened the Chinese People’s Relief Congress (zhongguo renmin jiuji 
daibiao huiyi 中國人民救濟代表會議) in Beijing to establish official policy toward social 
welfare and relief work.395  A standing committee highlighted by Vice Premier Dong Biwu, 
Minister of Health Li Dequan, and Song Qingling presided over the meeting.396  Tannebaum also 
attended in his capacity as general secretary of the CWF and director of the PLAN China 
Branch.397  The Congress established the People’s Relief Administration of China (Zhongguo 
renmin jiuji zonghui中國人民救濟總會; “PRAC”) to coordinate and supervise social welfare 
and philanthropic activities nationwide.398  Among the meeting’s most passionately debated 
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topics was whether to continue accepting humanitarian aid from countries like the United States 
now considered among China’s foremost enemies. 
Speaking on the Congress’s second day, Song Qingling articulated a vision for a new 
model of humanitarianism that would meet China’s pressing social welfare needs while fostering 
ties with progressive forces around the world.  Later published in the People’s Daily, Song’s 
speech stands out as among the most influential public testimonials for how global 
humanitarianism could serve the Chinese Communist Revolution.399  She began by emphasizing 
how the CWF’s global humanitarian activities had contributed to the Communists’ victory in the 
civil war, singling out the PLAN China Branch for particular praise: “Before liberation, the 
recipients of PLAN aid were progressive or potentially progressive organizations.  At that time, 
these schools and children’s institutions had very few other sources of funding.  Through 
PLAN’s help, they were able to survive this extremely difficult time.”400  
Song acknowledged and echoed the Congress’s widespread criticism of “imperialist” 
humanitarian organizations that “use the issue of relief aid as an artifice for attacking new China.” 
Nevertheless, she did not call for ending all Western philanthropy in China.  Rather, Song called 
for using the transnational connections forged through humanitarianism to “transform foreign 
people’s opinions” of China.  In contrast to “formal government and news reports,” global 
humanitarianism could better accomplish this goal by building “people-to-people relationships,” 
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which Song argued were “more easily embraced by the people of imperialist countries.”  The 
PLAN China Branch’s adoption plan, which sought to foster intimate ties between Americans 
and Chinese children, was the ideal vehicle for this new model of humanitarian aid.  In citing the 
continued importance of its work “in accordance with the policies of the People’s Government,” 
Song trained a national spotlight on the PLAN China Branch as a model humanitarian 
organization for the Communist era.401 
Song’s address to the Chinese People’s Relief Congress was well received.  She wrote to 
Zhou Enlai afterward, “The Congress unanimously praised the China Welfare Fund’s past 
work…Therefore, we will continue with our previous work projects and should plan to 
strengthen their development so that they can serve as models for the entire country.”402  Song’s 
selection as the first chairman of the PRAC further affirmed her vision for China’s continued 
involvement in global humanitarian activities.403  In effect, her performance at the People’s 
Relief Congress had green-lighted a bold experiment in revolutionary humanitarianism—an 
experiment to be spearheaded by the PLAN China Branch and the children under its care.  
Maintaining a clear line of demarcation between “revolutionary” and “imperialist” 
humanitarianism was far from easy.  While the Congress was still in session, Song received news 
that PLAN headquarters in New York intended to work with other more conservative relief 
agencies including United Service to China and Church World Service to secure U.S. 
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Government aid for famine areas in China.404  Blindsided, she immediately cabled executive 
chairman Edna Blue to demand that she cut off all relations with those other relief groups.  On 
April 26, 1950—only one day after her speech to the Chinese People’s Relief Congress—Song 
wrote to the PLAN China Branch’s deputy secretary-general Zhang Zong’an to express her hope 
that “Mrs. Blue did not understand the political significance of her agreement.”  “If this is not the 
case,” she added ominously, “then I feel the time has come to tell Foster Parents Plan for War 
Children that we do not want their help anymore.”405  The episode quickly blew over, and the 
PLAN China Branch continued its work uninterrupted.  Nevertheless, the wide gulf between 
Song’s public assurances and private doubts foreshadowed the delicate tightrope act that she and 
the PLAN China Branch would have to maintain in pursuing their global humanitarian agenda in 
the context of surging Chinese nationalism and the quickly descending global Cold War. 
 
The Adoption Plan as “People’s Diplomacy” 
The sheer volume of correspondence between Chinese children and their foreign foster 
parents marks the adoption plan as a highly significant avenue of communication between 
ordinary Chinese and Americans at a moment when the two nations were fast becoming enemies 
on opposite sides of a global Cold War.  As stated in the PLAN China Branch bylaws, all 
children in the adoption program were required to write one letter to their foster parents every 
month.  If a child failed to write for two or more consecutive months without a valid excuse, the 
PLAN China Branch would consider terminating their financial assistance through the 
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program.406  In the year and a half between January 1949 and July 1950—the crucial period 
surrounding the Chinese Communist Revolution—Chinese children wrote 6,385 letters to their 
foster parents as part of the PLAN China Branch’s adoption plan.  During that same period, 
American foster parents sent 1,437 letters to their Chinese foster children.  These numbers would 
be even greater if not for disruptions to China’s domestic and international postal services in 
1949 due to the civil war.407  In July 1948 the Ta Gung Pao had reported that some American 
foster mothers would send their Chinese children four or five letters in a single month.408   
The PLAN China Branch sought to utilize this voluminous correspondence to win 
support for the Chinese Communist Revolution abroad—a strategy it termed “people’s 
diplomacy” (renmin waijiao 人民外交).  In its 1949 annual report, the PLAN China Branch 
argued that by providing an intimate view into how children’s lives had improved under 
Communist rule, children’s letters were winning friends for the Chinese revolution within 
American society: 
Before liberation, the content of the children’s letters reflected the bleakness and 
corruption of the reactionary Nationalist regime and their collusion with the American 
government.  On the other hand, since liberation the children’s letters have instead 
reflected the excellent discipline of the People’s Liberation Army and the new People’s 
Government as well as the children’s own progress. Their letters have made some PLAN 
donors believe that China is a country with a bright future and that the Chinese 
Communist Party isn’t what the American media makes it out to be.409 
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The PLAN China Branch did not claim that it could turn large swaths of American society in 
favor of the Communist Party.  Instead, the report deployed anecdotal examples of children’s 
letters influencing their foster parents to suggest the effect such programs might have if carried 
out on a large scale: 
There is one donor who has adopted a student at the Yu Tsai School who works for an 
American radio station.  He read a letter written to him by the student he sponsors out 
loud over American airwaves.  This is exactly what we’re hoping for.410 
 
One letter at a time, children could reveal to their sponsors a different side of the Chinese 
Communist revolution from what they read in the newspapers. 
In order for children’s letters to function effectively as “people’s diplomacy,” the PLAN 
China Branch issued prescriptions regarding both the content and structure of their letters.  In 
November 1949 the PLAN China Branch published a book called Work for the Suffering 
Children (Wei kunan ertong er gongzuo 為苦難兒童而工作) that posed the issue succinctly:  
“How can we take the exchange of ordinary pleasantries and dull greetings and transform them 
into people’s diplomacy and international propaganda?”  To achieve this goal, the book 
suggested potential topics for children’s letters: “the construction of new China, the glorious 
achievements of the People’s Liberation Army, the contrast between the People’s Government 
and the government of the Nationalist reactionaries—all of these can serve as subjects for the 
children to report on.”411  In a 1950 internal report, the PLAN China Branch outlined three stages 
through which children’s letters could progress as they continued to write their foster parents 
each month:  
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Stage one: Report stories from their institutions after liberation or the conditions of living 
in their villages since liberation. 
 
Stage two: Recount the glorious achievements of the people’s government, such as 
stabilizing commodity prices and self-help through production. 
 
Stage three: Discuss the international situation, such as the peace signature movement 
and the Korea issue.412 
 
The PLAN China Branch even went so far as to suggest specific narrative strategies suited to the 
particularities of the American psyche:   
Generally speaking, the majority of Americans’ political level is low, but they are 
relatively inclined to seek out facts.  For this reason, they will not easily accept empty 
sayings and slogans and on the contrary will feel an aversion to them.  On the other hand, 
they are willing to accept narrative stories and specific facts and examples…We think 
that the people who lead children in writing letters should grasp hold of this type of 
propaganda and reporting.413   
 
Through both personal stories and concrete details, children’s letters could influence Americans’ 
perception of China better than the dogmatic slogans of government propaganda.  
 
Figure 3.1.  Work for the Suffering Children: Foster Parents Plan for War Children China 
Branch Work Report (Zhanzai Yiyanghui Zhongguo Fenhui, 1949).  This book was published in 
November 1949 to explain the PLAN China Branch’s adoption plan to domestic audiences. 
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The PLAN China Branch maintained close communication with PLAN headquarters in 
New York in an effort to maintain its support for their work in Communist China.  One report 
back to PLAN headquarters read: 
In relation to the “liberation” of China, the implementation of FPP program has been put 
in so advantageous a position that…FPP’s work is no longer limited by political 
geography and because of the tremendous influence of the new era all the institutions 
begin to make progress in big strides.414 
 
In addition to sending general work reports and translated excerpts from the inspection 
department’s reviews of PLAN-supported orphanages, Gerald Tannebaum kept in close personal 
correspondence with executive chairman Edna Blue.415  In one letter, he sought to reassure her 
that children’s letters accurately reflected their experiences of the Chinese Communist 
Revolution: “It was no propaganda that the PLA soldiers would not touch a needle or a thread 
which belonged to the people, and which many of the children wrote to their foster parents.  It 
was actual fact.”416  These internal reassurances that the Communist Revolution had benefited 
PLAN’s work in China complemented children’s letters to their foster parents as a crucial aspect 
of the PLAN China Branch’s strategy of people’s diplomacy. 
 
“Using the Heart to Influence the Mind”: The Politics of Global Intimacy 
 The PLAN China Branch recognized that children’s letters could only be politically 
effective if the children maintained close, affectionate relationships with their American foster 
parents.  To this effect, the PLAN China Branch sought to use children’s letters to foster what it 
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called “sentiment across national boundaries” (guoji jian de qinggan國際間的情感)—its 
particular phrasing of the concept I call “global intimacy.”417  To be sure, the PLAN China 
Branch thought that building sentimental ties between Chinese children and American donors 
was a valuable end in itself: 
In this way, a lonely and suffering child will feel that on the other side of the Atlantic 
Ocean there truly is a friend who cares about him—helping him to feel a little bit of 
warmth.  Because of the exchange of letters, donors can also feel a sense of responsibility 
toward one particular orphan. As a result, not only can funding continue to be maintained, 
but more importantly a type of international sympathy and humanitarian love can also be 
created.418 
 
At the same time, in internal documents the PLAN China Branch frankly acknowledged that 
maintaining these emotional attachments served both its fundraising and political goals: “The 
work of PLAN is built upon individual relationships.  Whether or not American donors and the 
Chinese children they support have close relationships strongly affects the development of our 
work.”419  Through the exchange of translated letters, the PLAN China Branch sought to 
cultivate intimate ties between Chinese children and their American foster parents that were both 
emotional and economic, humanitarian and political.  
The intimate disclosures contained in children’s letters were not spontaneous outpourings 
of emotion but rather the result of the PLAN China Branch’s concerted efforts to facilitate the 
formation of affective bonds between American foster parents and Chinese children by providing 
what was in effect an education in epistolary intimacy.  In order to balance the twin imperatives 
of teaching foster parents about the Chinese revolution and sustaining their emotional investment 
in their foster children, the PLAN China Branch’s 1949 annual report instructed that children’s 
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letters “must be soft in tone but firm in substance” (wai ruan nei ying 外軟內硬).  The report 
went on to acknowledge, “Of course, this requires a comparatively high level of epistolary skill.  
Therefore, our education department must ensure that they clearly understand this point.”420  By 
1950, the PLAN China Branch had refined its prescriptions on children’s letters into a concise 
formulation:  “Use the heart to influence the mind” (cong ganqing dao lixing 從感情到理性).421  
Preserving affectionate ties with American foster parents would help ensure that children’s 
stories of revolution were read with sympathy and open-mindedness. 
The PLAN China Branch also sought to apply a veneer of equality to the adoption plan 
by replacing the familial terms of address children had long used for their sponsors with the 
language of friendship.  At the PLAN-funded Shanghai Home for Destitute Children, this change 
was implemented in August 1949.  In his July 1949 letter, a boy named Ping-wei addressed his 
monthly letter to his sponsor, a woman named Ruth, “Dear foster mother” (qin’ai de yimu親愛
的義母).  He signed the letter “Your foster son” (yi’er 義兒).422   Just one month later, however, 
Ping-wei addressed his letter “Dear foster friend” (qin’ai de yiyou 親愛的義友) and signed it 
using the identical term “foster friend.”423  This new practice of avoiding overtly hierarchal 
language was unevenly enforced, and as long as the basic structure of foreign adults providing 
money to Chinese children remained unchanged, it seems unlikely that this shift in terminology 
would have caused either party to view their relationship as one between equals. 
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The imprint of the PLAN China Branch’s prescriptions is visible in the generic quality of 
many of the children’s letters.  For example, on July 8, 1950, a 14-year-old boy named Cheng-
chung at Shanghai Boystown Orphanage wrote a letter that skillfully applied the PLAN China 
Branch’s recommendations.424  His letter begins: “Whenever I write letters to you a feeling of 
warmth and intimacy often rises up inside of me.  This is because of the correspondence we have 
been exchanging back and forth.”  Only after this affectionate opening does his letter turn to 
politics: “I love peace.  I hate those warmongers who go about starting wars…I think that you 
also must support peace.  Have you signed your name on the peace petition yet?  I have already 
signed my name.”425  Written shortly after the United States had intervened in the Korean War, 
the letter (and the peace petition to which it referred) was clearly critical of the United States.  
However, by writing in broad terms against “war” and in favor of “peace,” Cheng-chung’s letter 
“used the heart to influence mind” by being “soft in tone but firm in substance.”   
 In some cases, however, children’s letters went well beyond these generic requirements 
to express a deep sense of family intimacy with their sponsors.  On February 17, 1949 a boy 
named Pao at the Baillie School in Gansu Province wrote to his foster mother Phyllis: 
Your words are just those like those of my own mother ringing in my heart.  You said 
that you love me so much.  Now, we are mother and son.  If the mother loves the child, 
the son no doubt also loves her.  From the bottom of my heart I love you.426 
 
For some children, it was the exchange of photographs with their foster parents that contributed 
to a strong sense of familial intimacy.  A boy named Chi-hai wrote, “When I hold up my pen to 
write the letter to you, I first looked at your photograph for some time…Although it is only a 
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picture, it is as though I am talking to you face to face.  Really my little soul is always with you.  
It is as if my lonely heart has found my mother’s arms.”427  Other children even described 
meeting their foster parents in dreams.  In an interview with the New York Herald Tribune, 
PLAN advisor Julia Chen relayed (probably hyperbolic) reports of children who spoke of their 
American foster parents in their dying breaths: “In nearly every case where a child in the plan 
has perished in the course of the war, she said, the workers in charge have reported that he died 
speaking of his American foster parent.  Often the sick child’s last act has been to write a letter 
thanking his foster mother and asking her not to grieve.”428  While relationships between Chinese 
children and their American foster parents rarely reached such levels of emotional intensity, 
these letters and many others like them testify to the emotional significance that children and 
their foster parents might invest in their “adoptive” relationships.  
 
“We Do Not Have Enough Control over the Children’s Letters”: Translation, Censorship, 
and the Problem of Off-Script Letters  
 
Imposing rigid discipline on children writing from 27 institutions in 14 cities across 
China was easier said than done.429  Every one of the letters written by children through PLAN 
China Branch’s adoption program that I have read is unique.  With the exception of children who 
were too young to write, PLAN China Branch bylaws required that all children write out their 
letters in their own hand.430  The great variety of handwriting seen across these letters—
sometimes precociously elegant, sometimes clumsy and juvenile, sometimes all but illegible—
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confirms that this rule was at least generally observed.  Oftentimes, letters deviated dramatically 
from the PLAN China Branch’s recommendations.  The PLAN China Branch readily admitted as 
much in an internal report from 1950: “We do not have enough control over the children’s letters.  
Since liberation, the children’s political level has become very high, but their propaganda skills 
remain poor.”  For example, the report continued, some children “decry American imperialism 
and lecture to their sponsors, displaying the erroneous tendencies of excessively harsh language 
or excessively leftist ideology.”431  A prime example of one such letter, on July 30, 1950 a boy 
named Chin-Yung wrote to his foster parents:  
Today the people’s most hated scoundrel Chiang Kai-shek is still using American-made 
planes, weapons, and bullets to slaughter his fellow Chinese people.  They are deluded to 
think they can stop the People’s Liberation Army from attacking and liberating the 
people of Taiwan…I don’t understand why some countries want to interfere in the affairs 
of other countries.  Can you tell me in your response?432 
 
The PLAN China Branch partially blamed such harshly worded and overtly anti-American letters 
for the bevy of discontinued adoptions it suffered throughout 1950.  PLAN records show that the 
number of foster parents with adoptions in China declined sharply from 350 in January 1950 to 
134 in November 1950.433   
Yet if the PLAN China Branch worried that children might alienate their sponsors with 
naked political propaganda, an analysis of their letters reveals that more often children deviated 
from their prescriptions by neglecting to promote the Chinese revolution altogether.  On June 15, 
1949, a girl named Hsiu-yun at the Hsiang Shan orphanage near Beijing wrote a letter that 
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eschewed politics and instead shared a poem she composed on a fan she made herself out of 
cardboard: 
The wind blows into the fan 
I grasp it inside of my hand 
If someone wants to borrow it 
They’ll have to wait till winter hits.434 
 
On July 15, 1950, with the United States and China on the brink of military conflict in Korea, a 
boy named Lien-Hsi at the Shanghai Home for Destitute Children wrote his American foster 
parents a brief letter all about his love for summer:  
Summer is very fun.  The cicadas in the trees sing beautiful music.  At night the fireflies 
glow.  I like to catch them and put them inside of a bottle.  I think that summer is very 
fun.435 
 
As these letters and many more like them demonstrate, children were not required to take up the 
explicitly political topics suggested by the PLAN China Branch. 
 Although I have not come across any letters that overtly criticize the Chinese Communist 
Party, some letters painted a bleak portrait of life after liberation.  On July 12, 1949, nearly half a 
year after the liberation of Beijing, a boy named Chih-sun wrote to his foster mother to describe 
what he saw on a fieldtrip they took to the outskirts of the city.  His letter reads like a chronicle 
of misery.  He describes sweat-drenched workers emerging from a coal mine “like ants 
swarming out of a hole” and farmers “working with knitted brows” because drought had led to a 
poor wheat harvest.  Finally, he describes returning to the city to see people who were once 
landlords, rich peasants, and Nationalist soldiers peddling their old possessions to eke out a 
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living.   “Before they enjoyed wealth,” he wrote.  “Now they are suffering.”436  By dramatically 
deviating from the script, letters such as this one reveal that the PLAN China Branch required the 
active participation of children in order for its adoption plan to function as “people’s diplomacy.” 
 When the PLAN China Branch felt that the content or tone of a child’s letter threatened 
its philanthropic or political goals, they turned to the process of translation as a means of 
censorship.  The PLAN China Branch’s book Work for the Suffering Children points out how the 
necessity of translating their correspondence allowed them to mediate the relationships between 
children and their foster parents:  “What needs to be explained here is that they do not 
communicate directly but instead through our organization.  Therefore we can pay close attention 
to and carefully translate their letters.”437  In internal reports, the PLAN China Branch more 
strongly hinted at the censorial function of translation.  The 1949 annual report stated that until 
the education department had successfully trained children in the delicate art of writing letters 
“soft in tone but firm in substance,” “all that we can do is to pay extra attention during the 
process of translation.”438  If these statements are perhaps deliberately vague, careful comparison 
of the original Chinese-language letters with their English translations reveals examples in which 
translation was clearly used a tool for censorship.  On July 29, 1950, a boy named Shu-san at the 
Baillie School in Gansu Province wrote a letter in which he boldly encouraged his foster parents 
to fight for revolution in the United States.439  A literal translation of an excerpt from his letter 
would read: 
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I wonder what it is like in your country.  I think that every one of you must look forward 
to liberation at an early date.  In that case, you must work hard, for in the course of 
liberation there will arise many difficulties.  For example, many progressive thinkers will 
be captured, jailed, and interrogated with torture.  This is a necessary stage of 
revolutionary work, and we can learn important lessons from it while at the same time we 
will come to hate it even more.  This is my opinion.  I do not know if it is correct.440 
 
In contrast, the corresponding section of the PLAN China Branch’s English-language translation 
reads as follows: 
I wonder how is the general condition in your country.  I am sure that every one of you 
wishes to enjoy the full liberty, but it can only be achieved at the cost of countless 
struggles.  In the course of a revolution, it is not uncommon that so many people sacrifice 
their lives in order to realize the happiness of the mass of people.441 
 
In the English translation, “liberation” (jie fang 解放) has been rendered as “full liberty,” and his 
appeal to his foster parents to struggle for revolution has been edited to read as a statement about 
the difficulty of revolution in the abstract.  Clearly, the PLAN China Branch feared that 
encouraging foster parents to incite revolution risked jeopardizing their support for the program. 
 
 
Figure 3.2.  Chinese original and English translation of letter by Shu-san.  The PLAN China 
Branch used the necessity of translating letters as a tool of censorship.  Box 46, Folder 38, FPP. 
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The PLAN China Branch’s practice of censorship through translation benefits the 
historian by rendering the logic of censorship legible.  The PLAN China Branch used its role as 
translator to omit the “excessively leftist” content they found counterproductive, but I have 
encountered no evidence that they fabricated the contents of letters.  They could suggest 
potential topics for children’s letters, coach them on style and tone, and even censor problematic 
passages, but the PLAN China Branch ultimately relied on the children themselves to provide the 
unique content of people’s diplomacy through their inimitable stories of life during the Chinese 
Communist Revolution. 
 
Children’s Tales of Revolution 
 Children’s letters to their American foster parents are unique for the immediacy with 
which they conveyed life during the tumultuous, heady days of the Chinese revolution for a 
foreign audience.  In as much as they were part of a carefully crafted plan to secure material and 
ideological support for the Chinese Communist Revolution abroad, an analysis of these letters 
can help unpack the specific content of “people’s diplomacy.”  On the other hand, in each letter’s 
uniqueness we can glimpse how a particular group of Chinese children participated in one of the 
great events of twentieth-century world history, not least in their role as letter writers. 
 During the spring and summer of 1949, as the Chinese Civil War entered its final months, 
many children wrote to their foster parents with personal stories of atrocities committed by the 
American-backed Nationalist army. Among the most chilling of these letters are dozens 
describing the Nationalist air raids of Shanghai that left an estimated 810 people dead, 1,494 
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people wounded, and 2,530 homes destroyed between June 1949 and March 1950.442  While the 
Nationalist air raids of Shanghai received significant coverage in the American press, such news 
reports could not compare with the visceral immediacy of letters from children living through the 
bombings.443  For example, on July 3, 1949 a 14-year-old boy named Mao-mao at Shan Hai 
Science and Labor Union wrote to his foster parents: 
One day while we were in class we suddenly heard the buzzing weng weng sound of 
airplanes. Moments later we also heard the rumbling sound of bomb after bomb 
exploding.  The walls inside the classroom shook… Everyone hates the Nationalists’ 
reckless behavior.444 
 
Such letters transformed the Nationalists’ air raids from just one of many far-away tragedies into 
an attack waged on Americans’ very own “adopted” Chinese children. 
In order to fully understand how children’s letters constructed particular narratives of the 
Chinese Civil War for their American foster parents, it is important to cross-reference these 
letters with the case histories sent to foster parents when they “adopted” a Chinese child.  
Through these case histories, the PLAN China Branch could shape the context through which 
Americans would interpret their foster children’s letters.  For instance, on July 1, 1949, a boy 
named Ping-pu wrote a letter similarly expressing outrage at the recent Nationalist bombings of 
Shanghai: “Several days ago Nationalist planes came again to bomb Shanghai.  About 500 
                                                
442 Xie Zhongqiang 謝忠強, “Xin Zhongguo Chengli Chuqi Shanghai Shi Fan Hongzha Douzheng Shulüe 新中國成
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people were killed or hurt.  Now the Chinese people hate the Nationalists even more.”445  
Turning to Ping-pu’s case history, we learn that he was 15 years old, born in Hangzhou, and 
attending the Yu Tsai school.  We also see a first-person account of how he became an orphan:  
As the Sino-Japanese war broke out in 1937, we had lots of air-raids and my parents were 
killed finally in one of the raids which also destroyed our home and everything.  I was 
then only five years old.  I became a beggar in the streets.  In the daytime I begged my 
meals and spent my nights in some dilapidated temples.446 
 
In light of this story, Ping-pu’s July 1949 letter takes on new layers of meaning.  While 
experiencing the Nationalist air raids of Shanghai in the summer of 1949, his mind must have 
flashed back to the Japanese air raids that killed his parents, destroyed his home, and condemned 
him to years begging on the streets.  In the context of his case history, Ping-pu’s letter helped 
build the narrative that the Nationalists had replaced Japan as the new threat to China’s children 
and would need to be defeated if they were to grow up in peace and safety.   
As the civil war came to a close, children in newly liberated areas began to use their 
letters to contrast their previous lives under the Nationalists with their current lives under the 
new Communist government.  In one of the rare letters to directly address the gendered 
experiences of Chinese children, a girl named Tien-tien at the Peking Nursery wrote about the 
new opportunities afforded to girls: 
Our school has added some new students.  They are girls who in the old society were 
oppressed and tricked, which is to say they were sold in brothels…They are eager to 
improve, smart, and lively, and they study very hard…We have a lot of sympathy for 
them.  I truly hate the unreasonable system of the old society.447 
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Other letters conveyed a palpable sense that children were for the first time able to participate in 
important national and international affairs.  Fourteen-year-old Chi-kuan, also at the Peking 
Nursery, described how he had the opportunity to meet a foreign ambassador: “At 4PM on 
Saturday April 15th China’s foreign friend the ambassador of Czechoslovakia showed us a movie.  
It was really interesting.  This is an unprecedented activity.  Because it is the first time a foreign 
ambassador played together with us poor children.”448  Brimming with a newfound sense of 
purpose, such letters painted a picture of the People’s Republic of China as a place where 
children were active agents in shaping a bright future for themselves, China, and the world. 
In certain cases, letters dwelled upon matters that must have struck foster parents as 
unlikely subjects for children to concern themselves with.  For example, on July 10, 1949, 13-
year-old Chung-chin at the Changchow Poor Children’s Home wrote to his foster parents about 
the government’s campaign against currency speculation: “The reason prices fluctuated was 
because there were many silver dollar peddlers stirring up trouble and disrupting the financial 
situation.  So the government ordered the silver dollar peddlers to be eliminated, forbid silver 
dollar trading, and asked the army to help in completing these two great tasks.”449  While 
currency speculation may seem an improbable topic for a 13 year-old’s letter, the PLAN China 
Branch took various steps to provide children with the vocabulary to discuss government 
policy.450  The FPP Correspondent (yiyanghui tongxun義養會通訊), a monthly newsletter 
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distributed to PLAN-supported institutions, published numerous pieces intended to teach 
children about new government initiatives.  In one of the livelier examples, the March 1950 issue 
included the music and lyrics to a song titled “Hurry Up and Buy Commodity-Indexed Victory 
Bonds” (kuai mai shengli zheshi gongzhai ge快買勝利折實公債歌): 
Oh the sun is rising, shining all a-bright 
To issue public bonds is what’s right 
Oh the sun is rising, red in all its might 
To support the government we will fight 
Oh the sun is rising, red for all in sight 
Quick buy public bonds and render great service—all right!451 
 
By transmitting the political education they received at PLAN-supported orphanages to their 
American foster parents, children’s letters provided an essential link between domestic youth 
mobilization and international propaganda. 
 The corpus of Chinese children’s letters sent to the United States through the adoption 
plan raised several questions, as relevant to the PLAN China Branch at the time as they are to the 
historian today.  Who were the Americans receiving these letters?  What did they make of what 
their foster children told them about the Chinese Revolution?  In short, was people’s diplomacy 
working?  To answer these questions, the PLAN China Branch collected information about 
American donors through which it could analyze their class backgrounds and political leanings—
and adjust its program accordingly. 
 
Meet the Foster Parents 
The PLAN China Branch’s fundraising in the United States is best understood in the 
context of a decade-long history of humanitarian fundraising for vulnerable children abroad on 
                                                                                                                                                       
South District Work Group and No. 2 West District Work Group Regarding Opposing Silver Dollar Speculation 
Propaganda Summary],” 1949, C21-1-12-31, SMA. 
451 “Kuai mai shengli zheshi gongzhai ge快買勝利折實公債歌) [Hurry up and Buy Commodity-Indexed Victory 
Bonds],” Yiyanghui Tongxun 義養會通訊 [FPP Correspondent], No. 14 (March 1950), 2.  
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the part of the American left (see also Chapter Four).  As Laura Briggs has demonstrated, 
Americans’ concern with rescuing children overseas emerged in the 1930s out of a “left anti-
Fascist internationalist front” arrayed against German Nazism, Franco’s war against the Spanish 
Republic, and the Japanese invasion of China.  She argues that heart-rending photographic 
images of mothers and children in the midst of these conflicts were “leftist images that 
demanded attention for working-class lives” abroad.  By portraying their subjects as 
“hardworking but down on their luck,” these images simultaneously stirred sympathies for 
vulnerable children across national, racial, and cultural boundaries and “built support for popular 
organizations and socialist movements.”452  Originally focused on helping the Republicans in the 
Spanish Civil War, PLAN had been born out of this 1930s popular front movement.  A decade 
later, the PLAN China Branch’s fundraising campaigns in the United States built upon this 
tradition by seeking to train the sympathies of its progressive, internationalist donor base on the 
figure of the Chinese child. 
 The advertisements that PLAN used to attract donors in the United States provide insight 
into the types of Americans it sought to recruit as foster parents.  Unlike other adoption programs 
that deployed anti-Communist rhetoric, PLAN avoided overtly political appeals and instead 
focused directly on child suffering.453  In some cases, however, PLAN advertisements 
highlighted issues like social inequality more likely to appeal to the American left.  An October 
1948 advertisement quoted a letter from a 13-year-old boy named Chen Tsen-yuan that observed 
                                                
452 Laura Briggs, Somebody’s Children: The Politics of Transracial and Transnational Adoption (Durhma: Duke 
University Press, 2012), 129-135. 
453 For example, in articles announcing the expansion of PLAN’s work into China in the New York Times and New 
York Herald Tribune, executive chairman Edna Blue cited “appalling reports of misery and starvation,” including 
the figure that “90 per cent of the many thousands of corpses picked up in Shanghai streets last winter were those of 
children.  “New Foster Parents Project,” October 1, 1947, New York Times, 32; “China’s Starving Children,” 
November 17, 1947, New York Herald Tribune, 22. 
177 
 
the vast disparities between China’s rich and poor: “In the cold winter it is not much surprise to 
hear that 40 to 50 children with not enough clothes died in one day of coldness…of course the 
rich people wear as much as they can carry.”454  PLAN advertisements also highlighted 
prominent progressive figures who served as foster parents, including first ladies Eleanor 
Roosevelt and Bess Truman, writers Helen Keller and Thomas Mann, and Congressman Will 
Rogers Jr.455 Moreover, executive chairman Edna Blue strongly denounced those who would 
“use relief as a political weapon” by refusing to support children in Communist countries.  She 
was quoted in the New York Times as saying, “They must learn the true meaning of relief work.  
I have never met a child who was a republican, Fascist or Communist.”456  As a result, 
conservatives sometimes criticized PLAN as a “Red front organization.”457  While PLAN was 
officially nonpolitical, it courted progressive Americans as foster parents and publicly criticized 
the use of humanitarianism as a tool of U.S. Cold War foreign policy.  In both these regards, it 
was an ideal partner for the CWF’s experiment in revolutionary humanitarianism.  
As the PLAN China Branch did not receive biographical information about American 
foster parents, they relied upon the information foster parents shared in their letters to gain an 
understanding of the donors who were the targets of people’s diplomacy.  According to their 
analysis, the categories of people most likely to serve as foster parents included students, 
religious people, teachers, community organizations, workers, capitalists, and public figures.458  
                                                
454 “Eyes That Trust, Plead, and Accuse,” October 24, 1948, New York Herald Tribune, F48. 
455 “Eyes that Trust, Plead, and Accuse,” November 16, 1947, Daily Boston Globe, A31. 
456 “Politics is Decried in Aid to Children: Head of Foster Parents Plan Tells of Tour, Defends Help in Satellite 
Countries,” August 18, 1948, New York Times, 22. 
457 See for example, William Fulton, “Push ‘Do-Good’ Schemes Over Radio, In Press: Some Are Drum Beaters for 
Trumanism,” March 19, 1951, Chicago Daily Tribune, 10. 
458 Wei kunan ertong er gongzuo, 11-12. 
178 
 
In addition to creating a demographic portrait of American donors, the PLAN China Branch also 
analyzed their letters to gauge how their participation in the adoption plan affected their views on 
China.  While they found most foster parents ill-informed about Chinese politics, they believed 
that children’s letters were providing them with a favorable impression of the new China:  
From the foster parents’ letters, we can see clearly that the majority of Americans do not 
have a good understanding of the surrounding political situation.  Their letters generally 
discuss things like family affairs and religion.  Although these kinds of people have an 
indifferent attitude toward China, their reaction to the People’s Republic of China has 
actually been fairly good.  Of course, there is also a minority of foster parents’ letters that 
are indeed very reactionary.459 
 
While some sponsors remained “indifferent” to the People’s Republic of China, and a small 
number were apparently downright hostile, the PLAN China Branch initially remained optimistic 
that children’s letters were gradually improving their American foster parents’ views of the 
Chinese Communist Revolution. 
 Unfortunately, I have not been able to locate any original letters that American foster 
parents wrote to Chinese children through the PLAN China Branch’s adoption plan.  However, 
the PLAN China Branch’s book Work for the Suffering Children published two examples of 
letters from American foster parents in Chinese translation.  While these letters should not be 
read as representative of sponsors’ letters in general, they modeled the type of responses the 
PLAN China Branch sought—and at least occasionally received—from American donors.  The 
first letter, from an American identified as “E.H.” to his foster child Ping on April 7, 1949, 
expresses approval of Ping’s commitment to work for social equality:  
I am extremely interested in your determination to dedicate yourself to improving the 
lives of working people…From the perspective of morality, there are some people who 
have too much, and then there are others who have nothing at all and have even been 
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deprived of life’s basic necessities.  This is wrong indeed.  Therefore, we really must 
struggle to improve the lives of such people.460 
 
The second letter, from “Byron” to Zhenru on November 12, 1948, asked after Zhenru’s safety in 
the midst of China’s civil war: “I read with great attention the news about your war.  I pray that 
you and your compatriots will not endure even more suffering.”461  Expressing concern for the 
plight of working people and condemning the suffering wrought by the civil war, these letters 
meshed well with Chinese Communist rhetoric.  By publishing them as examples, the PLAN 
China Branch sought to show a domestic audience that American foster parents were not 
“imperialists” but ordinary people who shared their desires for China’s future. 
Privately, however, the PLAN China Branch’s initial optimism that children’s letters 
were improving Americans’ views of Communist China gave way to the realization that most 
foster parents were unwilling to engage in protracted political exchanges.  A mid-1950 report 
summarized the changes that foster parents’ letters had undergone in the ten months that had 
elapsed since the founding of the PRC: 
Stage 1: Show concern for children’s lives after liberation, very much want to know 
about the real situation in new China. 
 
Stage 2: Apart from the small minority who have reactionary thinking, the majority of 
donors have an initial understanding and favorable impression of China’s People’s 
Government. 
 
Stage 3: They go from not understanding Chinese affairs to having a favorable 
impression, but in the end they ultimately go silent.  The majority of sponsors’ letters do 
not say a single world about China’s domestic situation.  Those that do are a very small 
minority, and they often distort the facts.462 
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As of mid-1950, the results of people’s diplomacy were decidedly mixed.  PLAN had 
attracted a large and diverse group of left-leaning Americans by appealing to themes like 
combating poverty and inequality while publicly criticizing the denial of humanitarian aid to 
people in Communist states.  Moreover, its analysis of foster parents’ letters suggested that many 
had gained a positive impression of the Chinese revolution from their foster children.  
Nevertheless, as time stretched on foster parents became increasingly unwilling to engage with 
their adopted children about the political situation in China, and many stopped writing altogether. 
Internally, the PLAN China Branch complained that “the American imperialists’ actions to 
oppose our people have hindered donations and interfered with the affection between donors and 
their adopted children.”463  With the United States and China on the brink of war in Korea, the 
PLAN China Branch’s adoption plan, already on shaky ground, would face its most difficult 
challenge yet. 
 
Follow the Money (I): The China Welfare Fund Children’s Theatre 
The new approach to global humanitarianism articulated by Song Qingling and 
implemented by the PLAN China Branch sought to meet not only the ideological but also the 
material needs of the Chinese Communist Revolution.  Therefore, an analysis of the politics of 
the PLAN China Branch adoption plan must answer a fundamental question: Where did the 
money go?  The dislocations of the civil war had left China in desperate need of funds to meet its 
basic social welfare needs.  In this context, the PLAN China Branch channeled funding to 
“progressive” child welfare institutions that could simultaneously provide for homeless children 
and train them to participate actively in the revolution.   
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The China Welfare Fund Children’s Theatre (zhongguo fuli jijinhui ertong jutuan 中國福
利基金會兒童劇團, hereinafter “Children’s Theatre”) makes a particularly good case study 
through which to examine how PLAN funds were spent on the ground in China.  First, as the 
only PLAN-supported institution directly operated by the CWF, it served as a model of the type 
of institution to which the CWF sought to direct global humanitarian aid.  Moreover, the PLAN 
China Branch closely monitored and explicitly endorsed the Children’s Theatre’s work.  Its 1949 
annual report counted the Children’s Theatre among several institutions that “maintain complete 
and friendly cooperation with PLAN.”  Finally, while in some cases PLAN funded only a small 
number of children at a large institution, it directly supported nearly two-thirds (30 of 48) of the 
children at the Children’s Theatre.464   
Founded in Shanghai in the spring of 1947, the Children’s Theatre was a children’s 
theatrical troupe consisting primarily of orphans and other impoverished children.  Equal parts 
child welfare institution and performing arts ensemble, it provided shelter, education, and 
vocational training to its members while also offering cultural programming for a mass audience 
of children.  However, in the context of full-scale civil war between the Communists and 
Nationalists, the Children’s Theatre quickly found its work implicated in the political conflict.  In 
1948 the Children’s Theatre rehearsed an original play titled The Circus (xiaoma xiban 小馬戲
班) that they intended to perform at schools throughout Shanghai.  However, the vast majority of 
school authorities declined their offer, apparently fearing that association with Song Qingling 
and the CWF might attract negative attention from Nationalist Party agents.  Instead, the 
Children’s Theatre turned to underground Communist Party members who connected them with 
“progressive” teachers and students interested in the performance.  Ultimately, they staged 
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performances in nine separate locations over nine consecutive days, reaching an audience of 
more than 10,000 children.465  Through the experience of staging The Circus, the Children’s 
Theatre forged close connections with the underground Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai 
that would fundamentally shape its work until the city’s liberation in May 1949. 
Throughout the early months of 1949, the Children’s Theatre organized highly political 
artistic activities with Communist-affiliated teachers and students—despite the increasing threat 
from school authorities and Nationalist agents.  “Under the watch of secret agents,” Children’s 
Theatre members met clandestinely with students in dormitories, classrooms, and the corners of 
playgrounds.  They taught these students skits about the liberated areas, new-style songs, and old 
folk arts like the lion dance and stilt-walking that they infused with new meanings “explaining 
that the people’s power has already become great, but the dark rule is becoming more intense, so 
that the only option is to struggle—to wage a ruthless struggle with the multitudes of the 
reactionary faction.”  This work carried genuine risks for the children who carried it out.  They 
divided into small groups and frequently switched locations to evade detection, but some 
university students who had attended Children’s Theatre activities were arrested nevertheless.  
The military metaphors through which the Children’s Theatre described this “guerrilla-” (youji 
shi 游擊式) and “shock attack-” (tuji shi 突擊式) style work underscores the extent to which 
they framed their activities as taking part on the side of the Communists in the civil war.466  
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After the liberation of Shanghai in May 1949, the Children’s Theatre quickly emerged as 
one of the city’s most visible and influential cultural institutions.  In the first two years of the 
PRC alone, the Children’s Theatre staged 217 performances that reached an estimated audience 
of 300,000 people.467  They also performed in at least 16 parades and mass demonstrations 
during this period, for occasions ranging from the founding of the PRC to International 
Children’s Day to the Movement to Oppose Currency Speculation.468  As Children’s Theatre 
reports would have it, the children enthusiastically embraced their heavy workload in the name 
of revolution: “They did not know fatigue.  They did not know hardship.  They had but one 
conviction: to work—for the fatherland, for the great working people who were sick and tired of 
pain and exploitation!”469  Children’s letters to their foster parents, however, sometimes tell a 
different story.  Thirteen-year-old Yu-li of the Children’s Theatre wrote: “Recently my health 
has not been good.  I get sick often.  I get sick more than once a week.  This asthma is very 
difficult.  But in this kind of organization, there’s nothing that can be done.”470   
It was the Children’s Theatre’s June 1950 production of Little Snowflake (xiao xuehua 小
雪花) that announced its arrival as a major cultural force in post-liberation Shanghai.  An 
adaptation of a 1948 Russian children’s play by Vera Liubimova about “how the American 
imperialists treat the black children within their own country,” it was their largest and most 
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ambitious production yet.471  Little Snowflake was performed 30 times throughout the summer of 
1950 at Shanghai’s Lanxin Theater, reaching a total estimated audience of 58,000 people, the 
vast majority of whom were children.472  A deeply ideological play that achieved wild 
popularity, Little Snowflake offers a vivid illustration of how the Children’s Theatre channeled 
humanitarian funds into a potent mixture of social welfare, youth mobilization, and international 
propaganda.   
Little Snowflake sought to educate children about American capitalism, imperialism, and 
racism while evoking their sympathy with oppressed people around the world.473  Set at an 
American school, the play follows the tribulations of a black boy named Dick (nicknamed “Little 
Snowflake”) who is abused by a white girl named Angel and her father Big Capitalist Bill.474  
The child actors of Little Snowflake often filled their letters to their sponsors with their own 
interpretations of the play’s educational value.  As 15-year-old actor Su-ping wrote, “This play is 
mainly to teach children not to have close-minded racist thinking.”475  However, beneath the 
surface of its heavy-handed critique of American racism, the plot of Little Snowflake subtly 
reflected the CWF’s efforts to articulate a new justification for accepting global humanitarian aid 
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in the context of surging anti-imperialist sentiment.  The play is full of progressive American 
characters that ultimately succeed in defending Little Snowflake Dick against Big Capitalist Bill.  
Fervent advocates for downtrodden children, they symbolized international progressive forces 
through which the CWF sought to build a new and revolutionary global humanitarianism.   
Did Little Snowflake achieve its didactic goals?  Contemporary accounts suggest that the 
play was extremely well received.  In some cases, audience reactions were downright raucous.  
One vivid account from October 1950 describes (perhaps with some embellishment) the visceral 
responses of an audience of children:   
When the black child was arrested by American agents — how they shouted!  How they 
yelled!  “Dick, look out!  There’s someone behind you who wants to arrest you!” And 
when the black child escaped from jail with his clothes ripped and his body bloody from 
beatings, the actors cried and the audience cried with them.  They cried with passion and 
some even sobbed out loud.  However, when that capitalist again appeared on the stage, 
the children’s tear-stained faces turned angry.  “Scoundrel!  Hey!  Get out of 
here!  Get!”  They stomped the floor with their little legs and stood up from their seats so 
that the theatre fell into chaos and the play was almost unable to continue.476 
 
However, it was not until after the performances concluded that audiences truly got out of hand.  
In his July 4, 1950 letter to his foster parents, Yu-li described the scene that often unfolded once 
the curtain dropped:  
When the performances end, the little audience members come backstage looking to beat 
up the bad guy.  The manager says to them, “This is just a play, please don’t do that.” But 
the little audience members still charge backstage.  “It doesn’t matter, the bad guy still 
must be beaten!” So in the end they still cause a bit of trouble.477 
 
The written reflections of the children and adults who watched Little Snowflake provide 
further evidence of the play’s profound impact.  After attending a performance, a 14-year-old girl 
named Chung-lan wrote her foster parents to describe what she took from the show: 
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Because white people can simply beat black people to death and the government doesn’t 
care, when we saw the white people beating the black people, some of my classmates 
cried, and I cried too.  I think that white people and black people are both people.  Why 
can white people bully black people like that?  It really is not right.478 
 
Chung-lan’s intense emotional response to the violence depicted on stage prompted her to reflect 
more broadly on the injustice of racial inequality.  Chung-lan and her classmates were not unique 
in being deeply affected by the play.  After one performance of Little Snowflake, a middle school 
teacher wrote a letter to the Children’s Theatre declaring, “There is not a single advanced teacher 
who could within one hundred minutes produce even one percent of the effectiveness of this 
work!”  The manager of the Lanxin Theater where the performances were held claimed, “Ever 
since this theatre opened, this play has gotten the best reaction.  It really lets you see the power 
of New China!"479   
To be sure, the money that the PLAN China Branch sent to the Children’s Theatre was 
used to provide food, shelter, education, and vocational training to the poor and orphaned 
children who were its members.  At the same time, the Children’s Theatre used PLAN funding to 
participate deeply and meaningfully in the Chinese Communist Revolution—sometimes to an 
extent that risked the health and safety of the children under its care.  By utilizing PLAN funds 
for its potent mixture of social welfare work, youth mobilization, and international propaganda, 
the Children’s Theatre offered a new model for how to deploy global humanitarian aid in the 
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Follow the Money (II): Shanghai Boystown 
In addition to the Children’s Theatre, another of the most prominent institutions to 
receive PLAN China Branch support was a home for troubled youth called Shanghai Boystown 
(shaonian cun 少年村).  Shanghai Boystown was originally founded by the Buddhist Jingye 
Society in June 1940 as a wartime shelter for “street urchins” (liulang ertong 流浪兒童) called 
the Jingye Foundling.480  After the conclusion of WWII, the Jingye Foundling was moved to 
Dachang in the northern outskirts of Shanghai and rechristened Shanghai Boystown after Irish 
Priest Edward Flanagan’s famous “Boys Town” orphanage in Nebraska.481  The prominent 
Buddhist writer and philanthropist Zhao Puchu was chosen to serve as its superintendent.482 
 Shanghai Boystown began accepting PLAN funding in September 1947, and it quickly 
became almost entirely dependent on the adoption plan to meet its basic expenses.483  Sixty of 
the ninety children at Shanghai Boystown were enrolled in the adoption plan, and monthly 
financial reports show that PLAN funding was stretched to cover everything from food, clothes, 
and medicine for the children to staff salaries and repair work.484   In fact, a February 1950 report 
acknowledged that Shanghai Boystown “relies solely on PLAN’s allowance for its monthly 
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expenses.”485  The PLAN China Branch’s educational and inspection departments visited 
Boystown regularly, and like the Children’s Theatre, it was listed among the institutions with 
which the PLAN China Branch maintained “complete and friendly cooperation.”486   
Shanghai Boystown closely collaborated with the underground Communist Party in 
Shanghai, hiring numerous underground Party members as teachers, their salaries paid with 
PLAN funds.  The head instructor at Shanghai Boystown was an underground Party member 
named Wang Juan who worked under the alias Wang Danren.  She later remembered, “We 
primarily used our work at Boystown as cover to penetrate deeply into the city and carry out 
some other activities.  However, we also had a responsibility to educate the children and youth of 
Boystown.  We also looked for opportunities to impart some revolutionary principles and to train 
and bring up some activists.”487  In September 1948 Wang Juan and two other Boystown 
teachers were convicted of conducting organizational and propaganda work for the Communist 
“bandits” and given multiyear prison sentences.488  However, their arrests appear to have been 
treated as isolated cases and did not significantly disrupt life at Shanghai Boystown.489 
 What lessons did these teachers impart to the children under their care?  Letters from the 
children at Shanghai Boystown to their American foster parents suggest the strong ideological 
bent of the education they received.  On June 26, 1949, a boy named Zonghong wrote, “Since I 
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have also suffered the pain of exploitation and oppression, now that I have freed myself, why 
would I not use my strength to work for the people?”490  Two months later Lien-shoo wrote, “We 
still must study hard so that we can reconstruct new China, overthrow the dictatorial reactionary 
forces, and revive democracy, freedom, and equality.  These are the thoughts that are in our 
minds.”491  Clearly, the underground Communist Party members who taught at Shanghai 
Boystown infused their political ideals into the education they provided their students, who in 
turn communicated them to their American foster parents. 
 In addition to learning revolutionary principles in the classroom, children at Shanghai 
Boystown were sometimes enlisted to carry out dangerous tasks on behalf of the Chinese 
Communist Party.  For instance, before the liberation of Shanghai three boys formed a “small 
bicycle team” to secretly transport the prominent Communist educator Duan Lipei between the 
Boystown campus in Dachang and meetings in Shanghai.492  They took a different route each 
time to avoid being followed by Nationalist agents, and sometimes the path was so roundabout 
that what would have been a one-hour ride took an entire afternoon.  However, as one of the 
boys, Shen Miaogen, later wrote, “for the revolution, for the safety of Teacher Duan Lipei, we 
were happy to do it no matter how difficult or tiring.”493  It was a 14-year-old boy named Zhang 
Weizhong who undertook perhaps the most daring mission of any Boystown student.  In order to 
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avoid being caught in the fighting of the civil war, in April 1949 Shanghai Boystown evacuated 
to the original location of the Jingye Foundling in central Shanghai.  They shared the courtyard 
with a group of Nationalist soldiers recuperating from injuries.  As he was young and would not 
attract suspicion, the Jing’an District underground Communist Party instructed Zhang to attempt 
to locate where the soldiers kept their weapons and ammunition.  Zhang frequently went to play 
with the Nationalist soldiers while furtively searching out where they stored their weapons.  
Eventually he discovered that they had thrown their weapons and ammunition into a fishpond 
behind the courtyard.  He informed his teachers, and the People’s Liberation Army was able to 
salvage the weapons and ammunition from the water.494   
In the summer of 1949, many of the older boys left Boystown to join the People’s 
Liberation Army.  Shortly after the liberation of Shanghai, a contingent of PLA soldiers moved 
in beneath Shanghai Boystown in the former courtyard of the Jingye Foundling.  At the 
encouragement of Boystown’s head administrator Zhou Wengeng, many boys enthusiastically 
signed up to join, and 23 ultimately met the requirements and joined the army. Most were 
assigned to serve in the cultural working corps (wen gong dui 文工隊) that staged performances 
to encourage troops on their way into battle.495 A boy named Teh-san wrote to his foster father 
explaining his decision to join the army:  
Although I have left my beloved home Boystown, I will not forget your kindness in 
providing for me…Although our life in the cultural working corps is difficult, I still get a 
lot of joy and comfort from the good impressions we make on the audiences in our 
performances every day.496 
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The zeal with which the youth of Shanghai Boystown volunteered for the PLA is perhaps best 
revealed in the letters of those boys who were turned away because they were too young or did 
not meet the physical requirements.  Chai-po wrote, “Originally I also joined, but I had to come 
back because I did not pass the physical requirements.  I feel very depressed because I know that 
joining the army to serve the people is the most honorable thing.”497  As for those boys who 
succeeded in joining the PLA, little could they have expected that they would soon be deployed 
to Korea to fight against the United States, the country of their former foster parents—and that 
not all of them would make it back alive.498 
 
Unhappy Endings: The Korean War and the Closing of the PLAN China Branch  
Gun-chun was one of the 23 Shanghai Boystown students who joined the People’s 
Liberation Army in June 1949.499  Later that month, he wrote a letter to his foster parents, the 
Macauleys, explaining his decision.  Although he asked them to continue writing, it was in effect 
his goodbye letter: “I am very thankful to you my foster parents for raising us.  Although we 
have entered society on the path to serve humanity, I still hope that you will write to us, and 
finally I hope that you will send me pictures of my foster brothers.”500  In October 1950, 
approximately 14 months after he wrote that letter, China intervened in the Korean War and 
Gun-chun was deployed to the Korean Peninsula, where he found himself at war with the 
country of the people he called his foster parents.   
                                                
497 Letter from Chai-po, July 13, 1949, Box 115, Folder 87, FPP. 
498 “Women canjia le renmin jiefangjun,” 90-91. 
499 “Women canjia le renmin jiefangjun,” 90. 
500 Letter from Gun-chun, June 1949, Box 114, Folder 83, FPP. 
192 
 
As a member of the cultural working corps, Gun-chun’s job was to make costumes and 
props for a dance troupe that performed to encourage the troops.  He was remembered as 
someone who talked little but was painstaking and meticulous in his work.  During the summer 
of 1951, as the Chinese army retreated north toward the 38th parallel, Gun-chun suffered severe 
burns on his face and hands from napalm bombs dropped by U.N. forces.  He was rushed to a 
field hospital for treatment, but shortly thereafter the hospital was caught in an attack and he was 
never heard from again.501  It was not until years later that one of Gun-chun’s former classmates 
and comrades, Wang Wenxiang, looked him up in the military archives and found the 
coordinates of his burial site just south of the 38th parallel.502 
 
 
Figure 3.3.  A portrait of Gun-chun, who left Shanghai Boystown to join the People’s Liberation 
Army in June 1949.  On the right is the final letter he wrote to his foster parents, approximately 
two years before he died serving in the Korean War.  Box 114, Folder 83, FPP. 
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Gun-Chun’s tragic fate illustrates how the PLAN China Branch’s strategy of cultivating 
global intimacy to ameliorate global politics eventually crumbled against the hard realities of war.  
At the time he left Shanghai Boystown, Gun-chun was, by all appearances, an adoption plan 
success story.  He had received food, shelter, and an education through the support of his 
American foster parents, with whom he had built a mutually affectionate relationship.  And he 
left Boystown ready to become a self-sufficient young man through a career in military service.  
Nevertheless, within two years of leaving the adoption plan, he was engaged in a vicious battle 
with the compatriots of his foster parents that would leave him dead, laid to rest in an unmarked 
gravesite in an unfamiliar land.  To the Macauleys, Gun-chun was a “foster son,” but to the 
American warplanes dropping napalm bombs over Korea, he was still simply “the enemy.” 
 By the time Gun-chun met his fate in Korea, the PLAN China Branch had already been 
shuttered.  The officially stated reason for closing the PLAN China Branch in December 1950 
stemmed from a dispute regarding whether PLAN funds could be subject to the approval of the 
People’s Relief Administration of China.  As part of a broader reorganization of the China 
Welfare Fund in 1950, the organization’s new regulations stated that “all money and goods 
donated by international friends must receive the approval of the PRAC before they can be 
accepted and used.”503  On October 11, 1950, Tannebaum wrote to Edna Blue in New York to 
explain this new policy: “The reason for this…is that a national plan on relief and welfare is 
being developed and it is their intention to muster all possible aid to effecting this plan.” 
Tannebaum added that he had met with PRAC vice secretary Dong Biwu, and he assured Blue 
that there was “no question” that the PRAC “clearly understand our operation in China, and are 
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in agreement with allowing us to function.”504  Nevertheless, on November 2, 1950, the PLAN 
General Committee decided that requiring funds to be cleared by the PRAC violated the PLAN 
charter’s insistence that it “should be free from any connection with, or allegiance to any group 
having any political or propagandistic interest of any kind.”  A motion to immediately terminate 
PLAN’s work in China passed unanimously.505   
 The PLAN China Branch, the CWF, and the PRAC were outraged by PLAN’s decision to 
terminate the China program, which they viewed as PLAN succumbing to domestic pressure not 
to do anything that might help the Chinese people under the leadership of the Communist Party.  
Tannebaum wrote to Edna Blue, “The American government is making the breach between the 
Chinese people and the American people wider and wider…[I]f there is anything you can do to 
correct it, the American people will be ever appreciative to you.”506  Nevertheless, PLAN 
headquarters explained in a series of telegrams and letters that it had become “difficult for one to 
believe that the relief funds can directly benefit the children.”  In response, the PLAN China 
Branch reluctantly informed the PRAC that they had no choice but to shutter their operations at 
the end of the year: “We unanimously felt that this was the inevitable result of the American 
imperialists’ longstanding opposition to the Chinese people.”507  In their capacities as chairman 
and vice-chairman of the PRAC, Song Qingling and Dong Biwu replied excoriating the 
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termination of PLAN aid to China as politically motivated: “We were extremely indignant to 
hear of this measure, which is obviously searching for a pretext to treat the Chinese people as an 
enemy.”  However, in a separate letter to the CWF, Song Qingling struck a somewhat softer tone, 
noting that PLAN “always helped the Chinese people in the past.”508 
 Song Qingling, Dong Biwu, and the PLAN China Branch were probably justified in 
viewing PLAN’s stated reason for terminating its China program as “pretext.”  While subjecting 
PLAN funds to PRAC approval could be read as violating the letter of the PLAN charter, PLAN 
frequently coordinated with politicians and government bodies in other contexts.  In fact, 
PLAN’s founding mission in 1937 was to provide funding for an effort by the Duchess of Atholl, 
a prominent Conservative member of the British Parliament who strongly supported the 
Republicans, to establish hostels for refugee children in Spain.  Shortly after closing its China 
Branch, PLAN began operating in Korea, where “institutions were supported only upon the 
recommendation of the Korean Ministry of Social Affairs.”509   
Ultimately, the PLAN China Branch’s experiment in revolutionary humanitarianism 
ended because PLAN’s New York headquarters would no longer fund what it correctly 
perceived as a humanitarian program that benefited the Chinese Communist Revolution.  At the 
same time, the other large-scale adoption programs that had continued operating after the 
Chinese Communist Revolution, including those of the China’s Children Fund and the 
American-Oriental Friendship Association, were also coming under increasing pressure to leave 
China, albeit for very different reasons. 
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On July 3, 1950, a boy named Da-Chwen at the World Red Swastika Society’s 
Orphanage for Homeless Children in Tianjin wrote a letter to his foster mother Shirley in which 
he mused on the importance of self-sufficiency:  
Everyone says that only the People’s Government can help the people solve their 
difficulties.  It is right to use our own abilities to overcome disaster.  Depending on other 
people is not a fundamental solution.  Don’t you agree?510 
 
It is unclear whether Da-Chwen intended the irony of writing such a letter to the woman who had 
financially supported him for several years.  Regardless, his words were prescient.  China’s 
intervention in the Korean War in October 1950 lent new urgency to a campaign to achieve 
national self-sufficiency in providing for social welfare needs.  In this context, Chinese officials, 
intellectuals, and child welfare workers revived the Marxist argument that humanitarian 
programs facilitated imperialism in China by rendering China’s most vulnerable citizens 
dependent upon imperialist largesse.  Among the most prominent humanitarian programs in 
China, the adoption plan emerged as a focal point of this critique—with profound consequences 
for the future of the global humanitarian enterprise in China and across East Asia. 
  
                                                





The Humanitarian Cloak: The Birth of Cold War Humanitarianism In East Asia 
 
 
In 1947 Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek donated their former wartime 
residence—a 100-acre estate consisting of 21 stone buildings in the picturesque hills overlooking 
the Yangzi river in Chongqing—to serve as the location for an orphanage to be named Chiang 
Memorial Children’s Village (zhongzheng fu you cun 中正福幼村).511  They entrusted the 
operation of the orphanage to an American Southern Baptist missionary named Dr. J.R. Saunders.  
In order to raise money, Saunders created the American-Oriental Friendship Association (zhong 
mei youyi xiehui 中美友誼協會; hereinafter “AOFA”), which fundraised for Chiang Memorial 
Children’s Village and other Christian orphanages in China through its own version of the 
“adoption plan” for international child sponsorship.  In one typical fundraising brochure, 
Saunders encouraged American donors to “adopt” Chinese children and “rear them as your own”: 
Through the adoption plan, individuals, families, and groups in the United States and 
Canada can adopt children in China.  They can write to the children they are sponsoring 
and receive replies; many parents take out adoptions for their children and through 
correspondence build up a lasting friendship.  Our Homes emphasize the Adoption Plan 
with its possibilities for understanding, goodwill, and mutual benefit to both the child 
adopted and the child’s sponsor.512 
  
While the AOFA’s adoption plan celebrated affective bonds of friendship and family 
across national, racial, and cultural lines, such transnational intimacies also became infused with 
urgent political significance in the context of the Chinese Communist Revolution and the 
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emerging global Cold War.  A September 1948 AOFA newsletter asked, “Can you think what 
will be the danger to Christianity and Democracy if the 15,000,000 orphan children of China are 
allowed to become Communist?  When you say you can do nothing to prevent the spread of 
Communism, ARE YOU SURE?”513  The political significance of the adoption plan was also 
readily apparent to the new Chinese Communist authorities in Chongqing.  When the Chongqing 
Branch of the People’s Relief Administration of China (zhongguo renmin jiuji zonghui 中國人民
救濟總會; hereinafter “PRAC”) investigated Chiang Memorial Children’s Village in 1951, they 
were appalled to find that children still “carried around pictures and letters from their American 
parents and from foreign children.”  Their report framed the effects of the adoption plan in 
alarmist terms as compromising the political loyalty and even the very Chinese-ness of the 
children: “They look down upon their own fatherland, lose respect for their own nationality, and 
despise their fellow compatriots.”  It quoted one child named Ssu-Chun—who had been 
“adopted” by a man named John from Marion, Virginia—as telling investigators, “I would rather 
be an American’s dog than a Chinese person.”514 
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Figure 4.1.  Photograph of a boy named Sun at Chiang Memorial Children’s Village receiving a 
letter from his American sponsor and writing a reply.  Asia Calling, Vol. 1, No. 5, 3. 
 
 
Throughout the summer and fall of 1951, the PRAC Chongqing Branch waged a 
campaign to reverse the effects of the adoption plan by getting children to recognize that “the 
kind of harm the American imperialists’ had done to their thinking was even more sinister than 
physical abuse.”  The campaign culminated with the children participating in a mass 
denunciation meeting (kongsu hui 控訴會) in which they renounced the intimate ties they had 
forged with foreigners through the adoption plan.  A boy named Er-hsiang, who had been 
“adopted” by a couple in Perry, Georgia, was among the first to speak: 
“Before I did not know that they had come to poison and deceive us, and I even thought 
that they had come to give us help and be good to us.  Only now do I know that Saunders 
is an imperialist element.  He insulted our dignity and poisoned our character.  I truly hate 
him!”  
 
Shortly thereafter, a boy named Ling-yung, who had been adopted by a man named King See in 
Manila, the Philippines, also rose to speak: “In the past I listened to the imperialists’ rumors and 
hated the Communist Party and the People’s Liberation Army.  Now I understand that I had 
drank his poison.”  One by one, other children followed suit in making their denunciations.  
After each child spoke, he or she took out the photographs and letters they had saved from their 
foster parents and tore them up before their classmates and teachers.  Er-hsiang’s letters from his 
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foster father Geo, Ling-yung’s photograph of his sponsor King See—all ended up with the 
ripped remains of global intimacy accumulating by the fistful on the ground beneath the 
children’s feet.515 
 The striking image of the children of Chiang Memorial Children’s Village ripping their 
former sponsors’ letters and photographs to shreds at a mass denunciation meeting provides one 
dramatic illustration of the processes through which China systematically dismantled foreign-
funded humanitarian institutions during the early 1950s.  In the immediate aftermath of the 
revolution, Chinese Communist leaders had endorsed the PLAN China Branch’s efforts to utilize 
the adoption plan to transform children into “people’s diplomats” who could secure material and 
ideological support for the revolution abroad (Chapter Three).  However, in the context of the 
Korean War, the adoption plan instead appeared to have created a sizeable group of children 
emotionally and economically indebted to China’s greatest military and ideological enemy—the 
United States.  Paradoxically, the very aspect of the adoption plan that had made it seem such a 
promising program for forging a new “revolutionary humanitarianism”—the transnational 
intimate relationships forged between Chinese children and foreign adults—also made it a 
dangerous example of how “imperialist humanitarianism” might subvert the revolution from 
within. 
This chapter uses the adoption plan as a lens through which to analyze the dismantling of 
global humanitarianism in 1950s China.  I argue that the uprooting of the humanitarian order in 
post-revolution China fundamentally reshaped the geopolitics of humanitarianism in East Asia, 
foreclosing the possibility of a humanitarianism of international solidarity and ushering in a new 
age of “Cold War humanitarianism.”  The adoption plan figured centrally in this process.  
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Focusing particularly on two case studies—the AOFA-funded Chiang Memorial Children’s 
Village in Chongqing and the CCF-supported Canaan Children’s Home in Beijing—I trace how 
children’s affective loyalties became a key battleground in the campaign to discredit foreign 
philanthropy in China.  In the context of China’s participation in the Korean War and the 
emerging Cold War, the intimate ties between children and their foreign “foster parents” became 
potent symbols of how humanitarianism functioned as a “cloak” for imperialist encroachment.  
Eventually forced to leave China, humanitarian organizations like the CCF and AOFA 
redistributed aid to East Asian Cold War hotspots such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, and South 
Korea, where they reimagined the adoption plan as building sentimental bonds between the 
United States and its Cold War allies.  Intimate relations and international relations became 
deeply intertwined through the practice of humanitarianism in the global Cold War. 
 
“All Honest People”: Humanitarianism and International Socialism Before 1950 
Debates over humanitarianism in post-revolution China were shaped by the uneasy 
partnerships forged between humanitarian organizations and international socialist groups during 
the first half of the twentieth century.  Marxist critiques of humanitarianism date back to The 
Communist Manifesto, in which Marx and Engels list humanitarianism as one instance of what 
they term “bourgeois socialism.”516  According to Marxist logic, humanitarianism reinforced 
global inequalities by sanding the roughest edges off of imperialism and colonialism.  By 
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providing services like orphanages and famine relief, humanitarians sought to convince natives 
to associate imperial powers with noble beneficence while ignoring the imperialist exploitation 
that created the conditions of near-constant humanitarian crisis in the first place.  As Sam Moyn 
has observed, Marx-inspired critiques of how humanitarianism reinforces global social 
hierarchies remain the “near orthodox view of humanitarianism” among scholars today.517  
Despite their presumed ideological hostility, humanitarianism and international socialism 
developed a surprisingly symbiotic relationship as they both grew into globally significant 
movements during the first half of the twentieth century.  During the Russian famine of 1921-
1922, Lenin and the Bolsheviks actively courted humanitarian aid.518  In a dramatic appeal “to all 
honest people” published in U.S. newspapers, the Russian writer Maxim Gorky declared, 
“Russia’s misfortune offers humanitarians a splendid opportunity to demonstrate the vitality of 
humanitarianism…I ask all honest European and American people for prompt aid to the Russian 
people.”519  Despite virulent anti-communism in Europe and the United States during the early 
1920s, both the International Committee of the Red Cross and Herbert Hoover’s American Relief 
Administration (“ARA”) answered the call—launching what was at the time “the greatest 
humanitarian aid program in the history of the world, involving dozens of nations and as many 
charitable organizations.”520  In order to overcome American resistance to donate to Bolshevik 
Russia, Hoover’s ARA helped pioneer the use of photography and film to cultivate sympathy for 
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the victims of humanitarian crisis.521  Not only did humanitarian aid during the Russian famine 
help the Bolsheviks survive a major crisis of their early rule, the famine was also “a major 
turning point in the emergence of a feeling of international solidarity in response to natural 
disasters.”522  During the 1930s, the American left became increasingly involved in humanitarian 
efforts at home and overseas (Chapter Three).  In the midst of the Great Depression, 
photographers such as Dorothea Lange of the Farm Security Administration depicted the 
suffering of migrant women and children to combat anti-immigrant sentiment and make the 
moral case for economic relief.  At the same time, heart-rending images of child refugees fleeing 
conflicts in China, Spain, and Germany dramatized the human toll of the rise of fascism.523  In 
the Popular Front struggles of the late 1930s, humanitarians and socialists were often closely 
allied in efforts to combat fascism in Europe and Asia. 
After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Chinese causes rapidly ascended to 
the forefront of the global humanitarian conscience, and China became one of the primary fields 
for humanitarian-socialist collaborations.  In response to the devastation of Chinese industry 
wrought by the Japanese invasion of coastal China, a group of prominent left-wing figures in 
China—including New Zealander Rewi Alley; Americans Edgar Snow, Helen Foster Snow, and 
Ida Pruitt; and the British Ronald Hall—promoted the Chinese Industrial Cooperative Movement 
(zhongguo gongye hezuo yundong 中國工業合作運動) as a way to alleviate poverty and 
unemployment.524  Contributions from foreigners and overseas Chinese poured in from at least 
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10 countries, totaling approximately US$ 5 million during the course of the war.525  Thanks in 
particular to the insistence of Song Qingling and Rewi Alley, a significant portion of funds was 
directed to the Communist base area at Yan’an.  By 1941, the Yan’an base area was home to 41 
industrial cooperatives with 1,041 members.526  In a September 1939 letter to Ronald Hall 
praising the cooperative movement, Mao Zedong wrote, “the size of its contribution to our 
struggle is beyond measure.”527  
In addition to the Industrial Cooperatives Movement, Song Qingling’s China Defence 
League also deployed the rhetoric of international solidarity to advocate for humanitarian aid to 
the Chinese Communist Party.  In 1943, the China Defence League published an English-
language book called In Guerilla China that combined forceful appeals for humanitarian aid to 
the Communist-controlled “Border Regions” with heroic descriptions of Chinese Communist 
“guerillas” as “the forces that have bitten deepest into the Japanese Fascist lines.”528  In a 
February 8, 1944 letter “To American Workers,” Song asked them to “openly express their hope 
that the people fighting Fascism behind the lines of the Japanese invaders are also able to receive 
a share of supplies befitting of their combat mission.”529 
The most celebrated symbol of humanitarian selflessness in China’s WWII was the 
Canadian Communist medical doctor Norman Bethune.  After briefly serving in the Spanish 
Civil War, Dr. Bethune worked as a medical volunteer in Mao’s Eighth Route Army for two 
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years before dying of blood poisoning on November 12, 1939 from a cut on his finger sustained 
while performing surgery on the battlefield.  On December 12, 1939, Mao wrote a memorial 
titled “In Memory of Norman Bethune” (jinian bai qiu en紀念白求恩) that cemented his heroic 
status within the Chinese Communist Party.530  By the early PRC, Dr. Bethune was lionized as 
the embodiment of the new ideal of “revolutionary humanitarianism” (geming rendao zhuyi革命
人道主義).  In a December 1952 essay titled, “Learn From Comrade Norman Bethune’s Spirit of 
Revolutionary Humanitarianism,” President of the Chinese Medical Association Fu Lianzhang 
praised Bethune as having “manifested the noble spirit of communism and internationalism.”531  
The celebration of Norman Bethune’s “revolutionary humanitarianism” provided an ideological 
and rhetorical framework through which humanitarianism might be incorporated into the 
emerging social welfare system of the People’s Republic of China. 
 
Strange Bedfellows: Christian Humanitarianism in Communist China 
Inheriting these global and local histories of fraught cooperation between humanitarian 
organizations and international socialist movements, the PRC leadership was initially divided 
over whether and under what conditions China should continue to accept humanitarian aid from 
abroad.  The nature of this divide is well-illustrated by the very different speeches delivered by 
Chairman of the PRAC Song Qingling and Vice Premier Dong Biwu at the Chinese People’s 
Relief Congress in April 1950.  Song forcefully articulated her vision for a new model of 
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humanitarianism as “people’s diplomacy” that could secure much-needed material aid while also 
forging people-to-people links with “progressive” forces abroad.532  In contrast, Dong accused 
the United States in particular of using the “cloak of humanitarianism” (rendao waiyi 人道外衣) 
as cover for a “reactionary political plot” to destroy the revolution.  Situating American 
humanitarianism in the context of the United States’ “so-called Asia policy,” he quoted U.S. 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson as calling relief aid to China “a great opportunity to win back 
the Chinese people’s hearts and strike a blow to the Soviet Union.”533  While Song emphasized 
how aid from abroad could help the PRC, Dong warned that it could be a Trojan horse 
undermining the revolution from within. 
 In the meantime, humanitarian institutions and local officials were already taking the 
initiative to negotiate how to continue humanitarian work across the ideological battle lines of 
the emerging Cold War.  The efforts of China’s Children Fund to carve out a role as an 
American Christian philanthropy in Communist China are emblematic of this brief but 
significant moment in which humanitarian organizations sought to integrate their programs into 
the fabric of the PRC’s social welfare system.  The CCF has been described as “the most 
politically conservative” international child welfare organization in the postwar period, 
deploying its “Christian identity” as a “weapon in the Cold War battle.”534  Nevertheless, 
characterizing the CCF as a dyed-in-the-wool anticommunist organization fails to account for its 
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concerted efforts throughout 1949-1950 to court the support of Chinese Communist officials and 
alter its programs to meet Communist demands.  The CCF’s experiences during this period 
illustrate both the possibilities and limitations of practicing Christian humanitarianism in the 
early PRC. 
After the Chinese Communist Revolution, the CCF was faced with the delicate task of 
simultaneously justifying its work in the rapidly polarizing political climates of Mao’s China and 
McCarthy’s America.  Within China, the CCF used its monthly Chinese-language publication 
Blessed Children to convince Chinese audiences that its humanitarian programs were appropriate 
for China’s new ideological climate.  For example, on the front page of the December 1950 issue 
are two brief articles, “Instructions from Chairman Mao” and the “Pu Kong Orphanage 
Christian’s Pledge,” their parallel placement inviting careful comparison.  Highlighting the 
overlap between Maoist ideology and Christian principles, “Mao’s Instructions” call for a “spirit 
of mutual help” and “pursuing a simple lifestyle.”535  Likewise, the “Christian’s pledge” adopts a 
Maoist vocabulary to demand that children “imitate the spirit of Christ in assiduously serving the 
masses.”536  By very selectively quoting from both Mao and its own Christian tracts, the CCF 
implied that Communists and Christians held shared principles that could underpin the practice 
of Christian charity in Communist China. 
The CCF also sought to convince Chinese readers that its adoption plan specifically was 
suitable for the children of new China.  To this effect, Blessed Children published an article titled 
“Lessons From Incoming Letters” that attempted to apply a facade of equality to the highly 
paternalistic relationships between Chinese children and their American benefactors.  The article 
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reminded CCF children that “many sponsors are groups of ordinary Sunday school children who 
might even be younger than you all!”  It also encouraged children to avoid using formalistic 
expressions of gratitude such as “please frequently favor me with your instructions” (qing duo 
cijiao 請多賜教), which it dismissed as “social niceties of the old society.”  Moreover, the article 
included a Chinese translation of a letter sent by a group of American children in which each had 
written a “life lesson” to share with their Chinese counterparts.  These life lessons focused on 
uncontroversial values like perseverance (“no matter what happens, never lose faith”) and 
helping others (“Don’t laugh at other people, instead you should help them”).537  By selecting 
this particular letter for translation and publication, the CCF implied that the letters children 
received through the adoption plan were innocuous missives that might even inculcate them with 
values that would help them become productive citizens of the PRC. 
 However, the CCF deployed strikingly different rhetoric when justifying its continued 
work in the PRC to American audiences.  In late 1949, CCF founder Calvitt Clarke penned an 
article for China News entitled “Can We Do Business With Communist China?”  His answer was 
a resounding “yes”: 
As for CCF operating Chinese orphanages both within and without Communist China, 
our concern is the Chinese people and especially the children of China.  We ask for the 
privilege of serving them wherever they desperately need us.  Our thinking may differ 
from the beliefs of Communist officials but we Americans have learned in our country to 
cooperate with different races and beliefs.  A child forms a common bond.  And we 
believe that Christ died for us all, for all the round world.”538 
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By invoking universal Christian love as well as the familiar notion that humanitarianism was 
above politics, the CCF argued that to stop its work in China would amount to punishing 
innocent children for the sins of their government. 
 Other China News articles implied that the gravest threat facing children in CCF 
orphanages was not Communist oppression but rather abandonment by their erstwhile American 
sponsors.  The CCF assured donors that Communist officials were permitting its work to 
continue “without interruption,” while also emphasizing that “no funds pass through any 
government official’s hands” and “not one dollar has been lost.”539  In contrast to these measured 
reassurances about Chinese Communist rule, the CCF harshly criticized those Americans who 
had recently canceled their adoptions: 
So frequently of late the office receives letters from former contributors stating, ‘We have 
decided to drop the adoption of our Chinese child.  We do not want to support any 
Communist.’  In the first place, the child isn’t a Communist…In the second place, that 
child, deserted by the friend he prayed for, is much less apt to become a Communist if he 
is cared for in our orphanage, where he is taught the same things he was taught before the 
Communists came, including Christianity, than if he is thrown out into the street.540 
 
Dramatizing the life-or-death stakes of Americans dropping their adoptions, Clarke wrote,  
“Unless there is a marked improvement in income in the next few months I shall have to cable 
instructions to either turn out a percentage of children in all of our orphanages located in 
Communist territory or close up some of the orphanages completely.  Such a cable will be a 
death warrant to thousands of children.”541 
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 As such articles demonstrate, by 1950 the CCF was increasingly forced to defend itself 
against accusations that its work benefitted the Communist Party.  In response to these 
allegations, the CCF began developing the argument that its work in China was actually anti-
Communist because it instilled children with Christianity and love for the United States.  In a 
letter to the State Department’s Director for Chinese Affairs Edmund Clubb, Clarke estimated 
that only one in one hundred letters “shows propaganda or influence upon the child on the part of 
the Communists.”  On the other hand, “many” letters were “full of wishes to see America and 
appreciation for what America has done.”  The CCF also used children’s letters with content 
favorable to the United States to assuage the worries of State Department officials who came to 
investigate their office.542 
 The CCF pursued conflicting public relations strategies in different national and 
linguistic contexts—emphasizing its ability to strengthen Communist rule in Chinese 
publications and its ability to weaken Communist control in American publications.  This 
reflected the very different functions of the CCF China office in Guangzhou—tasked with 
securing continued support from local Communist officials—and the CCF headquarters in 
Richmond—which was responsible for fundraising among an increasingly anti-Communist 
American public.  As a result, both the CCF’s Chinese- and English-language publications 
presented deliberately oversimplified characterizations of its relationship to Chinese 
Communism.  However, the interactions among CCF employees, local officials, and orphanage 
children on the ground in China reveal a messier reality marked by negotiation, conflict, and 
compromise. 
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 In the months after the revolution, the CCF negotiated with Guangzhou municipal 
authorities over the conditions under which it could continue operating in China.  At the 
November 15, 1949 meeting of the CCF’s China Executive Committee in Guangzhou, Chairman 
Calvin Lee summarized the initial compromise they reached: 
The People’s Liberation Army has not interfered in any way with C.C.F. work and [our] 
religious program will not be interfered with if it is carried out on a voluntary and not 
compulsory basis.  Orphans have been asked to join in the propaganda work of the P.L.A. 
but only on a voluntary basis and a few orphans have joined this kind of work on their 
own free will.543 
 
As the CCF had always made religious instruction central to its philanthropic mission, Lee’s 
reassuring language belied a major concession: CCF children and staff would not be required to 
participate in religious activities, and they would be permitted to participate in propaganda work 
for the Communist Party.  As a result of this compromise, Communist ideology gradually came 
to replace Christianity in the instruction offered at CCF orphanages.  In February 1950, 
superintendent Hai Lau Ming of the CCF’s Kiu Kwong Orphanage reported, “Compulsory Bible 
classes have been abolished.”544  By late 1950, children at the CCF-supported Lingnan Industrial 
School were participating in a variety of explicitly political activities, including welcoming 
returning soldiers from the People’s Liberation Volunteer Army, attending an exhibition on the 
“Resist America, Aid Korea” movement, and celebrating the anniversary of the founding of the 
Chinese Communist Party.545   
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 The CCF also proved willing to embrace aspects of the Chinese Communists’ inchoate 
pedagogical philosophy.  At the July 1950 meeting of the CCF South China District Orphanages 
Conference (hereinafter, “SCDOC”), a wide range of fundamental changes to the CCF’s program 
were discussed, including “how to implement a democratic style of looking after children,” “how 
to adapt to the religious life of the liberated areas,” and issues regarding the writing and 
translation of children’s letters.546  At an SCDOC study meeting held on December 2, 1950, 
participants were encouraged to consult a series of reference materials, including a small book 
titled Fostering and Educating a New Generation (peiyang jiaoyu xin de yi dai 培養教育新的一
代) that argued, “The goal of our education is to raise the new generation to possess correct 
ideology and revolutionary disposition.”547  At the same time, the book also devoted 
considerable space to criticizing “extreme” practices, such as struggle sessions that left 
uncomprehending children in tears and teachers who let student “little cadres” grade their own 
exams in the name of democracy.548  While the CCF embraced ideas like “new democracy” and 
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“ideological education,” these concepts were still very much in flux, and more moderate 
interpretations compatible with the CCF’s own pedagogical practices often still prevailed. 
  Nevertheless, the CCF’s efforts to continue funding orphanages via the adoption plan 
during the early years of the PRC were not without considerable difficulties.  Most pressing was 
a lack of funds.  In November 1949 the CCF’s China Office announced that, due to declining 
fundraising in the United States, the CCF would be cutting all staff salaries and all grants to 
affiliated orphanages by one-third.549  While CCF orphanages attempted to make up for 
decreased funding by increasing children’s productive labor, such activities rarely made much of 
a dent in budget deficits.550  Furthermore, the high turnover of children made coordinating the 
adoption plan increasingly difficult.  In February 1950 the China Executive Committee decided 
to send a list of children who had withdrawn to Clarke in Richmond “so he can decide what to do 
about the sponsors of these children.”551 
 Despite these problems, as the year 1950 drew to a close the CCF’s adoption plan 
appeared to all involved to have weathered the tumultuous post-liberation period and carved out 
a role in early PRC society.  In June 1950, Calvin Lee made a tour of several CCF orphanages in 
South China and reported that they were “running smoothly.”552  On June 26, 1950 the Pu Kong 
Orphanage sent 327 letters and hand-drawn cards from its children to the CCF office in 
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Guangzhou to be forwarded to their foster parents in the United States.553  These were apparently 
received in Richmond, where in September 1950 the Executive Committee reported, “our work 
in China is continuing as usual, without interference from the Communist Government.  Much of 
the Christmas mail from China has already been received.”554  There were also indications that 
both Americans and Chinese were willing to continue their support for the adoption plan.  Clarke 
remarked at one meeting, “It would appear from the correspondence that the general public 
throughout America is sympathetic to the needs of the orphan children whom we are helping—
regardless of the attitude of the State Department.”555  And on December 13, 1950, a meeting of 
the teachers, students, and staff of the Lingnan Industrial School voted to continue receiving 
CCF aid through the adoption plan.  As their decision put it, “this is the aid of American friends 
and does not have any relationship with imperialism.”556 
 
“A Living Dr. Norman Bethune”: Laura Richards and the Canaan Children’s Home 
 
In at least one case, Chinese Communist authorities were so impressed with an orphanage 
funded by the CCF’s adoption plan that they offered to transform it into a model of revolutionary 
humanitarianism.  Founded in 1929 by an American Presbyterian missionary named Laura 
Richards, the Canaan Children’s Home in Beijing had been funded by the CCF’s adoption plan 
                                                
553 “Meihua ertong fulihui puguang guer’yuan gonghan美華兒童福利會普光孤兒院公函 [China’s Children Fund 
Pu Kong Orphanage Official Letter],” June 26, 1950, 17-1-124-68, GMA. 
554 “Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of China’s Children Fund,” September 27, 1950, Box IA1, 
Folder 9, CCF. 
555 “Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of China’s Children Fund,” February 1, 1950, Box IA1, 
Folder 9, CCF. 
556 1950 niandu er ci huiyi lu 一九五〇年度二次會議錄 [Minutes of Second Meeting of 1950], 20-3-2-25, GMA.  
215 
 
since 1946.557  Like other CCF orphanages, the Canaan Home coexisted with the new 
Communist authorities for more than two years after the liberation of Beijing.  In fact, in a spring 
1950 letter to CCF sponsors, Richards conveyed the impression that the Canaan Home had 
flourished with the birth of the PRC: “Never before have we had so many teachers;” “Our 
clothing is now better than it used to be;” “The place in which we now live is quite suitable for 
our family.”558  However, Richards’ optimistic tone masked her tense relationship with the local 
cadres assigned to monitor the orphanage.  Beginning in February 1949, CCP cadres regularly 
gathered the children at Canaan Home for evening political study sessions in which they were 
instructed on themes such as “economic exploitation” and “Americans are imperialists.”559  One 
month later, the Canaan Home moved to the former site of the Peking American School, where 
three Communist cadres set up a permanent office from which to inspect the orphanage’s 
operations.560  They interviewed the children one-by-one, probing for evidence of mistreatment 
or that Richards harbored ill will toward the Communists.  At least according to Richards’ 
unpublished memoirs, however, the children remained steadfast in their support of her and 
refused to renounce their Christian faith.561 
 In the course of their surveillance, the cadres apparently developed a begrudging respect 
for Richards’ work providing for more than 200 orphans.  Richards was famously Spartan in her 
                                                
557 Becky Cerling Powers, Laura’s Children: The Hidden Story of a Chinese Orphanage (Vinton: Canaan Home 
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living habits.  As one child, “Zechariah,” later recalled, “She lived the same life as the children, 
eating carrots, wild vegetables, the leaves and stems of sweet potatoes…The better parts of the 
food, like the sweet potato plant, she saved for the feeble men and babies.”562  Richards’ friend 
and former colleague Florence Logan remembered that “Laura’s way of life gave the 
Communists no grounds for their usual accusations against foreigners.”563  As Logan put it, 
“Poverty was her greatest protection, really.  They couldn’t accuse her of mistreating servants, 
things like that.  She was a servant herself.” 564  Like other CCF-sponsored orphanages, the 
Canaan Home also incorporated “daily labor” into the orphanage’s routine, and its publicity 
materials emphasized the spiritual and physical benefits of performing labor.565  Finally, Laura 
Richards was apparently well liked by the neighbors and local community members interviewed 
by the cadres.566   
 In early 1951, the cadres who had spent two years observing Richards’ work at Canaan 
Children’s Home made her an extraordinary offer.  They called the entire orphanage together for 
a meeting and began by generously praising Richards: “She served the Chinese people with all 
her mind and soul.  She gave her life to the cause of the Chinese people.  We admire her. We 
realize that she has no hostility toward the Chinese government.  It is our wish to cooperate with 
her to run this orphanage.”  And then they offered her a deal.  If Richards would discontinue 
religious education and publicly criticize U.S. imperialism, she could continue running the 
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orphanage and would be honored as a “living Dr. Norman Bethune.”567  The CCP’s remarkable 
willingness to make a CCF-funded orphanage into a model of revolutionary humanitarianism 
stands as a testament to the real if fleeting possibilities for humanitarian collaboration across 
Cold War lines. 
The moment, however, would soon pass.  For the deeply religious Richards, who viewed 
Canaan Home first and foremost as an endeavor of Christian faith, the Communists’ offer was 
impossible to accept.  She went immediately to the British Embassy to request help securing an 
exit visa and left China to return to the United States via Hong Kong shortly thereafter.568  
Spurned by Richards, the CCP launched an all-out rhetorical assault on the Canaan Home, 
denouncing it as an imperialist institution in a flurry of newspaper articles, mass denunciation 
meetings, and propaganda materials.  Once imagined as a model of revolutionary 
humanitarianism, the CCF-funded Canaan Children’s Home would instead gain notoriety as a 
symbol of how humanitarian institutions served as a “cloak” for Western imperialist 
encroachment. 
It is important, then, to avoid reading the virulent anti-communism of humanitarian 
organizations like the CCF—and the virulent anti-humanitarianism of the CCP—backward into 
the early years of the PRC.  Near the end of 1950, it appeared as if the CCF’s flexible approach 
to dealing with Communist authorities—and the Communists’ own moderate approach to 
humanitarianism—had made it possible for the adoption plan to survive as a global humanitarian 
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program in Communist China. Within a matter of days, however, the situation would change 
dramatically. 
 
“Just Short of a Declaration of War”: Defunding The Humanitarian Project  
 
The Chinese government’s decision to reverse course and systemically cut off foreign 
funding for philanthropic activities in China originated in the context of reciprocal economic 
sanctions between the United States and China during the Korean War.  In a move the New York 
Times called “just short of a war declaration,” on December 16, 1950 the U.S. Government froze 
all Chinese assets in the United States and barred U.S. ships from calling at Chinese ports.569  
Retaliating in kind, on December 28 Premier Zhou Enlai announced the freezing of all American 
assets in China, including all public and private American funds in Chinese bank accounts.570  As 
the United States was China’s largest provider of humanitarian aid, the decision to freeze all 
American funds immediately threatened the financial viability of the humanitarian project in 
China.  At Chiang Memorial Children’s Village, the effects were immediate.  By January 3, 1951, 
less than one week after Zhou’s order, a significant portion of its funds had already been 
                                                
569 Walter H. Waggoner, “Red China’s Assets in U.S. Are Frozen: Washington Takes Unilateral Action—Tightens 
Ban on Shipping to Mainland,” New York Times, December 17, 1950, 1. 
570 “Suqing meidi zai zhongguo de jingji he wenhua qinlüe shili肅清美帝在中國的經濟和文化侵略勢力 
[Eliminate the American imperialists’ forces of economic and cultural aggression in China],  Renmin ribao, 
December 30, 1950, 1; Henry R. Lieberman, “Red China Seizes American Assets: Order Confiscates Property, 
Freezes Public and Private Funds in Reprisal Move,” New York Times, December 29, 1950, 1. 
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frozen.571  By the end of January, only 3,500 yuan remained accessible—enough to maintain the 
orphanage for only another three months.572 
Korean War economic sanctions help explain the specific timing of China’s decision to 
begin defunding humanitarian work in December 1950, as well as why U.S.-funded institutions 
were targeted earliest and most vociferously.  Nevertheless, tit-for-tat retaliation for U.S. 
sanctions was only a proximate reason for targeting foreign philanthropy.  More significantly, 
Chinese officials and intellectuals had come to identify global humanitarianism as an insidious 
tool of economic exploitation.  On December 29, 1950, the famous writer Guo Moruo, in his new 
capacity as vice-premier of the Government Administration Council, delivered a report titled 
“Guiding Principles for Dealing with Cultural, Educational, and Relief Institutions as well as 
Religious Organizations that Accept American Funds.”573  Unanimously approved by the 
Government Administration Council and published the following day on the front page of the 
People’s Daily, Guo’s report sketched the historical and ideological logics behind the decision to 
bar all American philanthropy in China.574  It was the opening salvo in what would become a 
widespread campaign to expose the pernicious effects of humanitarianism in China. 
                                                
571 “Zhonghua jidujiao weili gonghui fuyoucun 1951nian zhongwen di shi yi ci jilu (baogao fuyoucun zhi yuanqi, 
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Tracing the history of American philanthropy in modern China, Guo’s report argued that 
it was a form of “cultural encroachment” (wenhua qinlüe文化侵略) with the singular purpose to 
“deceive, corrupt, and instill a slave-like mentality” in the Chinese people to facilitate economic 
exploitation.  Guo located the origins of American cultural encroachment in China with the early 
twentieth-century Boxer Indemnity Scholarship Program that funded Chinese students to study 
in the United States.  He quoted a 1906 memorandum by the President of the University of 
Illinois, Edmund J. James, arguing for educational assistance to China on the basis that “trade 
tends to follow moral and spiritual domination far more inevitably than it follows the flag.”575  
For Guo, this quote was smoking-gun evidence that the true motive behind such goodwill 
programs was capitalist exploitation: “This is an imperialist’s own most candid and 
straightforward recognition of the aim of cultural encroachment.”  Such “cultural encroachment” 
proliferated rapidly during the period of Nationalist Party rule, when half of all foreign aid to 
China came from the United States, the largest portion of which was directed to “religious and 
relief activities,” including the funding of more than 200 orphanages.  After liberation, Guo 
contended, these American-funded institutions in China engaged in a variety of tactics to 
sabotage the revolution, including “spreading rumors, committing libel, engaging in reactionary 
propaganda…and even going so far as to hide weapons, collaborate with Nationalist special 
agents, and engage in espionage.”576 
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576 “Zhongyang renmin zhengfu zhengwuyuan guanyu chuli jieshou meiguo jintie de wenhua jiaoyu jiuji jiguan ji 
zongjiao tuanti fangzhen de jueding 中央人民政府政務院關於處理接受美國津貼的文化教育救濟機關及宗教團
體方針的決定 [Central People’s Government Government Administration Council Resolution Regarding Guiding 
221 
 
 In the wake of Guo’s report, a deluge of editorials, essays, and publicity materials echoed 
his arguments in decrying American aid to China.  For example, on December 30, 1950, a front-
page editorial in the People’s Daily titled “Eliminate the American Imperialists’ Forces of 
Economic and Cultural Encroachment in China” deployed evocative metaphors to conceptualize 
the relationship between humanitarianism and imperialism.  “American imperialists use 
economic encroachment to extract the blood and sweat of the Chinese people, and then they 
vainly attempt to use a small bit of the blood and sweat they have extracted from the Chinese 
people to purchase back their loyalty.”  The editorial then proceeds to liken humanitarians to a 
certain type of image-conscious robber: “There exists in this world a certain kind of thief.  He 
pillages your property and then afterward gives you back a few unimportant items and asks you 
to consider him your ‘benefactor.’  The American imperialists are just this kind of thief.”  The 
editorial concludes that of all forms of U.S. encroachment in China, philanthropy was the most 
“venomous”:  
The American imperialists’ huge investment in financial aid to China’s religious, cultural, 
and relief enterprises is for the simple purpose of using these methods to strangle the 
spirits of the Chinese people, cause the Chinese people to mistake enemies for friends, 
and willingly become their slaves.  This is the American imperialists’ most venomous 
encroachment policy.577 
 
As many foreign-funded charitable institutions had connections to Protestant and 
Catholic missions, efforts to delegitimize humanitarian aid to China also overlapped with the 
Three Selfs Patriotic Movement, which aimed to sever ties between Chinese Christians and 
foreign missions and bring religion under state control.  The concept of the “three selfs”—self-
support, self-government, self-propagation (zi yang 自養, zi zhi自治, zi chuan自傳)—dates 
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back to mid-nineteenth-century discussions within the American Board of Commissioners for 
Foreign Missions and the British Church Missionary Society on how to develop the native 
church.  In the early 1950s, however, Chinese Communist authorities adapted the three selfs idea 
to appeal to the patriotism of Chinese Christians while encouraging them to confront their 
historical connections to imperialism.  To this effect, a group of left-leaning Christian leaders 
worked with Zhou Enlai to prepare a “Christian Manifesto” that called for rapidly achieving 
independence from foreign money and personnel while resolutely opposing imperialism.578  The 
director of Chiang Memorial Children’s Village, Zhang Junci, was among the first group of 
1,527 Chinese Christians who had signed the manifesto as of August 1950.579   
The chorus of prominent intellectuals and officials who criticized global humanitarian aid 
to China during the final days of 1950 provided an ideological justification for the economic 
sanctions that defunded American-supported philanthropic institutions in China.  Rooted in a 
Marxist analysis of how foreign philanthropy made China’s most vulnerable citizens dependent 
on imperialist charity and therefore unwilling to engage in anti-imperialist struggle, their starkly 
framed critiques presented the dismantling of humanitarianism as a prerequisite for genuine 
independence.  Throughout 1949-1950, local officials had tolerated—and in some cases even 
enthusiastically embraced—the adoption plan as a useful humanitarian program safe from 
accusations of imperialist influence.  In the fateful year of 1951, the new ideological framework 
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provided by Guo’s report would lead to a dramatic reevaluation of the effects of the adoption 
plan on the children of new China. 
 
“The Crimes of Imperialism Against China’s Children” 
 Over the course of 1951, these high-level critiques of humanitarianism morphed into a 
mass movement to systematically discredit and dismantle all American-funded humanitarian 
institutions in China.  A January 9, 1951 directive from the East China Military and 
Administrative Committee instructed, “Without exception, all relief institutions that receive 
American aid are to be taken over by the local branch of the People’s Relief Administration of 
China according to the regulations of the general office.”  The directive further emphasized that 
in addition to taking over operation of American-funded institutions, PRAC officials should 
“launch anti-American patriotic mass movements, so as not only to break off economic 
connections to American imperialism, but also to completely sweep away the deceiving 
influence of imperialism from political thinking.”580  
 In the spring, as local branches of the PRAC mobilized to investigate foreign-funded 
child welfare institutions across China, they publicized horror stories of gross neglect and 
maltreatment of children—transforming “the crimes of imperialism against China’s children” 
into a national cause célèbre.  On March 7, the People’s Daily ran an exposé about the Holy 
Infant Home for Babies (sheng ying yuying yuan聖嬰育嬰院), operated by Canadian Catholic 
nuns in Guangzhou, alleging that 2,116 babies had died in the past two years, a death rate of 
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94%.581  Two days later, another exposé made similar charges of gross neglect leading to 
astronomical death rates at two orphanages run by Catholic nuns in Nanjing.582  These and 
similar claims also circulated through materials published and distributed by the PRAC, 
including two 1951 booklets titled The Crimes of Imperialism Against China’s Children (diguo 
zhuyi canhai zhongguo ertong de zuixing 帝國主義殘害中國兒童的罪行) and The Crimes of 
Imperialism Against China’s Children (Continued) (diguo zhuyi canhai zhongguo ertong de 
zuixing xuji 帝國主義殘害中國兒童的罪行續集).583  These accusations provoked an 
emotionally charged nationwide backlash.  As of early April, the People’s Daily had received 
112 letters from individuals and groups expressing outrage over the abuse of children at foreign-
funded child welfare institutions.584   
While these scathing indictments helped discredit the humanitarian motives of foreign 
orphanages, by highlighting only the most shocking instances of abuse, such articles left open the 
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possibility of distinguishing between good and bad humanitarians.  If the children at a foreign-
funded orphanage were well nourished and kindly treated, was it still guilty of imperialist crimes?  
As many of the orphanages funded by the adoption plan provided for children’s material welfare 
at comparatively high standards, Communist authorities needed a new line of attack to show that 
these institutions also inflicted serious harm upon China’s children.  In this context, the intimate 
relationships forged between Chinese children and foreign adults via the adoption plan emerged 
as explosive symbols of how the emotional and psychological damage wrought by dependency 
on humanitarian aid could be even more dangerous than physical abuse.   
 The CCF-funded Canaan Children’s Home had first come to the attention of Beijing 
municipal authorities in the summer of 1949, when the students of the Tongzhou Agricultural 
Association Training Class filed a complaint accusing the Canaan Home of preventing three 
children from joining their youth study group.  In response, the Beijing Municipal Civil Affairs 
Bureau launched an investigation that would last nearly two months and uncover problems far 
beyond those raised in the initial complaint.  In addition to criticizing Canaan Home for 
“prohibiting students from joining the study group,” the Civil Affairs Bureau’s report also 
lambasted Canaan for its “dark reactionary rule,” under which children were not permitted to 
leave the premises, converse with the opposite sex, or receive family visits; and in which they 
were coerced into accepting religion.585  No immediate punishments were inflicted on the 
Canaan Home, and Laura Richards gradually managed to win over the cadres stationed there for 
observation.  However, after Richards turned down their offer to continue running the orphanage 
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as a “living Dr. Norman Bethune,” the old accusations against the Canaan Home would come 
pouring forth again—this time in public. 
 After Richards’ abrupt departure, the PRAC Beijing Branch immediately began 
preparations for assuming control of Canaan Children’s Home, and their investigations revealed 
the alarming consequences of children’s perceived debt to their American benefactors.  In early 
1951, Wang Tongxun of Fu Jen University inspected Canaan Home and was shocked to find it a 
world apart, where it was as if the revolution had never occurred: “The children amazingly do 
not even know who the leader of China is.  They ask, how come we do not hear about ‘Chairman 
Chiang’ these days?”  Even more troubling, Wang found that the children’s deep affection for 
their American patrons had rendered them politically disloyal.  When Wang tried to teach the 
children songs such as “The East Is Red,” they resisted and even erased the lyrics from the 
blackboard when he left the room.  As the children explained to him, “Americans saved our lives, 
so we must repay their kindness.”  As far as Wang was concerned, the Canaan Home was 
unassailable evidence of how humanitarianism served American imperialism.   He concluded, 
“Does this not clearly illustrate what American imperialism’s so called ‘relief’ and ‘friendship’ 
as well as the ‘philanthropic undertakings’ they operate in China actually are in the final 
analysis?”586 
 Others who inspected Canaan Children’s Home likewise made explicit the political 
stakes of the children’s intimate ties to the United States.  Highlighting the fact that children 
were given foreign names like “John” (yue han約翰) and “Eve” (xia wa 夏娃), one report 
claimed that the orphanage “made children slowly forget their own parents, their own 
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country.”587  As a consequence, such reports argued, children felt political loyalty to the United 
States over China.  A member of the Beijing YMCA recounted an incident in which an official 
from the Beijing Civil Affairs Bureau asked a child at Canaan, “Is America better, or is China 
better?”  The child responded, “America is better!” The official then asked, “If America and 
China went to war, whom would you help?”  Again, the child answered, “I would help 
America.”588  Published when China and the United States were, in fact, at war in Korea, the 
story underscored the life-or-death stakes of children’s attachment to the United States. 
 
Figure 4.2 The Crimes of Imperialism Against China’s Children (Zhongguo renmin jiuji zonghui, 
1951).  Published by the PRAC in 1951, the booklet singled out the CCF-funded Canaan’s 
Children Home as an example of the emotional and psychological damage inflicted upon 
children by dependency on humanitarian aid. 
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 Even more so than at Canaan Children’s Home, the representatives of the PRAC 
Chongqing Branch sent to investigate Chiang Memorial Children’s Village focused almost 
obsessively on the intimate relationships forged between Chinese children and their American 
foster parents through the adoption plan.  The report they produced described with palpable 
scorn how the adoption plan worked to “stupefy” (ma zui 麻醉) the children:  
Every child is introduced to an “American father,” an “American mother,” and an 
“American child” to be its friend…These “foreign fathers and mothers” then use this 
opportunity to write letters to the children and to send photographs, American picture 
postcards, pictorials, and all kinds of gifts to stupefy China’s children.  Through Saunders, 
the children’s life circumstances are also regularly reported to the “foreign fathers and 
mothers.”  At that time, each Chinese child would carry around pictures and letters from 
their American parents and from foreign children. 
 
In “just this way,” the report concluded, the adoption plan “harms the thinking of Chinese 
children and causes them to forget their own fatherland.”589 
 The PRAC Chongqing Branch report liberally quoted individual children to demonstrate 
the psychological damage wrought by their participation in the adoption plan.  In addition to Ssu-
Chun, who had told investigators he “would rather be an American’s dog than a Chinese person,” 
the report quoted another child named Guoqing who said, “I really wish I could turn into a 
mosquito and fly to America.”590  Comparing themselves to dogs and insects, these children’s 
quotes suggested that the adoption plan debased and even dehumanized children by alienating 
them from their Chinese identity.  Echoing accounts of the Canaan Children’s Home, the report 
added that the adoption plan also caused children to “adopt a hostile attitude to the Chinese 
Communist Party and the People’s Liberation Army.”  If the former superintendent of Chiang 
Memorial Children’s Village, J.R. Saunders, could have seen this report about the children who 
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were formerly his charges, he doubtlessly would have felt very gratified.  AOFA publications 
had often asserted that the adoption plan would hinder the development of communism in China 
by securing children’s loyalty to the United States.  One pamphlet claimed, “Your contribution 
will go far towards preventing the advent of Communism by more firmly cementing the friendly 
relations between the people of this country and those of China.”  Beneath a picture of smiling 
AOFA-supported children, the pamphlet added, “These children will never forget America.”591  
Ironically, the best evidence for these claims would come from the observations of the PRAC 
Chongqing Branch as it prepared to assume control of the orphanage and purge it of all 
American influences.  Saunders had left Chongqing two years prior, but PRAC officials found 
that many children still carried around photographs of their American foster parents.592 
 
“My Knowledge of American Imperialism”: Children’s Narratives in the Campaign to 
Discredit Humanitarianism 
 
These startling findings at Canaan Children’s Home and Chiang Memorial Children’s 
Village gained national notoriety as they circulated through letters, newspaper reports, publicity 
pamphlets, and mass denunciation meetings.  Across all these media, the firsthand testimony of 
children who received aid from abroad emerged as a privileged form of evidence in the 
campaign to discredit global humanitarian work in China.  To be sure, like “speak bitterness” 
sessions and other uses of personal narrative in public discourse in the PRC, children’s 
testimonials were highly generic and only accessible to broader publics through the mediation of 
the newspaper editors who published their letters and the local officials who solicited their 
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participation in denunciation meetings.593  Nevertheless, the broad circulation of children’s 
narratives reveals how the emotional loyalties of children became a key battleground in the 
campaign to uproot the humanitarian project in China. 
 On March 21, 1951, the People’s Daily published a letter from a boy named Enguang 
who had lived at Canaan Children’s Home for more than ten years before entering a vocational 
school attached to Yenching University.  Enguang’s letter made the explosive and true 
allegations that Laura Richards’ husband, Nie Shouguang, who handled the orphanage’s 
administration and finances, had raped two female children in addition to embezzling orphanage 
funds.594  While these were certainly the most shocking and damning accusations, Enguang’s 
criticisms of Canaan Home were not limited to the physical abuse of children.  Framing his 
personal observations in the stock phrases that had begun circulating in condemnations of 
humanitarian institutions, he added, “The American imperialist elements not only abuse them, 
they also provide them with an education of enslavement that causes them to forget their own 
fatherland.”595  Enguang’s letter spoke to how foreign humanitarian institutions endangered both 
the bodies and minds of Chinese children. 
The Canaan Children’s Home also played a significant role in the PRAC’s broader 
publicity campaign to discredit foreign humanitarian work in China.  For example, the PRAC’s 
                                                
593 On the practice of “speaking bitterness” (suku 訴苦) see, Gail Hershatter, The Gender of Memory: Rural Women 
and China’s Collective Past (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011). 
594 “Baowei zuguo ke’ai de ertong.” During the early 1940s, Nie Shouguang (聶受光) raped two teenaged girls at 
the orphanage, embezzled the largest donation in the orphanage’s history, and fled to his ancestral home in Anhui 
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political connections were crucial to allowing the orphanage to continue operating in occupied Beijing.  She never 
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595 “Defend the Loveable Children of Our Fatherland.” 
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book The Crimes of Imperialism Against China’s Children included a lengthy section accusing 
the Canaan Home of seeking to “destroy China’s next generation” through “a false ideological 
education to make children resent their biological parents, resent society, resent their own 
fatherland, and even forget their fatherland.”596  Emphasizing the children’s intimate, familial 
ties to Americans, the book recorded one child’s response when asked to write an essay on the 
topic “my knowledge of American imperialism.”  Refusing the assignment altogether, the child 
retorted, “We were brought up by Americans.  Mother Richards was an American, how could I 
write such a thing?”597   
Orphanages supported by the adoption plan were also prominently targeted through the 
mass denunciation meetings that were frequent spectacles of the Three Selfs Patriotic Movement 
and the campaign to eliminate foreign-funded philanthropy in China.  Chiang Memorial 
Children’s Village gained nationwide notoriety in April 1951 at the Meeting for Dealing with 
Christian Organizations that Accept American Funds in Beijing.  Attended by 151 delegates 
representing Christian organizations from across China, the meeting aimed to “completely sever 
all relations between Chinese Christianity and American imperialism.”598 After three days of 
speeches and small group discussions, the floor was opened for “indignant denunciations” of 
imperialists and their collaborators within the Chinese Church.  Some of the harshest 
                                                
596 Diguo zhuyi canhai zhongguo ertong de zuixing 帝國主義殘害中國兒童的罪行 [The Crimes of Imperialism 
Against China’s Children] (Beijing: Renmin Jiuji Zonghui, 1951), 22. 
597 Diguo zhuyi canhai zhongguo ertong de zuixing, 25.  
598 “Zhengwuyuan wen jiao weiyuanhui zongjiao shiwuchu zhaoji huiyi—chuli jieshou meiguo jintie de jiudujiao 
tuanti—lu dingyi fu zhuren haozhao quanguo jidujiao xintu pubian shenru san zi gexin yundong, chedi geduan yu 
diguo zhuyi de yi qie guanxi 政務院文教委員會宗教事務處召集會議——處理接受美國津貼的基督教團體——
陸定一副主任號召全國基督教信徒普遍深入三自革新運動，徹底割斷與帝國主義的一切關係 [The Religion 
Office of the Government Administration Council Cultural and Education Committee convenes a meeting—Dealing 
with Christian Organizations that Accept American Funds—Deputy Director Lu Dingyi Calls Upon All Christians 
Nationwide to Immerse Themselves in the Three Selfs Reform Movement, Completely Cut Off all Relations with 
Imperialism],” Renmin Ribao, April 17, 1951, 1.  
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denunciations were reserved for a reactionary “guilty of the most heinous crimes”—the 
Chairman of the Chiang Memorial Children’s Village Board of Directors, Bishop W.Y. Chen.599 
Bishop W.Y. Chen was among the most prominent Chinese Christians in the United 
States.  A March 1944 profile in Time magazine referred to Chen as “China’s No. 1 Protestant” 
and dubbed him the “unofficial ambassador of another famed Chinese Methodist, Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-shek.”600  After Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek donated their former 
wartime residence to serve as the location of Chiang Memorial Children’s Village, it was Chen 
who travelled to New York to present the deed to the President of the Division of Foreign 
Missions, Bishop Garfield Bromley Oxnam.601  By April 1951, however, Chen’s American 
celebrity and close connections to the Nationalist government had become his greatest liabilities.  
At the meeting, the Methodist Bishop of North China, Z.T. Kaung, accused Chen of “calling 
himself the Bandit Chiang’s unofficial ambassador and everywhere asking for ‘American aid’ in 
order to serve as [the Americans’] helper in slaughtering the Chinese people.”602  
Even more threatening than Chen’s personal ties to the United States were his efforts to 
forge affective bonds between Americans and Chinese children through his work at Chiang 
                                                
599 “Chuxi chuli jieshou meiguo jintie de jidujiao tuanti huiyi de daibiao kongsu diguo zhuyi liyong zongjiao qinlüe 
zhongguo—bi fanzi, Chen wenyuan deng yi xiang pi zhe zongjiao waiyi jinxing fandong huodong—daibiao men 
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議的代表控訴帝國主義利用宗教侵略中國——畢範字和陳文淵等一向披著宗教外衣進行反動活動——代表
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Christian Organizations that Accept American Funds Denounce Imperialists Using Religion to Encroach Upon 
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600 “Bishop from China,” Time, Vol. 43, No. 11 (March 13, 1944), 79. 
601 “Chiangs Donate Wartime Headquarters to Methodist Church to House Orphans,” New York Times, September 
23, 1947, 19. 
602 Jiang Changchuan, “Wo kongsu jiudujiao bailei chen wenyuan我控訴基督教敗類陳文淵 [I denounce Christian 
Scum Chen Wenyuan],” Renmin Ribao, April 25, 1951, 6. 
233 
 
Memorial Children’s Village.  At the same meeting, Lutheran Pastor Li Muqun also rose to 
accuse Chen of “using ‘donations’ from the war criminal Song Meiling and American 
imperialists…to implement an education of enslavement for China’s children.”  Pastor Li read 
out loud the accusations against Chiang Memorial Children’s Village leveled by a twelve-year-
old child at a previous denunciation meeting:  
They often publicize how rich and good America is and talk about poor and bad China is.  
They often show American movies for us to watch, to see the American kids in the movie 
eating bread with butter and drinking milk with white sugar. They also show movies shot 
in Chinese villages or famine areas for us to watch, to see how Chinese kids suffer.  It 
made many of us kids envy and love America and not love our own fatherland. 603 
 
Again framing the receipt of global humanitarian aid as compromising the national loyalty of 
Chinese children, Pastor Li lent power and credibility to his denunciation by quoting at length 
from a child’s own personal recollections. 
The children of Canaan Children’s Home also participated in mass denunciation meetings.  
On April 28, 1951, more than 20 current and former Canaan children attended a mass 
denunciation session as part of the Meeting for Dealing With Relief Organizations that Accept 
American Funds in Beijing.  Speaking on their behalf, the young writer of the letter to the editor 
of the People’s Daily, Enguang, repeated many of his earlier accusations, reserving especially 
harsh words for Canaan’s American superintendent Laura Richards, a woman he had grown up 
calling “mamma.”604 
 
                                                
603 Li Muqun, “Kongsu mei diguo zhuyi zougou chen wenyuan 控訴美帝國主義走狗陳文淵 [Denounce the 
American Imperialist Running Dog Chen Wenyuan],” Renmin Ribao, April 25, 1951, 6. 
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Denounce American Imperialism using ‘charitable endeavors’ to Cruelly Harm the Chinese People], Renmin Ribao, 
May 5, 1951, 3. 
234 
 
Tattered Remains: The Takeover of Canaan Children’s Home and Chiang Memorial 
Children’s Village 
 
 The on-the-ground investigations of Canaan Children’s Home and Chiang Memorial 
Children’s Village—and the national publicity campaigns these inspired—culminated with the 
formal takeover of the orphanages by local branches of the PRAC.  In the process of assuming 
control of these institutions formerly funded through the adoption plan, the PRAC placed 
particular emphasis on severing children’s affective ties to Americans and rebuilding their 
emotional bonds with China. 
The PRAC Beijing Branch formally took over control of the Canaan Home in March 
1951.  Contemporary accounts of the takeover narrated the event as simultaneously re-instilling 
children with proper familial and political sentiments.  A recurring theme in critiques of the 
Canaan Home had been that it sought to permanently sever children’s relationships to their birth 
parents, many of whom were still alive.  On April 6, 1951, the People’s Daily published a letter 
from a woman named Yumei who 14 years earlier had sent her 3-month-old daughter to the 
Canaan Home due to economic distress after her husband lost his job.  After sending her child to 
the orphanage, Yumei realized that she would never be permitted to take her daughter back. 
“After my child entered the orphanage,” she wrote, “it was just the same as if I had sold her.”605  
Yumei’s account is consistent with CCF policy as described in internal documents.  A February 
1946 document outlined CCF policy regarding parents who wanted to resume custody of their 
children: “For the purposes of nurturing them to become useful adults, all orphans who are 
accepted by this organization cannot be taken back part way through.  If there is a need to take a 
child back, a guarantor must be responsible for repaying all expenses for the period when the 
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child was taken in by this organization.”606  Some children apparently greeted their parents’ 
attempts to retake custody with hostility.  When her father came to reclaim her, a girl named 
“Magdalene” was quoted saying to him, “How cheap!  Before you didn’t support me, and now 
you want to take me back.  Nothing is that easy!”607  In this context, the PRAC Beijing Branch’s 
takeover of Canaan Home was portrayed as reinscribing children’s proper loyalties to family, 
country, and party.  Finally reunited with her daughter after the takeover, Yumei’s letter 
concluded, “If it weren’t for the Communist Party and Chairman Mao, my daughter and I never 
would have been able to reunite.” 
 The PRAC Chongqing Branch likewise viewed its most important task in effecting the 
takeover of Chiang Memorial Children’s Village as severing the transnational intimacies forged 
through the adoption plan and cultivating children’s emotional attachment to new China.  On 
November 15, 1951, the PRAC Chongqing Branch sent a telegram to Superintendent of Chiang 
Memorial Children’s Village, Zhang Junci, announcing that it was dispatching its representative, 
Sun Litai, to formally assume control of the orphanage.  Echoing the language of Guo Moruo’s 
December 1950 report, the telegram justified the takeover by citing how the “education of 
enslavement” provided at Chiang Memorial Children’s Village had turned children into “docile 
servants of imperialism.”608  Another report detailing specific plans for the takeover invoked the 
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“cloak” metaphor deployed by Dong Biwu at his speech to the People’s Relief Congress in April 
1950 and repeated in many critiques of humanitarianism thereafter:  
For the past several years, the American imperialist element Saunders has used the cloak 
of ‘relief aid’ to inflict harm on the thinking of China’s children that is even more sinister 
than physical abuse while deeply inculcating the enslaved reactionary ideology of 
befriending and worshipping America.609 
 
By utilizing familiar language from national-level attacks on humanitarianism, the PRAC 
Chongqing Branch presented its takeover of Chiang Memorial Children’s Village as part of a 
larger, nationwide struggle to reverse the psychological and emotional effects of 
humanitarianism on China’s children.   
 Having framed the adoption plan as causing to children to “worship” America and 
“despise” China, the PRAC Chongqing Branch’s work could only be considered complete when 
the children had renounced their ties to their American benefactors and expressed their loyalty to 
China and the Communist Party.  The PRAC Chongqing Branch began their campaign to win 
back children’s affections by educating them on the “Resist America, Aid Korea” movement and 
organizing other activities designed to “expose the facts of American imperialism’s cultural 
invasion.”  These initial efforts did not meet with much success.  While children expressed 
outrage at “imperialist” crimes, they did not believe such crimes took place at their own 
orphanage, where all children ate their fill and wore warm clothes, and they apparently believed 
the orphanage’s relationship with the United States would continue after the takeover.  However, 
on August 20, 1951, representatives from Chiang Memorial Children’s Village attended a 
meeting for American-funded institutions convened by the Southwest District Military and 
Political Affairs Committee.  Upon returning from the meeting, orphanage employee Hu 
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Decheng presided over intensified efforts to reeducate children’s emotional loyalties.610  The 
successful conclusion of his campaign was marked by the mass denunciation meeting described 
in the introduction—when the children of Chiang Memorial Children’s Village denounced their 
American sponsors and ripped their letters and photographs to pieces. 
The PRAC Chongqing Branch officially took over control of Chiang Memorial 
Children’s Village on November 19, 1951.  To mark the occasion, the children and staff 
organized an elaborate “welcome the takeover” celebration attended by more than 200 people.  
After speeches by representatives of the PRAC, the women’s federation, and local community 
members, the child Er-hsiang spoke on behalf of the 86 children remaining in the orphanage.  
We cannot know what he actually felt as he addressed the audience gathered before him, or 
whether the tattered remains of his foster father Geo’s photograph still seared in his memory.  
But the words he spoke described his and his classmates’ emotional state with crystal clarity:  
“We have never been as happy as we are today!  We have long desired to return to our 
fatherland’s embrace.  Today it really has been achieved.  We feel extremely happy in 
our hearts!”611 
 
As far as the PRAC Chongqing Branch was concerned, it was the “happily ever after” 
punctuating the end of the tale of Chiang Memorial Children’s Village. 
 
The Birth of Cold War Humanitarianism in East Asia  
After being forced out of China in 1951, humanitarian organizations worked quickly to 
transfer funds, personnel, and even children from China to the United States’ Cold War allies in 
East Asia.  The dramatic transformation of China’s Children Fund during the 1950s exemplifies 
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how this uprooting of humanitarian organizations from China reshaped the geopolitics of global 
humanitarianism in East Asia.  On February 6, 1951, the Board of Directors renamed the 
organization “Christian Children’s Fund” (retaining the acronym CCF) and began a dramatic 
global expansion.612  By 1955, approximately 16,227 children in 24 different countries across 
Asia, the Middle East, and Europe were enrolled in the CCF’s adoption plan.  In a testament to 
the geopolitical significance of East Asia in the early Cold War, Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, and 
Taiwan combined to account for 80% of all children supported.613  As the CCF reallocated 
humanitarian aid from China to these new Cold War hotspots, it also reconceptualized the 
adoption plan as creating emotional and economic ties between Americans and their new Cold 
War allies. 
In early 1951, the CCF moved its overseas headquarters from Guangzhou to Hong Kong 
and refocused its efforts on the rapidly growing population of Chinese refugees flowing to the 
British colony.  The CCF made concerted efforts to transfer children out of its south China 
orphanages, and approximately 300 eventually made it to new CCF-funded institutions in Hong 
Kong.614  By 1953, the CCF sponsored 2,131 children at 9 orphanages across Hong Kong, many 
of them recent refugees from China.615  The CCF also began publicizing its work in Hong Kong 
as rescuing child refugees from a cruel and incompetent Chinese Communist regime.  Heart-
rending stories of children left to starve by callous Communist cadres replaced the CCF’s earlier 
reassurances that the Communists were permitting the normal operation of its orphanages.  
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Assistant International Director Edmund Janss offered a tragic tale of what happened to the 
children who could not be relocated to Hong Kong:  
Reports soon leaked out of Red China that these youngsters had been ousted from CCF 
Homes by soldiers of the “People’s Republic.”  A heartbreaking letter from one such 
youngster, Kwang San Sun, was sent to Richmond a few months later: “A soldier gave 
me a small bag of rice and told me to leave.  I asked him, ‘But where shall I go?’  He 
snapped at me gruffly, ‘Wherever you want!’”  The saddest and most poignant part of the 
letter, however, was the closing, where the child said, “Please, dear friend, remember that 
I will never forget your kindness.  Tell my dear sponsor also that I will never forget his 
goodness to me, no matter what happens!”616 
 
The CCF also circulated pitiful narratives of Chinese children orphaned by Communist cruelty 
only to be rescued by the adoption plan in Hong Kong.  For example, John C. Caldwell’s 1957 
book Children of Calamity relayed the tale of Chan Kak Shing, “a bright and attractive boy now 
in the CCF Agricultural Settlement in Hong Kong”:  
My father owned a little land and a shop in the Poo Yue district of South China.  Shortly 
after the communists came into power he was arrested…He hanged himself in prison, 
using strips of bedding and blankets which mother had taken to prison for him…My 
mother died of shock soon after Father’s death.  I was able to escape to Hong Kong.617 
 
In such materials, the CCF rebranded itself as a beacon of hope for the child victims of Chinese 
Communist oppression. 
The CCF also published Chinese-language materials that sought to instill appreciation 
and gratitude for its work among the local population in Hong Kong.  In October 1951, the CCF 
founded a bimonthly Chinese-language magazine called Children’s Voice (tong sheng 童聲) that 
detailed the work at CCF orphanages in Hong Kong and included many firsthand testimonials 
from local children.  A December 1951 article titled “What is the Christian Children’s Fund?” 
noted that 55,000 Americans had contributed to the CCF and challenged readers, “Can we not 
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also be as warmhearted and devoted in fulfilling our duties?”618  Children’s Voice also published 
examples of letters that CCF-supported children sent to their sponsors overseas, such as one 
letter that began, “My dear friend: It has been several months since I have written a letter to you.  
I am very sorry.  I hope that you are in good health, just like I have wished.”619  By publicizing 
these letters to a local audience, Children’s Voice sought to create a sense of intimacy and 
gratitude toward the United States among the people of Hong Kong. 
The ways in which Cold War politics—more so than demonstrated need—came to shape 
the political geography of humanitarian aid distribution is well-illustrated by the CCF’s work in 
Taiwan.  By 1953, the CCF sponsored two orphanages in Taiwan that had enrolled 120 children 
in the adoption plan.620  However, as the missionary in charge of establishing the CCF-funded 
orphanage in Taichung noted, there simply was not much need for its services on the island.  
“Our big problem is that we are starting an orphanage in a place that is really not in need and for 
this reason it will take some time…it does not seem right to take children from good homes and 
put them in an institution just because they are orphans.”621  Why would the CCF put so much 
effort into implementing its adoption plan in a place where it wasn’t needed?  The Cold War 
logic underlying the CCF’s expansion into Taiwan is clearly revealed in a pamphlet advertising 
its work on the island.  Entitled “The Most Anti-Communistic Spot in Asia,” its cover depicts a 
Chinese child spooning rice into her mouth above the caption: “Russia did not supply the rice in 
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this child’s bowl, nor did the Communists in China.  America supplied it.”622  The message could 
not be clearer: providing for the needs of Chinese children through CCF would ensure their 
loyalty to the United States rather than the Soviet Union or the PRC. 
 
Figure 4.3.  “The Most Anti-Communistic Spot in Asia.”  CCF publicity materials about Taiwan 
emphasized how the adoption plan could build sentimental ties between Americans and the 
children of U.S. Cold War allies in East Asia.  J. Calvitt Clarke Box 2, CCF. 
 
 In addition to working with Chinese refugee children in Hong Kong and Taiwan, by the 
early 1950s the CCF was also devoting a great portion of its resources to Japan and Korea, two 
of the United States’ most important allies in East Asia.  By 1953, the CCF supported 1,760 
children in Japan through the adoption plan, many of them the abandoned mixed-race children of 
American soldiers and Japanese women being housed at institutions such as the Elizabeth 
Saunders Home operated by Sawada Miki (Chapter Two).623  The incorporation of thousands of 
mixed-race Japanese children into the adoption plan played a key role in U.S. efforts to 
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transform Japan from WWII enemy into Cold War ally.  As John Caldwell noted in 1957, the 
CCF’s Japan office handled “some one thousand letters between children and their sponsors plus 
between three and four hundred gift packages a year.”624  The CCF explicitly connected this flow 
of money, letters, and gifts between Americans and Japanese children to the overall U.S.-Japan 
relationship.  At a CCF executive committee meeting on July 28, 1952, Overseas Director Verent 
Mills proclaimed, “The Japanese Government is friendly and favorable to the work being done 
by CCF.”625  Both publicly and privately, the CCF framed the adoption plan as serving the 
interests of U.S. foreign policy in Japan. 
 However, it was South Korea that emerged in the mid-1950s as by far the largest 
recipient of CCF aid.  By the time the Korean Armistice Agreement ended hostilities in the 
Korean War in July 1953, the CCF was supporting 4,000 children in 23 homes across South 
Korea.  As of 1955, 8,863 Korean children were enrolled in the CCF’s adoption plan—
approximately 55% of all children enrolled worldwide.626  While the CCF had long cooperated 
with U.S. military forces in China and Japan, it developed a particularly close relationship with 
U.S. forces in Korea.  In 1954, the CCF dispatched William Asbury to conduct a detailed survey 
of Korean orphanages for the U.S. Army Chief of Chaplains.627  In return, the Army provided 
large amounts of material aid to CCF programs in Korea.  That same year the CCF constructed a 
new orphanage called the Nam Buk Home with US $26,000 worth of building materials donated 
by the Army.  In fact, financial support from the Army was so important to the CCF’s Korea 
                                                
624 Caldwell, 73. 
625 “Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of Christian Children’s Fund,” July 28, 1952, Box IA1, 
Folder 11, CCF. 
626 “Proposed Budget for 1955,” Box IA1, Folder 12, CCF. 
627 “Report of the International Director for Christian Children’s Fund for 1954,” Box IA1, Folder 13, CCF. 
243 
 
program that an internal report warned that the withdrawal of a majority of troops in the fall of 
1954 meant “a considerable drop in income for many orphanages.”628  When promoting its 
Korea program in the United States, the CCF again foregrounded anticommunist politics.  One 
typical advertisement, titled “This Picture is as DANGEROUS as it is PITIFUL,” displayed an 
image of an emaciated Korean child beside the warning: “The road to communism is paved with 
hunger, ignorance, and lack of hope.”  Implying that “adopting” such starving children would 
save them from succumbing to communism, the advertisement concluded, “Christian Children’s 
Fund did something about the boy in the picture.  It fed him and saved his life and will give him 
schooling and teach him a trade.”629   
By the mid-1950s, the CCF’s adoption plan had enmeshed ordinary Americans and the 
children of U.S. Cold War allies in a vast web of intimate relationships sustained by the 
transnational circulation of photographs, gifts, letters, and money.  In 1957 it was estimated that 
the CCF’s Korea Office alone handled 50,000 letters between children and their sponsors every 
year.  These connections would endure throughout the Cold War.  For example, from 1968-1969 
one Korean boy named Yoon Tae sent 18 letters to his sponsor, a man named Jackson who lived 
in Tuckerton, New Jersey.  In letters over the years, Yoon Tae wrote to Jackson, "I miss you very 
much;" "I think of you every day and pray for you;" and "I love you very much.  I am very proud 
of you."630  In both tone and content, Yoon Tae’s letters echoed those exchanged between CCF 
sponsors and Chinese children in earlier decades.  However, the new transnational circuits along 
                                                
628 “Overseas Director’s Report for 1954,” Box IA1, Folder 13, CCF; “Proposed Budget for 1955.” 
629 Reproduced in Klein, Cold War Orientalism, 157. 
630 English translation of letters from Yoon Tae to Jackson, November 1, 1968 and August 27, 1968, CCF. 
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which such intimate exchanges took place during the 1950s and 1960s speak to the lasting 
changes to the geopolitics of humanitarianism wrought by the Chinese Communist Revolution. 
 
Conclusion: A Self-Fulfilling Prophecy 
The dismantling of the humanitarian project in post-revolution China fundamentally 
reshaped the politics of global humanitarianism in East Asia—putting an end to once 
commonplace collaborations between humanitarian organizations and socialist groups and 
ushering in a new age of Cold War humanitarianism.  The adoption plan played a key role in this 
transformation.  For the Chinese Communist authorities, the sentimental ties forged between 
Chinese children and their foreign foster parents through the adoption plan symbolized how 
humanitarianism rendered China’s most vulnerable citizens emotionally and economically 
dependent on its ideological and military enemies.  And after being forced out of China in 1951, 
organizations like the CCF reconceptualized the adoption plan as an important way to build 
affective and material ties between Americans and U.S. Cold War allies in East Asia.   
 The history of humanitarianism is typically told as a story of global expansion from Euro-
American origins, in which the recipients of humanitarian aid in the non-Western world appear 
only as victims either rescued or forsaken by the Western actors at the center of the story.  
However, it was the Chinese critics of humanitarianism—from prominent figures like Guo 
Moruo to the children who ripped up their former foster parents’ photographs at mass 
denunciation meetings—who ultimately forced humanitarian organizations like the CCF to 
abandon their work in the PRC and remake their programs according to the political geography 
of the Cold War.  For better or worse, the movement that dismantled the humanitarian project in 
post-revolution China would shape practice of global humanitarianism for decades to come. 
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 Throughout 1949 and 1950 groups like the CCF made significant compromises as they 
sought to carve out a role for Western humanitarian organizations in Communist China.  
Beginning in 1951, however, these same organizations would massively redistribute global 
humanitarian aid for the express purpose of assisting U.S. foreign policy while undermining the 
Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China.  The Chinese intellectuals who attacked global 
humanitarianism as a cloak for imperialist encroachment had framed their argument as historical 






“Dear Daddy”: From People’s Diplomacy to International Propaganda 
 
 
 During the early years of the People’s Republic of China, many of the older children who 
had participated in the adoption plan joined the People’s Liberation Army, and some soon found 
themselves fighting the compatriots of their former foster parents on the battlefield in Korea 
(Chapter Three).  Several of their former caretakers joined the fight as well.  Zhang Zong’an, the 
Assistant Director of the PLAN China Branch, second in authority behind only the American 
Gerald Tannebaum, was among them.  During the mid-1940s, Zhang had attended the American-
founded Baptist Shanghai University  (Hu Jiang Daxue 滬江大學), where she also joined the 
Chinese Communist Party and participated in underground party work.  In 1947 she was hired by 
the China Welfare Fund, serving as Song Qingling’s secretary and conducting translation work 
before her appointment as Assistant Director of the PLAN China Branch.  As a Communist Party 
member who was also well connected within American missionary and philanthropic circles, 
Zhang had been crucial to the PLAN China Branch’s ability to navigate the delicate politics of 
working with an American humanitarian organization in the midst of the Chinese Communist 
Revolution.  For example, in early 1950, when Song Qingling discovered PLAN’s ties to more 
conservative American relief agencies, it was Zhang in whom she confided.  The same qualities 
that made Zhang so valuable to the PLAN China Branch—her excellent English-language skills, 
political credibility, and experience working with a wide variety of Americans—would also 
serve her well in her next line of work.631 
                                                
631 Zhongguo fulihui zhi, 527. 
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 After the PLAN China Branch closed in late 1950, Zhang Zong’an went to work for the 
Enemy Propaganda Division (duidi xuanchuan chu 對敵宣傳處) of the General Political 
Department of the People’s Liberation Army (Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zong zhengzhibu 中
國人民解放軍總政治部).  As an “intellectual cadre,” she worked with a small team of 
approximately ten people to create and disseminate propaganda aimed at American and British 
soldiers in Korea.632  One of the main forms of propaganda they produced were English-
language leaflets—sometimes called “paper bullets”—that were fired out of mortars to shower 
down on U.S. troops.633  Frequently utilizing images of distraught children, these leaflets 
exploited the trauma of family separation to convince soldiers that they were better off 
surrendering to ensure they returned home to their children alive.  At the top of one leaflet was a 
photograph of a group of American children with the caption, “Where are our Daddies and 
Brothers?”  Beneath it was a cartoon drawing of a rotund man labeled “big business” telling a 
group of upset children, “Mustn’t be sad, kiddies.  After all, your daddies and brothers are 
fighting for a good cause—me.”634  Another leaflet adopted the voice of an American child 
pleading, “Daddy, Dear Daddy, Come Home to Us Now.”  It went on to ask, “Aren’t you a 
family man?  Haven’t you a darling sweetheart and kiddies?”635  Yet another leaflet exhorted, 
“Those who love you want you back home, safe and sound.  Don’t get killed and fill one of these 
                                                
632 Cheng Shaokun and Huang Jiyang, Meijun Zhanfu—Chaoxian zhanzheng huoxian jishi 美軍戰俘——朝鮮戰爭
火線紀事 [American Prisoners of War—A Record of Facts from the Frontlines of the Korean War], (Beijing: Hua 
Yi Chubanshe, 2013), 1.  In 1952 the Enemy Propaganda Division was incorporated into the newly created “Enemy 
Army Work Department” (敵軍工作部), which remained under the authority of the PLA’s General Political 
Department. 
633 Cheng and Huang, 5-6. 
634 Cheng and Huang, 2. 
635 “Red ‘Dear Daddy’ Propaganda Barrage Just Dud to Korea GIs,” Feb. 29, 1952, Newsday, 2. 
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permanent graves in Korea.”636  Widely covered in the American press, the Enemy Propaganda 
Division’s leaflets received mixed appraisals from American commentators.  An article in the 
Baltimore Afro-American reported that U.S. soldiers saw the leaflets as a “big joke,” quoting 
Sergeant Major Josh Cunningham of Mobile, Alabama as calling one leaflet “a gem” that could 
not be “any funnier.”637  However, other reports suggested that many U.S. soldiers found the 
propaganda deeply affecting.  Hal Boyle, a prominent Associated Press journalist, reported on 
the emotional effect such leaflets had on U.S. troops.  In one article, he quoted from a letter that 
an “upset” and “disturbed” soldier wrote to him asking how he should respond to such 
propaganda: “We realize that enemy propaganda is one of their greatest weapons…But in our 
position how can we help but believe parts of this?”638 
 
Figure 5.1.  A “paper bullet” produced by the PLA’s Enemy Propaganda Division and 
distributed to American and British soldiers during the Korean War.  Cheng and Huang, 2. 
 
                                                
636 Cheng and Huang, 4-5. 
637 Bradford Laws, “Chinese Propaganda Big Joke to GI’s in Korea,” June 30, 1951, Baltimore Afro-American, 1. 
638 Hal Boyle, “Communist Leaflets in Korea Designed to Upset GIs: Told to ‘Go Home’,” April 5, 1951, Christian 
Science Monitor, 6. 
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The work of the Enemy Propaganda Division drew heavily upon the techniques of 
“people’s diplomacy” pioneered by Zhang Zong’an and her colleagues at humanitarian 
organizations such as the PLAN China Branch.  In some regards, these leaflets were like a 
distorted mirror image of the adoption plan advertisements that Zhang had helped produce just a 
couple of years earlier.  They deployed images of distraught and pleading children—figured as 
potential war orphans—to appeal to the familial and humanitarian sentiments of their intended 
American audiences.  Moreover, they sought to mobilize the affective ties between parents and 
children divided across national and geographic boundaries to shape international opinion of 
China and its role in the world order.  In this case, however, it was the American parents who 
were in war-torn East Asia, and the kids anxiously awaiting word of them on the other side of the 
Pacific Ocean were their own children.   
Zhang Zong’an’s work for the Enemy Propaganda Division offers just one concrete 
example of how former humanitarian workers in China went on to important careers within the 
burgeoning field of international propaganda.  After the decision to ban all foreign philanthropic 
aid to China in December 1950, the Chinese and foreign workers who had administered 
humanitarian programs like the adoption plan were left looking for new ways to leverage their 
cosmopolitan backgrounds into viable careers while also reaffirming their political loyalties.  For 
many of them, the rapidly growing importance of international propaganda, and the 
accompanying demand for people with the skills to produce and distribute it, provided the best 
opportunity to accomplish these goals.  Nevertheless, transitioning into international propaganda 
work required people like Zhang Zong’an to utilize the multicultural knowledge and 
transnational social networks they had gained from decades in the discredited fields of 
humanitarian and missionary work to create propaganda that was deeply critical of their former 
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vocations.  There was thus an irony at the heart of Mao-era international propaganda: it relied 
upon missionary and humanitarian networks to propagate its critique of the missionary and 
humanitarian enterprises in China. 
 This chapter traces the roles of former adoption plan administrators in building China’s 
international propaganda capacities during the 1950s and 1960s as a case study to illustrate the 
crucial importance of missionary and humanitarian networks inherited from the Republican 
period in the construction of the Mao-era international propaganda industry.  In using 
“propaganda” to translate the Chinese term xuanchuan 宣傳, I do not mean to convey—as the 
English-language word does today—the sense of necessarily biased or misleading information.  
Rather, I use “propaganda” to translate xuanchuan in the way it was understood in Chinese at the 
time—as publicizing or promoting an organization, institution, or cause.  Most producers of 
international propaganda understood their work as correcting biased or misleading information 
by faithfully “explaining China to the world.”639  I analyze the emergence of China’s 
international propaganda “industry” in the 1950s across three distinct but overlapping fields: 
enemy propaganda work within the People’s Liberation Army, foreign-language print journalism, 
and the film industry.  Veterans of the adoption plan, including virtually the entire high-level 
staff of the PLAN China Branch, played prominent roles in each of these fields.  But perhaps 
even more striking than the transfer of personnel from humanitarian to propaganda work was the 
adaptation of humanitarian fundraising strategies for international propaganda purposes.  Many 
of the practices of “people’s diplomacy” developed through the adoption plan—the transnational 
                                                
639 On the evolving meanings of both the Chinese-language term xuanchuan 宣傳 and English-language term 
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exchange of family letters, the iconography of suffering war orphans, and the utilization of 
intimate relations in service of international relations—became hallmarks of Mao-period 
international propaganda.  The Korean War had uprooted the humanitarian project from China, 
but the underlying strategy of fostering global intimacy to influence global politics survived. 
 In illustrating how the emergence of a large-scale international propaganda industry in 
1950s China relied upon inherited humanitarian networks and strategies, this chapter contributes 
to a critical new body of scholarship that has questioned characterizations of the Mao era as a 
period of isolation.  According to what had long been a master narrative of twentieth-century 
Chinese history, the Communist revolution abruptly cut off the transnational flows of people, 
money, and ideas through China until the era of “Reform and Opening Up” commenced in the 
late 1970s, after Mao’s death in 1976.  More recently, scholarship has begun to chip away at this 
periodization from the edges, tracing continuities between the Nationalist and early Communist 
eras and identifying ways in which China was already beginning to “open up” before Mao’s 
death.640  Studies of “global Maoism”—the promotion of Mao’s particular brand of communism 
as a model for the third world—have further demonstrated the extent to which China remained 
engaged with the outside world, albeit on very different terms, throughout the Mao era.641  
Building on this scholarship, this chapter examines the connections between Republican-era 
global humanitarianism and Mao-era international propaganda to argue that transnational 
                                                
640 On the various continuities between Nationalist rule and early CCP rule, including the cultivation of international 
ties, see the essays in Jeremy Brown and Paul G. Pickowicz, ed., Dilemmas of Victory: the Early Years of the 
People’s Republic of China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007).  For a classic statement of the argument 
that there were significant continuities between Nationalist and Communist rule across the 1949 divide, see Joseph 
Esherick, “Ten Theses on the Chinese Revolution,” Modern China, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1995), 45-76.  For an account 
that emphasizes the extent to which China had begun opening to the world under Mao in the 1970s, see Odd Arne 
Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750 (New York: Basic Books, 2012). 
641 For example, see Alexander Cook, ed., Mao’s Little Red Book: A Global History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013); Gregg Brazinsky, Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry During the Cold War 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2017). 
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networks long considered to have been severed by the Communist revolution were in fact 
reconstituted across new industries during the 1950s and 1960s—often expanding to achieve a 
geographic scale and density of exchange unprecedented in Chinese history. 
 This chapter also engages with the small body of scholarship on the history of Chinese 
international propaganda.  Reflecting Cold War fears of Communist subversion, the earliest 
studies characterized Mao-era propaganda as insidious but highly effective, probably 
overestimating the extent of its influence in Western and third-world societies.642  More recent 
scholarship has shown the extent of improvisation within major Chinese propaganda organs and 
questioned whether their efforts significantly influenced international opinion.643  This chapter 
departs from this earlier scholarship in two key ways.  First, by moving beyond the discursive 
analysis of propaganda materials to examine how the producers and consumers of propaganda 
interacted through epistolary exchange, I show that China’s international propaganda worked not 
simply through impersonal encounters with dogmatic texts but also through the cultivation of 
personal relationships across national, racial, and linguistic lines.  Moreover, by surveying the 
transfer of personnel, material resources, and communications strategies from the humanitarian 
sector to the propaganda sector, I locate the emergence of China’s international propaganda 
                                                
642 James W. Markham, Voices of the Red Giants: Communications in Russia and China (Ames: Iowa State 
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Dissertation, State University of New York at Binghamton, 2009); Anne-Marie Brady, Making the Foreign Serve 
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International Sphere] (Beijing: Qinghua Daxue Chubanshe, 2014). 
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industry not only within a Cold War context but also within a longer history of Chinese actors 
cultivating transnational intimate relationships to reshape China’s international relationships. 
 
“Enemy Propaganda” 
 The Chinese “enemy propaganda” tactics that gained international infamy during the 
Korean War date back to the beginnings of the War of Resistance Against Japan.  In his 1937 
work “On Guerilla Warfare,” Mao placed great emphasis on the importance of propagandizing 
enemy soldiers: “We further our mission of destroying the enemy by propagandizing his troops, 
by treating his captured soldiers with consideration, and by caring for those of his wounded who 
fall into our hands.  If we fail in these respects, we strengthen the solidarity of our enemy.”644  
The Eighth Route Army also actively utilized Japanese POWs in its own propaganda efforts.  
Working with Nosaka Sanzō, a founder of the Japanese Communist Party who had been sent to 
China by the Comintern in 1940, the Eighth Route Army founded the Japanese Workers and 
Peasants School (Riben gongnong xuexiao日本工農學校), which sought to inculcate Japanese 
POWs with the idea that Japanese imperialism was the common enemy of the people of China 
and Japan.  Several branch schools were opened across Communist base areas, and by the end of 
the war more than 1,000 Japanese POWs had “graduated.”  In addition to the politicized 
education they provided, the schools focused on winning over reluctant Japanese POWs by 
fostering emotional bonds with Chinese soldiers.  And at least in some cases, their methods seem 
to have been successful.  One Japanese POW recalled that although he had not cried when he left 
                                                
644 Mao Zedong, On Guerilla Warfare.  https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-
warfare/index.htm.   
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his family to set out for war, when departing from the Eighth Route Army personnel who had 
cared for him upon his capture, he “could not stop himself from breaking out in tears.”645   
  Once POWs graduated from the Japanese Workers and Peasants Schools, they were 
utilized in various forms of enemy propaganda work.  In December 1939, the Japanese antiwar 
activist Kaji Wataru, who had escaped to China in 1936, founded the Japanese People’s Antiwar 
Alliance (Nihonjin Hansen Dōmei 日本人反戦同盟), which sought to weaken the morale of 
Japanese soldiers by educating them on the unnecessary cruelty of Japanese militarism in 
China.646  Its work was carried out largely by Japanese POWs trained by the Eighth Route Army.  
Utilizing their language skills, cultural knowledge, and personal networks, Japanese POWs 
created many forms of propaganda aimed at causing ordinary Japanese soldiers to question the 
war.  For example, they put up Japanese-language posters in occupied territories with phrases 
such as “Your Family is Desperately Longing to See You Return” and “The Eighth Route Army 
Does Not Kill Prisoners and Will Treat You Like Brothers.”  Japanese POWs also shouted 
propaganda through megaphones and distributed leaflets with Japanese-language messages 
designed to exploit soldiers’ homesickness.  For example, in the spring of 1943, Japanese POWs 
led a “Cherry Blossom offensive” in which they distributed illustrated leaflets and broadcast 
messages such as, “Far away in your hometown on the sea, the cherry blossoms are in bloom.”647 
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American commentators wrote quite positively about Chinese propaganda efforts 
targeted at their common enemy of Japan.  For example, after foreign correspondents visited 
Yan’an in June 1944, the New York Times reported on the apparently successful incorporation of 
Japanese prisoners into the Chinese war effort: “Japanese prisoners here are not held in camps 
but are impressed with the belief that by helping this army they are helping to liberate Japan 
from the militarists and the burdens of war.”648  But when the Chinese Communists applied 
similar tactics to American POWs in Korea, Americans would see it as something else altogether. 
By the time the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed in July 1953, Chinese 
propaganda directed at U.S. soldiers in POW camps in North Korea had emerged as one of the 
most hotly debated international issues of the Korean War.  The decision of 21 American POWs 
to refuse repatriation and remain in Communist China sent shockwaves through American 
society, in large part because their choice “laid bare that a basic tenant of US imperial warfare 
vis-à-vis the global order had been challenged: the US was supposed to be the power that 
transformed the enemy in wartime encounters, not the other way around.”649  As Monica Kim 
has argued, Americans resolved the cognitive dissonance elicited by the impossible notion that 
an American soldier would willingly choose Communist slavery over American freedom by 
appealing to the “specter of ‘Oriental’ brainwashing.”650  The U.S. Government produced reports 
arguing that Chinese propaganda techniques constituted a new form of psychological warfare 
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that “eschews physical torture and works on feelings with better results.”651  Within popular 
culture, Virginia Pasley’s Pulitzer Prize-winning book 21 Stayed and the Academy Award-
nominated film The Manchurian Candidate transformed the brainwashed POW into one of the 
most potent symbols of the Korean War.  In stark contrast, Chinese narratives of the war claimed 
that American POWs embraced their Chinese captors because of the “humanitarian” treatment 
they received in POW camps and the moral force of Chinese Communist ideas.  In such 
narratives, the Chinese instructors at American POW camps in North Korea were actually 
working to reverse the brainwashing American soldiers had undergone in the United States.  As 
one article put it, “Among those American prisoners of war who have been educated in the 
‘American way of life,’ rationality has just started to break through the strong biases that have 
been poured into their heads by the American propaganda machine…and forced them to face 
reality head on.”652  More recent Chinese scholarship has generally affirmed this narrative.  As 
Cheng Shaokun and Huang Jiyang argued in their 2013 book, “Among the prisoners of war were 
many who had been captured by the Japanese militarists or the Nazi German Army during World 
War II and had personally experienced that un-humanitarian, miserable life.  But in the POW 
camps of the Volunteer Army, they instead received an entirely different humanitarian, 
magnanimous treatment.  Comparing the two, they were filled with deep emotions.”653  Was the 
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Chinese propaganda directed at U.S. soldiers in Korea an insidious new form of psychological 
warfare, or simply an accurate reflection of the humanitarian treatment they received? 
Although rarely discussed in scholarship on the Korean War, at the heart of this debate 
was a highly contentious source that both sides claimed as evidence for their competing 
narratives of the war: the tens of thousands of letters that American POWs in Korea sent to 
family and friends back home.  These letters almost ubiquitously speak to the excellent treatment 
American soldiers received in Chinese-run POW camps.  Within Chinese war narratives, the 
content of the letters—and the fact that soldiers were permitted to write them—are 
straightforward evidence of the “People’s Volunteer Army’s policy of leniency toward prisoners 
of war.”654  As one People’s Daily article concisely summarized, “In their letters, the prisoners of 
war describe the humanitarian treatment they have received and express their desire for a 
peaceful solution to the Korea problem.”655  On the other hand, in American war narratives these 
letters constitute part of the “systematic enemy manipulation of POWs for propaganda 
purposes.”656  The very fact that the letters described positive treatment is interpreted as evidence 
of the opposite—that they must have been produced under threat of psychological and physical 
torture.  While the truth likely falls somewhere between these two narratives, neither attends to 
the particular form this propaganda took: the transpacific exchange of letters between captured 
U.S. soldiers and their loved ones back home.  Analyzing how the Enemy Propaganda Division 
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controlled the production and circulation of family letters at Chinese-operated POW camps in 
North Korea reveals how the practices of people’s diplomacy developed through the adoption 
plan informed China’s controversial enemy propaganda efforts during the Korean War. 
 
“Emotional Blackmail” 
 By late 1951, facilitating the exchange of letters between American POWs and their 
families had become one of the most important and high profile tasks of the Enemy Propaganda 
Division.  At first, Chinese authorities allowed soldiers to send letters back home through a 
variety of informal means, such as permitting released prisoners to take batches of letters with 
them upon their return.657  However, on December 24, 1951, Chinese, Korean, and U.N. 
negotiators meeting at Panmunjom agreed to allow the systematic exchange of letters between 
POWs and their families.658  Under the agreement, POW camps in North Korea were supplied 
with stationary, pens, and envelopes, and “mailboxes” were set up throughout the camps for 
prisoners to deposit their letters.  Within the Chinese armistice negotiation team, a five-person 
“Subcommittee on Prisoner Letters” was established to review (and, presumably, censor) the 
letters.659  Chinese negotiators would then hand over batches of letters during negotiation 
meetings in Panmunjom, after which the letters would be flown by way of Tokyo to Travis Air 
Force Base near San Francisco before being given to the U.S. postal service for distribution 
domestically.660  In just the first few weeks after reaching the agreement, 1,783 letters from 
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American POWs were sent back to the United States.  From that point forward, the parents of 
American soldiers taken captive in Korea generally reported receiving periodic communications 
from them.  In May 1953, the parents of Gilbert Hernandez reported that they had received “four 
or five letters” from him in the two years since his capture.  The father of Steven Ramos received 
“about 10 letters” from his captured son during the same period.661  In total, between December 
1951 and April 1953, approximately 30,000 letters from American POWs in Korea were 
received in the United States.662 
The contents of these letters, many of which were published in local newspapers across 
the United States, almost uniformly praised the conditions in POW camps and called for an end 
to the Korean War.  A letter from Major Robert J. Farthing to his wife described the excellent 
treatment he received at the hands of his Chinese captors: “We get three meals a day of the same 
food received by the Chinese soldiers.  Good medical treatment is available, but as yet I luckily 
haven’t needed any.  Please don’t worry baby, I’m being well taken care of.”  In other letters, 
POWs asked their families to take political action against the war.  Corporal John L. Tyler wrote:  
“Honey, could you and Mom get together and write our Congressman and have him see 
what can be done about pulling our troops out of Korea…You should see what our planes 
have done, torn down practically every building and village and are killing a lot of 
innocent people, women, and kids…It is awful to see these sights.  Don’t get me wrong, 
I’m not turning soft, those are facts I’ve seen with my own two eyes, and it is wrong.  Mr. 
Truman was wrong when he thinks our boys will die to make him richer along with the 
rest of his Wall Street warmongers.”663 
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Chinese authorities insisted that these letters accurately reflected the feelings of the diverse 
cross-section of American society represented by the U.S. soldiers captured in Korea.  The China 
Monthly Review, a Communist-friendly English-language periodical published in Shanghai 
claimed, “The countless letters and group statements sent by American GIs is not something that 
can be dismissed by the American press as ‘Communist propaganda.’  They are the thoughts and 
desires of ordinary Americans, from all parts of the US, newly drafted youth and men who have 
made the army their career.”664  But according to a 1954 U.S. Army report, American POWs 
were made aware that “unless their letters included material pleasing to the authorities, there 
would be little chance of their being forwarded.”  Suggested topics included, “peace requests,” 
“mention of good food, medical care, and gain in weight,” and “descriptions of recreational 
activities, particularly swimming in the Yalu River.”  Rooted primarily in the testimony of 
POWs after their return, the report argued, “The conclusion is inescapable that the Communists 
regarded the POW mail as one more instrument to be utilized to their advantage in the 
furtherance of both their foreign propaganda and the POW indoctrination campaigns.”665 
 Much like the PLAN China Branch had analyzed foster parents’ letters to determine 
whether the adoption plan influenced their views on China, the Enemy Propaganda Division 
analyzed the letters that POWs received from their families to assess whether their efforts were 
achieving the desired effect.  As with earlier attempts at people’s diplomacy, the results were 
mixed.  In the optimistic assessment of Du Ping, the director of the People’s Volunteer Army 
General Political Department, POW letters had “won the sympathies of their families and the 
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broad masses of the people.”666  And in fact some American POWs did receive letters from 
family members conveying their gratitude to the Chinese Army.  The father of one American 
prisoner wrote, “I am so happy to know that you are still alive and that you have been well taken 
care of.  The Chinese allowing you to write letters shows that they are not really like the way 
they are portrayed here.”  Chinese camp authorities often took photographs for American POWs 
to include with their letters, and much like in the adoption plan, these photographs helped 
communicate an enhanced sense of intimacy and authenticity.  The mother of an American 
prisoner from New York wrote, “I do not know what words to use to express the gratitude I feel 
to the authorities who are taking care of you and who allow you to correspond with your family 
members…I am certain that they will treat you in accordance with the Geneva Convention.  
After your photograph was published in the New York Times, I saw the proof.”  The Yorkshire 
Evening Post reported the reaction of the mother of an English POW in Korea upon receiving his 
photograph: “I was so happy to see the appearance of my son in the photograph.  In the past 
when he wrote me letters saying that all was well, I never believed them.  I thought they were 
just words of comfort.  But from the picture I can see that it is really true, and the strain on my 
heart has disappeared.”667   
 On the other hand, the Enemy Propaganda Division also noted a steady flow of 
“reactionary” letters designed to poison the minds of American POWs against their Chinese 
captors.  For instance, censors often found letters containing “deceiving propaganda materials” 
and “reactionary leaflets” as well as “threatening messages warning prisoners not to display any 
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enthusiasm in the People’s Volunteer Army prisoner of war camps.”668  According to the 
testimony of Major William E. Mayer, an Army psychiatrist who worked with American POWs 
upon their return from Korea, the censorship of incoming letters was part of a broader campaign 
to emotionally alienate prisoners, thereby making them more receptive to Communist 
propaganda.  In particular, Mayer claimed that the Chinese Communists often withheld letters 
containing positive news and only shared letters relaying negative news, creating the impression 
that American POWs had been abandoned by their loved ones back home.  He testified,  
[W]hen your letters are restricted to letters very often which announce some major or 
minor domestic crisis, when your letter turns out to be a notice from a collection 
company, or what a soldier calls a ‘Dear John’ letter, this isn’t the kind of thing you get 
together with your buddy and talk about.  Consequently, men were deprived of this 
common emotional basis for sticking together. 
 
By selectively withholding and releasing mail depending on its content, the Enemy Propaganda 
Division emotionally prepared POWs to accept their argument that America’s capitalist society 
“leads to selfishness, grasping, caring only for what is in it for you, little regard for another 
individual, especially if he is not there.”669 
 In order to counter the emotional impact that American POW letters had on their family 
members, and to ensure that these letters did not provoke backlash against the U.S. war effort, 
U.S. military officials immediately began a campaign to dismiss their contents as mere 
propaganda.  On December 29, 1951, less than a week after the commencement of the letter-
exchange program, U.S. military sources warned the recipients of these letters “not to be 
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surprised if they seem to follow ‘the Commie party line’.”670  As the stream of letters from 
American POWs to their parents, spouses, and children continued throughout the war, U.S. 
military officials began to frame them not simply as “propaganda,” but as an especially insidious 
form of emotional warfare that preyed on the familial sentiments of worried relatives.  In January 
1953, Arthur F. Kelly, the President of the Air Force Association, called letters from American 
POWs “a cruel and perverted kind of emotional blackmail directed at one of our most vulnerable 
targets—the grieving mothers, fathers and wives of American servicemen who have been 
captured by the Reds in North Korea.”671  An article in Air Force Magazine illustrated how this 
manipulation of family sentiment undermined support for the U.S. war effort: “The overjoyed 
parents read the letter to their relatives and friends.  The local paper ran it in a front-page story.  
The mother dashed off a note to her Congressman, asking that he do what he could to end ‘this 
senseless slaughter’.”672  In March 1953, the Defense Department issued a statement claiming, 
“the Communists were playing on the family ties of some American prisoners of war in Korea to 
turn them into ‘tools of the Communist propaganda machine’.”  According to the statement, the 
Communists’ aim was to “mobilize the pressure of public opinion to bear on the United States 
Government and the United Nations to accept Communist terms in an armistice in Korea.”673  At 
least privately, the Enemy Propaganda Division likely would have agreed with this assessment. 
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 As late as November 1950, Zhang Zong’an and the PLAN China Branch had encouraged 
Chinese children to write letters to their American foster parents explaining how their lives had 
improved under Chinese Communist rule.  Just thirteen months later, she and her colleagues in 
the Enemy Propaganda Division began systematically encouraging American POWs to write 
letters to their actual parents explaining how well they were treated by their Chinese Communist 
captors.  As it turned out, the techniques of “people’s diplomacy” originally developed for 
humanitarian fundraising could also be applied as ready-made tools of military propaganda.   
 
Humanitarian Fundraising and International Propaganda  
In addition to the highly targeted enemy propaganda work carried out at Chinese-
operated POW camps in North Korea, Chinese Communist leaders also vastly expanded their 
international propaganda work through foreign-language print journalism.  From its inception, 
the CCP had utilized print media to increase its support and prestige abroad.  Initially these 
publications were primarily aimed at the Soviet Union and overseas Chinese workers.  In July 
1920, Yang Mingchai and Comintern representative Gregory Voitinsky founded the Sino-
Russian News Agency (zhong’e tongxunshe 中俄通訊社), which sought to enhance Russian 
support for the Chinese Communist movement by writing and translating articles for Russian 
newspapers.  In the summer of 1922, the Chinese Youth Communist Party in Europe (lü ou 
zhongguo shaonian gongchandang 旅歐中國少年共產黨) founded a monthly publication called 
Youth (Shaonian 少年), which was succeeded by a new publication titled  Red Light (Chi guang 
赤光) in 1924 under the leadership of Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping.674  Other left-wing 
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Chinese-language periodicals with broader readerships soon followed, including the San 
Francisco-based Chinese Vanguard [Xianfeng bao 先鋒報] and the Paris-based Au Secours de la 
Patrie [Jiuguo shibao 救國時報], all geared toward building support for the Communists among 
overseas Chinese workers.675  After embarking on the Long March and establishing its new base 
area in Yan’an in 1935, the CCP developed ties with sympathetic foreign journalists, including 
Edgar Snow, Nym Wales, Anna Louise Strong, and Agnes Smedley, who helped propagate a 
favorable image of the CCP to global audiences.  The 1937 publication of Edgar Snow’s Red 
Star Over China, in particular, provided an important vehicle for Mao to share his personal story 
and narrative of the Chinese Communist movement with the wider world.676 
However, it was the need to attract international aid during WWII that first spurred the 
CCP and its allies to dedicate significant resources to foreign-language media.  In March 1938, 
already in desperate need of both military and medical supplies, the Politburo resolved to “utilize 
favorable international conditions to obtain all international aid that is possible and necessary.”  
The Politburo blamed the CCP’s failure to attract significant international help on its “weak” 
international propaganda work and called for “intensifying our efforts to provide all kinds of 
necessary books, materials, and pictures to newspapers, magazines, and news services in Europe, 
the United States, and the countries of Asia.”677  In his famous 1938 lectures “On Protracted 
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Warfare,” Mao acknowledged, “China’s strength alone will not be sufficient, and we shall also 
have to rely on the support of international forces…[T]his adds to China’s tasks in international 
propaganda and diplomacy.”  He argued that by “making great efforts to use international 
propaganda to secure foreign aid,” China could shorten the duration of the war.678  The need to 
create effective international propaganda in order to secure aid from abroad was again reaffirmed 
at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in November 1938, when a 
resolution was passed to “intensify overseas propaganda…so that our country can receive arms 
and ammunition, military raw materials, medical materials, technical personnel, and financial 
assistance from friendly countries.”679 
 Song Qingling’s China Defence League was among the first organizations to take up the 
CCP’s call to use international propaganda to attract humanitarian aid.  In June 1938 the 
organization founded the English-language China Defence League Newsletter, which solicited 
contributions toward humanitarian work in Communist-controlled regions by praising the CCP’s 
contributions to the overall war effort and criticizing the Nationalists’ for denying the CCP 
access to humanitarian supplies.680  Published from 1938 to 1941, the newsletter reached a global 
circulation of 2,500 copies and played an important role in the organization’s fundraising 
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success.681  Around the same time, the CCP began producing its first foreign-language 
publications from Yan’an, including Report from China, which was published in English, French, 
and Russian, and the Jin Cha Ji Pictorial (Jin cha ji huabao晉察冀畫報), which included 
English-language captions and was distributed in the United States, England, the Soviet Union, 
and Southeast Asia.682 
After the conclusion of WWII, the CCP continued to promote English-language 
propaganda publications to attract international sympathy and material aid during its rapidly 
escalating civil war with the Nationalists.  In 1946, Zhou Enlai directed Qiao Guanhua to found 
the Chinese Communist Party’s first foreign-language periodical, China Weekly News, which 
released only three issues before it was shut down by Nationalist authorities.  In a testament to 
the tight connection between international propaganda and humanitarian fundraising, one of the 
paper’s first feature articles introduced the work of Song Qingling’s China Welfare Fund.683  
After China News Weekly was shuttered, Qiao Guanhua relocated to Hong Kong, where he and 
his wife Gong Peng (who had been an important liaison between the CCP and foreign diplomats 
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and journalists throughout WWII) founded a new biweekly periodical called China Digest that 
became the CCP’s most important English-language publication throughout the civil war.684 
 In the decades before the Chinese revolution of 1949, the CCP and its domestic and 
international allies had embraced international propaganda as an important means of attracting 
humanitarian funds from abroad.  Nevertheless, their work remained piecemeal and 
comparatively small-scale.  Building on the experience gained from these early publications, 
after the revolution the CCP greatly expanded its international propaganda activities—and 
former administrators of humanitarian organizations were at the forefront of its efforts. 
 
China Reconstructs 
On December 30, 1950, only two days after Premier Zhou Enlai announced the freezing 
of all American assets in China, Song Qingling released a statement endorsing the decision.  Her 
support was crucial to the policy’s success.  After all, Song Qingling’s China Welfare Fund, and 
the many social welfare and relief institutions throughout China that it supported, were among 
those that would be most adversely affected by the loss of American funds.  Nevertheless, Song 
insisted that the policy was ultimately to the benefit of philanthropic institutions and those who 
depended on them: 
According to this order, of course, all American relief and welfare institutions in China 
will be thoroughly invested in and supervised by the People’s Government.  This is 
entirely in accordance with the interests of the Chinese people and with the interests of all 
of the men, women, elderly, and children who have been nurtured by relief aid.  In the 
relief and welfare work that America has carried out in China for more than 100 years, 
although a certain number of kind-hearted American people did indeed have the desire to 
help China, objectively they were all used directly or indirectly by American imperialism 
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for the purposes of covering up aggression, colluding with special agents, numbing the 
people’s will to fight, and buying the people’s support. 
 
Directly addressing the “people of relief and welfare circles,” Song called upon her colleagues to 
“enthusiastically support this order of the People’s Government” and “publicize and explain” the 
new policy to the recipients of humanitarian aid.  But while Song’s statement fully endorsed 
cutting off humanitarian aid from the United States, she concluded by reiterating the distinction 
between the friendly American people and the imperialist American government that she had 
previously used to justify accepting private voluntary aid from the United States.  In a strikingly 
conciliatory note, she asked those who worked in the humanitarian sector to “explain clearly the 
traditional friendship between the people of China and America and to carry out education in 
internationalism.”685  Her insistence on the importance of “internationalism” and continued 
collaboration between Chinese people and their allies within imperialist countries hinted at 
where she and the broader humanitarian sector in China would devote their energies after 
international aid was no longer available. 
 Song wasted little time plotting her next moves.  During the summer of 1950, the China 
Welfare Fund had undergone a thorough reorganization in which it was decided that the 
organization would expand beyond the provision of relief aid to provide a range of child welfare 
services on a permanent basis.  Renamed the Child Welfare Institute (Zhongguo fulihui中國福
利會; hereinafter “CWI”), the organization’s new regulations called for “publishing all kinds of 
propaganda information and materials sufficient to show all of the Chinese people’s efforts in 
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relief work” and “establishing connections with all progressive actors overseas in order to 
disseminate our organization’s propaganda materials.”686   The December 1950 decision to 
freeze all American funds in China accelerated CWI’s shift from soliciting and distributing 
humanitarian aid to conducting international propaganda work.  On December 31, 1950, the day 
after she released her statement, Song met with Zhou Enlai to discuss founding an “English-
language overseas propaganda magazine” under the auspices of the CWI.687  Zhou signaled his 
approval, and Song immediately began preparations for creating a magazine.  At a meeting held 
at CWI’s Shanghai headquarters on August 31, 1951, it was decided that “the target readers of 
this bimonthly magazine are progressive actors and free entrepreneurs in capitalist and colonized 
countries as well as those who sympathize or might sympathize with the people of China.  It is 
especially aimed at those free entrepreneurs and science and art workers who sincerely desire 
peace but are not progressive politically.”688  They eventually settled on the title China 
Reconstructs (中國建設), as it conveyed both the sense of China reconstructing itself and China 
helping to reconstruct other societies around the world.689  After a full year of planning and 
preparation work, the first issue of China Reconstructs was published in January 1952. 
 The closing of the PLAN China Branch in November 1950 and the founding of China 
Reconstructs just over one year later reveal the extent to which former humanitarian aid 
administrators were responsible for expanding China’s international propaganda capacities. 
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Besides Song Qingling, many of the PLAN China Branch’s top staff members worked for China 
Reconstructs in various capacities.  Gerald Tannebaum participated in planning meetings for 
China Reconstructs, assisted with overseas promotion and distribution, and later also worked on 
the editorial team.690  Lu Ping, who had headed the PLAN China Branch’s translation department, 
held a number of important roles at China Reconstructs over the years, including office manager 
and assistant editor-in-chief.  Zou Lŭzhi, who had been in charge of the PLAN China Branch’s 
education department, also served as an office manager at China Reconstructs, and Lin Debin, 
who ran the PLAN China Branch’s general affairs office, worked in the promotion 
department.691  Former superintendents of PLAN-supported institutions, such as Zhao Puchu of 
Shanghai Boystown and Ren Deyao of the Children’s Theatre, contributed articles to the 
magazine. 
  In addition to high-level staff from the PLAN China Branch, many of the other key 
figures in publishing China Reconstructs also had backgrounds in transnational philanthropy.  Li 
Dequan, the vice-chairman of the National Association for Refugee Children, and Wu Yaozong, 
who had worked for the YMCA in China, both served on the editorial board.  As the head of the 
sales promotion department, Song Qingling selected an American named Talitha Gerlach who 
had worked as a YWCA secretary in China and for the CWF before returning to the United 
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States to found an aid organization called China Welfare Appeal.692  Writing personally to Zhou 
Enlai to obtain permission for Gerlach to return to China, Song explained how Gerlach’s career 
in humanitarianism qualified her for international propaganda work: “First, she has a deep 
understanding of both China and the United States.  Second, because she worked in the YWCA’s 
international department, she has connections in many countries in a variety of different fields, 
from fundraising work to project management…Over the past decades she has always been a 
core force inside the China Welfare Fund.  She is familiar with the China Welfare Fund’s history, 
and since its founding she has also become a part of that history.”693  Song invited Israel Epstein, 
a veteran of the China Defence League who had become one of the most prominent foreign 
champions of the Chinese Communist Party, to serve as editor-in-chief—a post he would hold 
until his retirement in 1985.694  These veterans of transnational philanthropy, both Chinese and 
foreign, possessed the multicultural knowledge to publish an English-language magazine that 
would appeal to a diverse global audience—as well as the transnational social networks 
necessary to build a global readership base.  
 China Reconstructs was an instant success.  After initially printing 7,700 copies of its 
inaugural issue, CWI almost immediately had to print an additional 2,000 copies to meet demand.  
By the end of its first year of publication, the magazine’s circulation had reached 18,000 copies, 
distributed to an astonishing 107 countries, including 20 countries in Asia, 26 countries in 
Europe, 28 countries in the Americas, and 28 countries in Africa.695  Converted to a monthly 
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magazine in 1955, by 1956 its circulation had reached approximately 52,000 copies per issue.696  
Articles from China Reconstructs were also translated and reprinted in newspapers and 
magazines across the world.697  Beginning in 1960, the CWI began publishing China 
Reconstructs in a variety of foreign languages, including Spanish, French, Arabic, Russian, 
German, and Portuguese—as well as commencing publication of a Chinese edition for domestic 
circulation.698  Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, China Reconstructs stood out as one of the 
PRC’s most influential international propaganda publications, “especially in the countries of the 
third world, where it had a broad and deep influence.”699 
 
Figure 5.2 The inaugural issue of China Reconstructs, published in January 1952.  Much of the 
high-level staff of the PLAN China Branch worked for the magazine, which quickly became one 
of China’s most prominent English-language publications. 
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 The humanitarian backgrounds of its editorial staff were clearly reflected in the content 
of China Reconstructs.  One of the main topics throughout the inaugural issue was China’s 
recent decision to cut off all aid from abroad.  A feature article on the People’s Relief 
Administration of China re-articulated many of the criticisms of American charity that had been 
made domestically during the campaign to uproot foreign-funded relief work.  It explained, “To 
attain its own purposes, American imperialism directly or indirectly carried on various ‘charities’ 
in China…Obviously, the aim of such manoeuvres was not really to further the welfare of the 
Chinese people, but rather to smooth the road to U.S. domination over China.”  At the same time, 
the article was also careful to reassure readers that this decision had not negatively affected the 
former recipients of aid.  It continued, “In place of the funds which stopped coming from 
America, PRAC has financed those institutions which have continued to operate, as well as 
guided them in the improvement of their work.”700  To complement China Reconstructs, the 
CWI also issued other English-language propaganda materials that reproduced for foreign 
audiences the attacks on orphanages supported by the adoption plan.  One English-language 
booklet titled Children’s Tears accused foreign-sponsored orphanages in China of having 
“deceived well-meaning contributors in their home countries who thought that their gifts were 
really relieving suffering in China.”  The booklet argued,  
The complete disregard shown by these institutions for the lives and health of the 
children under their charge are eloquent evidence of the fact that they were founded to 
serve imperialist aims, with ‘charity’ as a convenient form rather than a genuine aim.  
This is confirmed by the fact that those children who did not die of malnutrition or other 
causes were educated in a spirit of subservience to everything foreign and alienation from 
their own families and countrymen. 
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The booklet included a translated statement by Enguang, a child who had formerly lived in the 
CCF-supported Canaan Home, in which he claimed that the institution “even tried to poison our 
minds against our families.”701  
 Despite being written, edited, and published by former humanitarian aid administrators, 
China Reconstructs deliberately minimized the extent to which aid from abroad had contributed 
to the “unprecedented progress of welfare work” for which CWI took credit.702  To illustrate the 
vitality of social welfare work in China, the first issue of China Reconstructs featured profiles of 
two of the most prominent institutions to have been supported by the PLAN China Branch’s 
adoption plan: Shanghai Boystown Orphanage and the China Welfare Fund Children’s Theatre.  
In an article titled “Urban Relief and Rehabilitation,” Zhao Puchu, the superintendent of 
Shanghai Boystown, continued the attack on “imperialist relief” that “even in the ‘best’ cases” 
caused its recipients to feel “subservience to the very forces whose exploitation of China was 
responsible for their widespread poverty.”  Instead he praised the work that institutions like 
Shanghai Boystown had done in the two years since liberation, which had “kicked the last props 
from under the moth-eaten slander that China has not the resources to move ahead without 
imperialist ‘advice’ or ‘philanthropy’.”703  Similarly, an article by Ren Deyao, one of the 
founders of the Children’s Theatre, proclaimed that “since liberation, the Children’s Theatre has 
settled down to become one of the main cultural influences among the children of Shanghai and 
the whole nation.”704  Neither article mentioned that both of these institutions were funded 
almost entirely by Americans through the adoption plan, including during the majority of the 
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two-year period that had elapsed since liberation.  In its pivot to international propaganda work, 
the CWI had to minimize the extent to which its proudest accomplishments had depended on the 
humanitarian aid it now had to disavow. 
 Nevertheless, the creators of China Reconstructs drew deeply upon their experiences 
conducting “people’s diplomacy” in their new international propaganda work.  The editorial 
guidelines that China Reconstructs issued to authors reiterated almost verbatim the prescriptions 
on style and tone that the PLAN China Branch had provided to children writing letters to their 
foster parents in the adoption plan.  For instance, the instructions provided to writers included: 
“Don’t use high-minded language;” “The political nature should not be too strong;” and 
“Consider the level of receptiveness of foreign readers.”705  With regard to content, writers were 
instructed to avoid “the original texts of documents and political reports, theory, and articles 
about politics and the military” and instead focus on concrete examples of the “social, economic, 
cultural, educational, and relief and social welfare aspects of China’s development.”  As Mao 
himself commented in 1958, “China Reconstructs speaks through facts.  This is how overseas 
propaganda should be done.”  By eschewing overtly political content and an excessively 
polemical tone, the editors sought to ensure that China Reconstructs could not “easily be 
mistaken for ‘official propaganda’ in capitalist countries.”706 
 The editors of China Reconstructs also relied on the transnational exchange of letters to 
gauge and influence foreign opinion of China.  From the first issue, China Reconstructs 
encouraged its foreign readers to write to the magazine: “If you have questions, write us about 
them.  If you have criticisms or suggestions, let us know.  We welcome praise too—but most of 
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all we want to know how we may help fill gaps in your knowledge of the fields we cover.  That 
is the way we hope to bring closer the peoples of China and the countries where our readers 
reside.”707  By the end of the 1950s, the magazine’s office was receiving well over 100 letters per 
month.708  The editorial staff went to considerable lengths to maintain personal ties with readers 
by responding quickly to their letters and adjusting the tone and content of articles to suit their 
tastes.  As Lu Ping recalled, “In light of readers’ letters, we quickly understood readers’ desires 
and tastes, helping the editors adjust our method of choosing articles and their content.  Second, 
we were able to respond to every letter, and we stipulated that all replies must be written within 
two weeks.”709  Especially early on, many of the letters that China Reconstructs received and 
circulated internally offered praise and affirmation for the magazine’s editorial choices.  One 
reader from Los Angeles wrote a letter that affirmed the decision to avoid overtly political 
content: “As long as your magazine avoids directly publicizing and praising your country’s 
leaders, I believe that the number of people who take pleasure in your magazine will be very 
many.”  A letter from Nottingham, England likewise praised the magazine’s ability to foster 
international understanding: “According to our experience, everyone who has read your 
magazine all want to continue reading it.  The respect and love they have for the magazine 
increase constantly.  We firmly believe that with such a good tool for communication, the 
understanding and friendship between our two great nations will continue to increase.”710 
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 The high volume of reader letters allowed the China Reconstructs staff to carry out a 
project they had initially conceptualized at the PLAN China Branch.  In June 1950, the PLAN 
China Branch had launched an ambitious project to create a comprehensive catalog of “sponsor 
information records.”  The plan was to comb through sponsors’ letters to compile information 
about their “class status, family situation, economic situation, profession, faith, etc.”  Once 
compiled, such records could then be used to help children tailor their letters to their foster 
parents’ personal backgrounds—and thereby better “educate and persuade” them.711  However, 
largely because the PLAN China Branch closed only five months later, these “sponsor 
information records” were largely incomplete and never put to use.  Several years later, many of 
the same staff members revived a similar version of this project at China Reconstructs.  The 
China Reconstructs office translated reader letters into Chinese, categorized them by subject 
matter, and utilized them to produce regular reports analyzing international opinion on a variety 
of topics.  Such reports were in turn used to inform the content and tone of future issues so as to 
influence global opinion of China more effectively. 
 In many cases, CWI reports optimistically confirmed that China Reconstructs was 
successfully portraying China’s socialist development as a beacon of hope for people across the 
third world and within the Euro-American left.  A couple of examples of reader letters excerpted 
in CWI reports are illuminating.  One student from Uganda wrote in response to an article called 
“The Development of the People’s Commune Movement,” “To me this article was very inspiring, 
because it made me think that the African people can also do this if we also have the opportunity.”  
An Indonesian reader replied to the article “Tibet’s Bumper Harvest,” “I was very happy to read 
about the situation in Tibet.  I hope these poor, unfortunate people now can live a socialist life.  
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This is what the selfless People’s Liberation Army and the new social system have given them.”  
These letters—and thousands more like them—confirmed to the CWI that China Reconstructs 
was helping to promote a positive image of China abroad. 
 Beyond collecting self-affirming praise, the CWI also utilized the letters it received from 
readers abroad to gauge opinion on contentions international issues.  For example, in 1960, in the 
context of widespread anti-Chinese discrimination in Indonesia, China Reconstructs received 
numerous letters concerning China’s policy of encouraging Chinese Indonesians to return to 
China.  Based on these letters, the editors of China Reconstructs prepared an analysis of Chinese 
Indonesians’ views on return migration.  First, they noted that while laborers were the main 
targets of anti-Chinese sentiment in Indonesia, the great majority of letters inquiring about return 
migration were from “petit bourgeois intellectuals.”  Moreover, the report continued, “because 
these readers’ economic status and political thinking are different from the main target of the 
anti-Chinese movement, their attitude toward the question of returning to the country also has 
differences.”  Specifically, “because they have been influenced by reactionary propaganda, they 
cannot but have doubts about family life under the socialist system and other matters.”  The 
report went on to list the specific questions regarding return migration that Chinese Indonesians 
raised in their letters: 
What to do if they do not understand Chinese?  How much is the cost of living?  Is 
income enough?  Is it possible to shoulder the expenses of family members who cannot 
work?  Can students continue their studies?  Do wives work?  What do they do?  Who 
manages the housework?  What is family life like?  What are the real conditions on the 
communes?  Is it true that husbands, wives, and children live separately?712  
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Based on the understanding of prospective returnees gained through reader letters, China 
Reconstructs could adjust its coverage to address their concerns—and CWI could tailor its 
services for returning overseas Chinese accordingly. 
 In other cases, reader letters alerted the CWI to broad-based dissent against Chinese 
policies, even among the very friendly international audience represented by readers of China 
Reconstructs.  One of the most controversial incidents among China Reconstructs’ readers was 
the Sino-Indian border dispute surrounding the Aksai Chin plateau—an area claimed by India 
where China had recently constructed a road linking Xinjiang and Tibet.  To be sure, some 
readers endorsed China’s position as articulated through extensive coverage in China 
Reconstructs.  One reader from Ceylon wrote, “I feel that China must peacefully maintain the 
current status and must not let the imperialist and reactionary faction peel off one inch of 
territory.  Even one inch of Communist territory is still tied to the fate of the proletariat of the 
entire world.”  More disconcerting, however, was the volume of letters from across the world 
questioning China’s position in the dispute.  One reader from the Netherlands wrote, “I do not 
understand why China, as a peace-loving country, cannot let India have one 90,000-square-
kilometer mountainous district…I am a good friend of the Chinese people.  I hope that China can 
be a little more broad-minded.  If you give a little territory to gain the good feeling of the Indian 
people it will be a great leap forward for world peace.”  The most critical letters came from India.  
One letter from an Indian reader described how the conflict had destroyed his faith in China: 
For a long time I have sincerely admired China and the Chinese people.  All along I have 
read your magazine with deep interest and firm conviction.  At the same time, I have felt 
pride in your many victories.  We, the people of India, take you as a people of action who 
live for genuine peace.  But your occupation of India, our homeland’s sacred territory, 
has dispelled all of the value I placed on you in the past.  What’s even worse, you 
cleverly call those who have been invaded the “invaders.”  This not only destroys your 
reputation, it will make you into one of the few countries in the world with which any 




While the CWI noted that the number letters expressing negative reactions to China’s position on 
the border dispute with India had declined from 1959 to 1960, its reports warned of a major 
public relations problem in explaining China’s stance to the rest of the world.713 
 Almost all of the key figures from the PLAN China Branch—including Song Qingling, 
Gerald Tannebaum, Lu Ping, Zou Lŭzhi, and Lin Debin—played crucial roles in making China 
Reconstructs into one of the most powerful tools for understanding and influencing international 
opinion of China.  Distributed to more than 100 countries and reaching a peak circulation of 
more than 50,000 copies, China Reconstructs reached far more people than the PLAN China 
Branch’s adoption plan.  Rather than retreating from the mission of using personal stories and 
transnational letter-exchange to transform global attitudes toward China, the pioneers of 
“people’s diplomacy” pivoted to the field of international propaganda, where they continued 
their work, albeit in a very different form, on an even greater scale. 
 
International Propaganda and the Propaganda of Internationalism 
 While foreign-language magazines like China Reconstructs aimed to shape how the 
world viewed China, Chinese Communist leaders were equally concerned with shaping how its 
own citizens viewed the world.  In addition to international propaganda, Mao-era China also 
witnessed the dramatic expansion of what I call the “propaganda of internationalism”—didactic 
essays, posters, plays, radio broadcasts, and other cultural productions that instructed domestic 
audiences on how to understand the Chinese revolution in global context.  Within the 
propaganda of internationalism, film was an especially important medium.  It was in this context 
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that Gerald Tannebaum, the Baltimore-born former director of the PLAN China Branch, enjoyed 
an improbable career revival as one of the most famous foreign film stars in Mao’s China. 
Tannebaum was among a very small cohort of foreign actors who gained prominence 
playing foreign historical figures in some of the most iconic Chinese films of the 1950s and 
1960s.  While Tannebaum’s transformation from humanitarian aid worker to film star may seem 
surprising, he had the voice (he had been a radio actor before joining the Army to serve in WWII) 
and the looks (an internal PLAN document described him as “very tall, very handsome, and very 
charming”) of a leading man.714  As film scholar Lü Xiaoming put it, 
Tannebaum was one of the few Westerners in modern Chinese history who remained in 
China after 1949.  But unlike George Hatem or Rewi Alley, he had a background doing 
radio broadcasts; he was not a stranger to the arts and especially not to performance; and 
on top of that he cut quite an impressive figure.  This made him into a unique candidate 
to play foreign characters in post-1949 Chinese films.715 
 
Tannebaum also worked as a translator and voice actor creating dubbed English-language 
versions of Chinese films for international circulation.  In 1959, he translated the narration of the 
ballet film Lotus Lantern (bailian deng 白蓮燈), the first Chinese film with narration dubbed in 
English.  The next year, he was a lead voice actor in the first Chinese film to have its dialogue 
dubbed in English, an eponymously titled film about Nie Er, the composer of the “March of the 
Volunteers.”  In 1960 he also translated the highly popular animated film Where is Mama? (xiao 
kedou zhao mama 小蝌蚪找媽媽).716  Tannebaum’s work as an actor and translator in the film 
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industry linked international propaganda to the propaganda of internationalism, bringing films 
about the Sino-Western encounter to a domestic audience while also bringing classic Mao-era 
Chinese films to an international audience. 
Ranging from scathing critiques of foreign imperialism to celebrations of 
internationalism, Tannebaum’s filmography identified friends and enemies within the Sino-
Western encounter, delineating the positions that Westerners could occupy within narratives of 
the Chinese revolution.  Yet lurking beneath the surface of these historical propaganda films was 
a simple irony: films critiquing the privileged position of Westerners in Chinese society required 
elevating Westerners who had remained in China—often with few credentials beyond a white 
face—into bona fide film stars.  For Tannebaum, whose long career as an American Army 
captain and humanitarian administrator in China deeply implicated him within the history his 
films portrayed, the line between actor and character was especially blurry. Tannebaum’s film 
career provides a window into the contested processes through which Chinese authorities and the 
former humanitarian workers upon whom their propaganda work depended renegotiated the roles 
that foreigners could play within the ideological and social terrain of Mao-era China. 
The sensitivity surrounding the privileged status of the Western actors who portrayed 
Western characters in Chinese films is well illustrated by the tension over Tannebaum’s salary, 
lifestyle, and benefits.  When Tannebaum began acting in 1958, the film industry was caught in 
the “ultra-left” fervor that accompanied the launch of Mao’s Great Leap Forward.  In this context, 
Tannebaum had little choice but to demonstrate his sincere commitment to egalitarianism by 
living exactly like his Chinese colleagues.  The actress Qin Yi, who appeared with Tannebaum in 
the 1959 film Lin Zexu, recalled his Spartan lifestyle: “Mr. Tannebaum came and went every day 
on a bicycle, regardless of whether it was daytime or the black of night.  He also ate the food in 
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our canteen. He never showed up late or left early from filming, and he was very obedient.  
Everyone had a good impression of him.”717  By the early 1960s, however, his status as one of 
very few well-established foreign actors in China enabled him to command increasingly plush 
benefits.  While filming in Beijing, Tannebaum typically lived at the Beijing Friendship Hotel.  
One of the best hotels in China, it was also the headquarters for the Office of Foreign Expert 
Affairs, providing medical care above local standards and special recreational activities for its 
foreign residents.  He was further granted a food stipend of 100 yuan per month and a 
transportation stipend of 6 yuan per day, enough to support a comfortable if not extravagant 
lifestyle.718  At a moment when China was still suffering from the most devastating famine in 
history, and even comparatively well-off families in Beijing were subject to tight food rationing, 
Tannebaum’s status as a foreign actor afforded him rare access to a life of material comfort.719 
Nevertheless, Tannebaum’s employers were also careful to avoid the impression that he 
received preferential treatment as a foreigner.  In the mid-1960s, at the peak of his acting fame, 
Chinese authorities rejected several of Tannebaum’s requests to obtain special privileges for his 
family members.  For example, when Tannebaum’s mother visited him in China in 1964, the 
China Reconstructs office refused to pay for her trip, informing him that as it was personal travel 
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he would need to pay all of her expenses himself.720  After returning to Shanghai that same year, 
Tannebaum was initially unable to have his wife, an actress named Chen Yuanchi, transferred 
back to Shanghai to resume work at the Shanghai People’s Art Theatre, where her repeated 
“lifestyle mistakes” (perhaps related to her romance with a foreigner?) had apparently earned her 
numerous enemies.721  While Tannebaum enjoyed benefits unavailable to almost all Chinese 
citizens, he could not be seen to obtain special favors for his family at will. 
 While the wrangling over Tannebaum’s compensation reflected the ongoing 
renegotiation of the position foreigners occupied in Chinese society, the content of his films 
revealed the simultaneous renegotiation of the roles foreigners could play within popular 
narratives of Chinese history.  Tannebaum’s first prominent acting role was in the 1959 film Lin 
Zexu—a historical drama named after the nationalist hero who stood up to rapacious British 
merchants by commandeering their opium stock and flushing it into the sea.  At the time 
arguably “the most important film made in the short history of the People’s Republic,” Lin Zexu 
was released in October 1959 in commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the 
PRC, inspiring “a veritable avalanche of enthusiasm in state-controlled news dailies.”722  In one 
review, the prominent historian Zhang Kaiyuan commended the film for bringing “this glorious 
first page of modern Chinese history onto the silver screen, providing audiences with a profound 
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patriotic education.”723  Tannebaum played the leading British opium dealer Lancelot Dent, a 
crudely racist imperialist who personified the greed and hubris of the British Empire.  When 
warned of Lin’s anti-opium campaign, Dent responds, “Is this Lin Zexu not Chinese? …If he’s 
Chinese, then he’s easy to handle.”724  Tannebaum’s emergence as someone able to portray 
foreign historical villains on the silver screen marked a turning point in the propaganda of 
internationalism.  Both due to a dearth of Western actors and the political risk of casting 
foreigners, before Lin Zexu “foreign actors virtually never appeared in Chinese films.”725  As a 
result, depictions of foreign imperialism were surprisingly rare in 1950s Chinese cinema.  In the 
early 1960s, Tannebaum appeared in a number of films that disseminated a narrative of Chinese 
history in which Western men featured first and foremost as the villains of a shameful age of 
imperialist encroachment not overthrown until the Chinese Communist Revolution. 
 While Tannebaum depicted the opium dealer Lancelot Dent as an unapologetic 
imperialist, he delivered a rather different performance as a fictionalized U.S. general in the 1962 
historical drama After Armistice (tingzhan yihou 停戰以後).  The film depicts the Anping 
Incident of July 29, 1946, when three U.S. Marines were killed in a clash with CCP forces 
outside the town of Anping.  It is now clear that members of the CCP’s Eighth Route Army, 
acting without the prior knowledge of central authorities in Yan’an, ambushed a Marine patrol 
and then falsely claimed that U.S. forces had attacked first.726  In the film, however, U.S. soldiers 
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and their Chinese Nationalist accomplices launch an unprovoked attack on CCP forces and then 
systematically impede efforts to expose the truth by fabricating evidence that they had been 
ambushed.  Tannebaum played “General Fielding,” a fictionalized U.S. general roughly modeled 
on Walter S. Robertson, the U.S. Commissioner in Beijing charged with mediating peace talks 
between the Nationalists and Communists.727  In contrast to the cartoonishly evil Dent, Fielding 
speaks passionately about his desire to help the Chinese people while secretly condoning attacks 
on the Chinese Communists who threaten Americans’ economic privileges in China.  In one bit 
of heavy-handed irony, Fielding is shown telling Nationalist and Communist representatives, 
“As an American peace envoy and friend of the Chinese people, it is my heartfelt wish that your 
two parties can cooperate well moving forward.  This is the hope of the American government—
and it is also my personal hope.”  After his speech, the film cuts immediately to a convoy of 
American soldiers launching a vicious attack on Communist forces.  For Tannebaum, who had 
first come to China with the U.S. Army in the 1940s, the film may have felt uncomfortably close 
to an indictment of his own personal past.  Nevertheless, the final scene of After Armistice 
reiterates the CCP position of distinguishing between the American people and their government.  
Fielding tells a Chinese Communist general named Gu Qing, “Please don’t forget that we 
Americans will always be a friend to the Chinese people.”  General Gu retorts, “The American 
people are our friend, but your government has already become the chief culprit of China’s civil 
war.”728  While primarily a critique of imperialism, the film leaves space for an “internationalism” 
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defined in part by the imagined support that ordinary people in imperialist countries retained for 
the Chinese revolution despite the “reactionary” politics of their governments. 
 The friendship between the Chinese people and “the people” of the capitalist West was a 
key tenet of Mao-era internationalism, but as of the early 1960s no actual “foreign friends” had 
been depicted in post-1949 Chinese film.  Since the beginning of his acting career in 1958, 
Tannebaum had actively lobbied for the opportunity to play a positive foreign character, and he 
especially wanted to perform the role of Canadian doctor Norman Bethune, who remained by far 
the most beloved foreigner in modern Chinese history.  Tannebaum apparently only agreed to his 
first role as Lancelot Dent in Lin Zexu on the condition that he would have the chance to play 
Bethune at some point in the future.729  However, plans to create a film about Bethune’s life were 
scuttled after Mao’s wife Jiang Qing, in her capacity as Director of Film in the Central 
Propaganda Department, commented, “The Chinese people’s life and struggle have not yet been 
filmed, why should we film the story of a foreigner?”730  With his prospects for playing a 
positive character seemingly slim, in 1962 Tannebaum announced that he was “already tired” of 
portraying such “formulaic characters” and would no longer act in films.731 
 However, in 1963 the prominent director Zhang Junxiang received permission to 
commence filming his long-delayed plans for a biopic about Bethune, and he asked Tannebaum 
to play the eponymous role.  After reviewing Zhang’s script, which he praised as having “good 
structure, lively action, and outstanding characters,” Tannebaum agreed to take the part.732  A 
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highly demanding director, Zhang was often harsh on Tannebaum (who, after all, was not a 
professionally trained actor).  On some occasions, “Zhang Junxiang could not restrain himself 
from using Chinese to yell, ‘You old foreigner, how can you be so dumb!’  In fact, Tannebaum 
understood completely, but he could only obediently submit to the director’s chiding, trying over 
and over again until the point when the director was satisfied.”733  In the end, all involved were 
impressed with Tannebaum’s “energetic performance,” which, in the words of one critic, 
“guaranteed the film’s success.”734  But much to Zhang Junxiang and Tannebaum’s dismay, after 
filming was completed in 1964, Jiang Qing again rejected the film for “prostrating before 
foreigners.”735  Dr. Bethune remained banned for another 13 years.736  When the film was finally 
publicly released in China in 1977, it received an enormously positive response.  Dr. Bethune 
was also widely screened internationally, including at the Pesaro Film Festival in Italy, to 
generally favorable reviews.737  It was the first major Chinese film since 1949 “that presented a 
Caucasian protagonist in a sympathetic light.”738   
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 Tannebaum’s performance as Norman Bethune reveals the extent to which “international 
propaganda” had replaced “revolutionary humanitarianism” as one of the only legitimate ways 
for a foreigner to prove his friendship for China.  As a left-leaning humanitarian fundraiser who 
had long provided aid to Communist-friendly institutions, Tannebaum identified deeply with 
Bethune.  Nevertheless, a comparison of their biographies reveals stark ironies.  By 1939, 
Bethune had come to view his individual efforts treating Chinese soldiers on the front as 
inadequate, and he resolved to return to North America where he believed he could have greater 
impact by fundraising for a large-scale medical training program in the Communist-controlled 
base areas.  He wrote, “I have come to the conclusion that I must leave the Region temporarily… 
and return to America to raise the guaranteed sum of $1,000 (gold) a month…How else can that 
money be raised except by wide-spread appeal of one such as myself who knows the needs of 
this region thoroughly?”739  As depicted in the film, Bethune ultimately delayed his fundraising 
trip to return to the frontlines, where he died a martyr.  The work that Bethune had concluded 
was the most important way for a foreigner to serve China—humanitarian fundraising—was 
precisely what Tannebaum spent his career doing.  And yet it was exactly because Bethune died 
before he could shift his efforts toward fundraising that he could be celebrated as a selfless hero 
unsullied by the disgraced practice of asking imperialists for money.  In contrast, Tannebaum 
remained largely anonymous throughout his humanitarian career and would ultimately be best 
remembered for portraying Bethune on film. 
 Dr. Bethune marked a significant departure from how Bethune had been celebrated in 
Chinese political discourse up to that point.  Until the early 1950s, Bethune had been celebrated 
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as a “revolutionary humanitarian” from whom all Chinese should learn (Chapter Four).  In 
contrast, Zhang Junxiang’s film was centrally concerned with how Bethune “changed his stance 
from humanitarianism to communism and internationalism.”740  At the level of plot, this was 
achieved by emphasizing not what Chinese Communists learned from Bethune, but rather what 
he learned from them.  Upon his arrival in China, Bethune appears haughty and superior, harshly 
judging Chinese Communist medical workers for their lack of technical expertise.  Over the 
course of the film, however, Bethune learns the “spirit of selflessness” from Chinese soldiers 
willing to suffer any hardship to serve the revolution.  In one emotional scene, Bethune exclaims, 
“I’ve compromised too long with the enemy within myself.”  Then, switching into Chinese, he 
continues, “Bangzhu wo, tongzhimen. Bangzhu wo.”  “Help me, comrades.  Help me.”741  By the 
film’s end, Bethune has committed himself to transmitting the lessons he learned from Chinese 
soldiers to the world through his writing: “I want the world to know how the Eighth Route Army 
is resisting hundreds of thousands of crack Japanese troops with nothing but rifles and millet!”742  
Once a model humanitarian, Bethune had become a model propagandist.  In part to refute Jiang 
Qing’s earlier judgment that the film pandered to foreigners, critics repeatedly emphasized the 
point that Bethune learned the spirit of internationalism and communism from his Eighth Route 
Army comrades.  Describing a farewell party at which Bethune thanks his Chinese comrades for 
teaching him to become a “true revolutionary warrior,” one reviewer commented, “Where in all 
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this is there the least bit of a slavish mentality toward all things foreign?  On the contrary, the 
film vividly embodies the spirit of internationalism and communism.”743   
 
Figure 5.3.  Gerald Tannebaum starring as Norman Bethune in the film Dr. Bethune (1964).  
Tannebaum had an improbable second career as one of very few prominent foreign actors in 
Mao-era Chinese films. 
 
 
At the same time as Tannebaum and his colleagues from the humanitarian sector were 
reinventing themselves as international propagandists, the once-glorified history of 
“revolutionary humanitarianism” was likewise being rewritten as the history of foreigners 
learning from and passing on the virtues of the Chinese revolution.  In this new narrative, the 
historical significance of Bethune—and, by extension, other foreign humanitarians—was not so 
much that they helped China but that they chose China, affirming for a domestic audience the 
global appeal of their revolution.  It feels fitting that Gerald Tannebaum played a defining role in 
popularizing this new narrative by portraying Bethune and other foreign characters on film.  
Tannebaum had dedicated his life to Chinese causes in relative anonymity, so perhaps it was 
some small consolation that when a generation of Chinese thought of the great hero Dr. Norman 
Bethune, it was Tannebaum’s face they pictured. 
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The Cultural Revolution and the End of Global Intimacy in Mao’s China 
For the first two decades of his career in China, Tannebaum had remained staunchly 
committed to the idea that the way to improve China’s international relations was by building 
close relationships between individual Chinese citizens and people around the world.  His 
portrayal of how Norman Bethune’s political outlook was transformed by the intimate 
friendships he forged with Eighth Route Army soldiers on the frontlines strongly reaffirmed this 
belief in the political power of personal relationships that cross national, racial, and linguistic 
boundaries.  For exactly this reason, Dr. Bethune was unacceptable to Cultural Revolution 
censors.  The anti-American politics of the Korean War had long brought an end to the adoption 
plan in China, but the Cultural Revolution rendered any form of global intimacy suspect.  
Lasting from 1966 to 1976, the Cultural Revolution was Mao’s effort to reignite the 
revolutionary passions of the masses to expunge all capitalist elements from Chinese society, 
resulting in a decade of political turmoil.744  This absolute insistence on class purity made all 
connections with the Capitalist West into counterrevolutionary acts.  In this context, Tannebaum 
replaced his longtime focus on building transnational intimacy with a new effort to explain 
Maoist politics to foreign audiences through the impersonal language of abstract theory. 
The Cultural Revolution shelved Tannebaum’s most cherished film project for more than 
a decade, but that did not stop him from becoming one of the Cultural Revolution’s most 
outspoken foreign champions.  Beginning in 1965, Tannebaum began writing for the Hong 
Kong-based English-language magazine Eastern Horizon.  Founded in 1960 and describing its 
target audience as “people in every part of the world [who] want eagerly to know more about 
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rapidly developing Asia with its divers peoples and cultures,” Eastern Horizon was 
enthusiastically supportive of Bandung-style internationalism and the Cultural Revolution.745  In 
his first article, “Impressions collected Over 40,000 Li,” Tannebaum sought to establish his 
credentials as an authoritative commentator on China: 
In the past year, during the course of some film work, I had the opportunity to travel over 
40,000 li (roughly 13,000 miles) throughout China.  I was able to observe closely the 
Northeast and Northwest as well as North and South China, travelling by practically 
every means of conveyance—on foot, on horseback and cart, and by train, plane, and ship.  
Many of the places visited are rarely seen by foreigners.  I penetrated into the rural areas, 
walked about the small towns and the big cities and talked with people on all levels and 
in all facets of life. 
 
He concluded, “I feel certain, therefore, that what I saw was representative of conditions in the 
country as a whole.  The economy is viable.  The people are in the mood for new major advances 
and have already set out after them.  In other words, China is booming!”746  But rather than using 
Eastern Horizon as a platform from which to relay lessons learned from his personal encounters 
with diverse Chinese people during his travels, Tannebaum’s articles adopted a social scientific 
tone that left no room for interpersonal relationships or affective ties. 
 The topics of Tannebaum’s articles in Eastern Horizon ranged from primers on cultural 
life in Shanghai to the theoretical underpinnings of the Cultural Revolution.  For example, at the 
outset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, Tannebaum published a laudatory review of the ballet 
Red Detachment of Women, which would become the most internationally acclaimed of the 
“eight model operas” promoted by Jiang Qing as exemplars of revolutionary culture.747  While 
such essays were highly predictable in their fulsome praise of officially sanctioned cultural 
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productions, they were nevertheless informed by Tannebaum’s deep knowledge of the arts in 
contemporary China and enlivened by his closely observed descriptions of life in Shanghai.  
From 1967-1970, however, Tannebaum embarked on a very different writing project: a series of 
six essays that sought to explain and defend the Cultural Revolution for a global audience.  In the 
first of these essays, “China’s Cultural Revolution: Why It Had to Happen,” Tannebaum’s 
writing is mechanical and formulaic.  Explaining the need for a Cultural Revolution, he argued, 
“The decisive element is that once the economic base has undergone a fundamental change, such 
as it had in China, the superstructure must follow course.  If the base is new but the culture 
remains as of old, sooner or later it will subvert the base.”  He concluded the essay: “The thought 
of Mao Tse-tung is indeed a radiant star lighting the way forward for all mankind.”748  Published 
in 1969 after three years of mass violence and increasing international condemnation, the fourth 
essay in the series, “The Working Class Must Occupy the Superstructure!,” doubled down on his 
defense of the Cultural Revolution:  
“The Cultural Revolution must be carried out to the end, otherwise revisionism will still 
be lurking in people’s minds and in certain policies and regulations, thus always 
presenting the risk of a resurgence of capitalist orientation…Beyond question this is not 
the last cultural revolution nor the last struggle in the superstructure.  It will be repeated 
many times because as long as classes and class contradictions exist, there will be class 
struggle and the struggle for the seizure of power.”749  
 
In these essays, the last Tannebaum wrote from China, all traces of the notion that international 
propaganda should be rooted in transnational interpersonal relationships have been eliminated. 
Two decades earlier, Tannebaum and the PLAN China Branch had cautioned children that 
Americans “do not easily accept empty sayings and slogans and on the contrary will feel an 
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aversion to them.”750  As a leading international propagandist of the Cultural Revolution, he 
abandoned his own advice.  
 
Conclusion 
On August 17, 1971, 26 years after he arrived, Gerald Tannebaum left China, stopping 
over in Europe for several months before arriving in the United States early the next year.  He 
was accompanied by his wife, Chen Yuanchi, who was widely reported to be the first private 
citizen from the People’s Republic of China to receive a visa to immigrate to the United 
States.751  At least as he explained it to the American press, Tannebaum left China not to escape 
the Cultural Revolution but, rather, to continue promoting it.  In a profile in Newsday, 
Tannebaum explained that he and his wife returned to the United States “because we thought we 
could do more here than there” to “explain modern China to modern America.”752  Over the next 
few years, Tannebaum continued to write and speak tierelessly about Chinese society and 
politics, but he was able to reach a much broader and more influential audience.  Rather than 
publishing in the small-circulation magazine Eastern Horizon, after returning to the United 
States he published frequent commentary in prestigious national publications such as the New 
York Times, Los Angeles Times, Baltimore Sun, and Newsday.753  Tannebaum also regularly 
lectured about China at universities such as Yale and his alma mater Northwestern, and he 
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occasionally taught courses in Modern Chinese History at New York University and the 
University of Maryland.754  He remained as committed as ever to “explaining China to the world.” 
 However, in the months surrounding Nixon’s 1972 trip to China to meet Mao, the 
symbolism of Tannebaum’s marriage to Chen Yuanchi probably did more than his political 
commentary to shift ordinary Americans’ views on China.  Back in the United States, 
Tannebaum established his credibility on Chinese affairs by emphasizing not his academic 
knowledge or access to elite policymakers but his easy intimacy with ordinary Chinese people.  
In one typical article, he wrote of the apartment complex where he and Chen lived in Shanghai: 
Almost everyone in the apartment house called me Lao Tan.  Tan is my Chinese surname, 
and lao, which means old, is a term of intimacy and friendliness.  It was a sign that my 
relations with the neighbors were easy and informal, and there were few barriers between 
us…[T]here was practically no subject—even internal politics—that my neighbors and I 
did not discuss, affording me an unparalleled opportunity to get close to the people.”755 
 
While Tannebaum appealed to his close relationships with Chinese people to bolster his 
credibility as a commentator, Chen Yuanchi wrote frequently of her marriage to an American as 
a model for improved U.S.-China relations.  Almost immediately after arriving in the United 
States to considerable press coverage, Chen published a lengthy essay in the New York Times 
titled “Why I Married an American,” in which she wrote that it was Tannebaum’s love for the 
Chinese people that inspired her love for him.  She wrote, “It was the love and faith he had in the 
Chinese people that moved me.  I never imagined a foreigner could be so devoted to another 
people’s cause.”  And she held out the success of their relationship as evidence of the possibility 
of a transformed world order: “The fact that he was an American touched me even more because 
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this gave me, a Chinese citizen, the confidence that real friendship between the peoples of the 
world is possible.”756  In the context of Nixon’s visit to China, Chen and Tannebaum’s 
transnational marriage was widely lauded in American newspapers as “a symbol of the improved 
ties between China and the United States.”757 
 At the moment of the United States’ “opening to China,” the love story of Gerald 
Tannebaum and Chen Yuanchi offered a compelling way to imagine how ordinary people could 
participate in healing the deep divide between these Cold War adversaries.  On one level, the 
political significance attached to their marriage was a throwback to the early days of the 
revolution, when the PLAN China Branch sought to transform Americans’ views of China, one 
“adoption” at a time.  It was also a preview of things to come.  Since the 1990s, the intimate 
relationships forged between Chinese citizens and people across the world—most prominently 
through transnational romance and international adoption—have again become highly contested 
issues through which China’s role in the world order is renegotiated on a grassroots level. 
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International Adoption and Global Intimacy in Contemporary China 
 
 
It’s the spring of 2016, and a new propaganda poster has appeared in subway stops across 
Beijing.  As in public spaces throughout China, Beijing subway stations are densely plastered 
with moralizing and patriotic billboards exhorting riders to “Serve the People,” “Rejuvenate the 
Nation,” and “Emulate the Spirit of Lei Feng.”  But even in an urban landscape in which such 
billboards are so ubiquitous as barely to elicit a spare glance from hurried commuters, the new 
poster campaign stands out.758  Released for China’s first annual “National Security Education 
Day” on April 15, 2016, the poster is titled “Dangerous Love” (weixian de aiqing 危險的愛情), 
and it consists of a 16-panel cartoon illustrating the romance between a Chinese woman named 
Xiao Li and an auburn-haired man named David from an unspecified “foreign country.”  David 
meets Xiao Li at a party and tells her that he is living in China as a “visiting scholar.”  After Xiao 
Li informs him that she is a civil servant whose work involves compiling internal documents for 
use in central policymaking decisions, David pursues a romantic relationship with her.  Smitten 
by David’s flattering attention, Xiao Li agrees to let him see some of these “internal documents” 
for an academic article he is writing.   Shortly thereafter, David makes off with the documents 
and is never heard from again.  Finally, Xiao Li is apprehended by the Ministry of State Security, 
which informs her that David is a spy and that she has violated the law by giving him documents.  
The cartoon ends with Xiao Li crying, “I didn’t know he was a spy!  I’ve been used!”759 
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 It is difficult to imagine that posting this cartoon in Beijing subway stations did much to 
enhance China’s national security.  As one Beijinger commented when interviewed about the 
poster by a journalist for the New York Times, “How could ordinary people know anything about 
state secrets?”  And certainly the Chinese state would not leave it to propaganda posters to 
inform government personnel with access to classified information about their legal obligations 
to maintain state secrets.  Rather, the poster campaign served a more general function of 
fostering suspicion about the intentions of Western men pursuing romantic relationships with 
Chinese women—and of shaming Chinese women who date foreign men for their apparent lack 
of patriotism.  The poster reveals that even after nearly four decades of “reform and opening up” 
had enabled Chinese people to form various kinds of intimate relationships with foreigners on a 
scale unprecedented in Chinese history, the Chinese state still views transnational romance as a 
highly gendered form of potentially subversive activity. 
 Such fears are not limited to China.  The U.S. Government has also produced cautionary 
tales warning U.S. citizens travelling to China about the risks of forming relationships with 
secret government agents.  Like many Americans who travel to China as researchers or on study 
abroad programs, before going to China to conduct dissertation research in 2016 I was asked to 
watch a film called Game of Pawns produced by the FBI’s Counterintelligence Unit.  The film is 
based on the true story of Glenn Duffie Shriver, an American who studied abroad in Shanghai as 
a college student and was eventually convicted of conspiracy to spy for China.  As depicted in 
the film, while studying in Shanghai Shriver is befriended by a “pretty and smart” Chinese 
woman named Amanda who invites him to write paid articles on U.S.-China relations.  In a neat 
inversion of the Chinese “Dangerous Love” story, Amanda works for the Chinese Ministry of 
State Security and gradually ropes Shriver into a scheme in which he will pursue employment 
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with the CIA in order to transfer classified materials to China.760   Although based on a true story, 
the film traffics in Orientalist stereotypes and appears designed to leave Americans travelling to 
China skeptical of the motives of any Chinese seeking to pursue a close relationship. 
 The fear that transnational intimacies may subvert national interests has even been raised 
with regard to the highest levels of the U.S. Government.  In what was widely praised as a 
triumph of investigative journalism, in June 2019 the New York Times published a lengthy 
investigation into the family finances of Elaine Chao, the Transportation Secretary in the Trump 
Administration, and her husband Mitch McConnell, the Republican Senate Majority Leader.  
The Chao family business, an American international shipping company called Foremost Group, 
conducts the vast majority of its business with China and enjoys unusually close ties to the 
Chinese government.  The article suggests that McConnell and Chao’s close ties to Foremost 
pose ethical issues, particularly since they have received tens of millions of dollars in gifts from 
the Chao family, who are also among McConnell’s most important political donors.  While the 
report raises legitimate concerns, the tenor of the article (as well as the heated commentary it 
produced) implies that having close familial or marital ties to China might compromise the 
ability of U.S. lawmakers and government officials to act purely in the national interest.761 
 Yet in stark contrast to the ways in which transnational romances between Chinese and 
Americans continue to conjure fears of spying and shady business dealings, the phenomenon of 
mass international adoption from China to the United States has largely been immune from such 
concerns.  In part because of the presumed childhood innocence of the adoptees and 
                                                
760 Game of Pawns (2013) is available on YouTube at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R8xlUNK4JHQ.  
761 Michael Forsythe and Eric Lipton, “For the Chao Family, Deep Ties to the World’s 2 Largest Economies,” June 
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humanitarian motives of the adopters, international adoption has been celebrated as an idealized 
form of transnational migration and a positive symbol of globalization.  In the United States, 
international adoption is apparently such an innocent topic that when Donald Trump Jr. met with 
a Kremlin-connected Russian lawyer promising dirt on Hilary Clinton in June 2016, he initially 
claimed that the meeting was to discuss American adoption of Russian children.762  Of course, it 
would be absurd to suggest that Chinese adoptees or their American adoptive parents pose a 
national security threat to either China or the United States.  Nevertheless, international adoption 
from China today remains as deeply intertwined with international politics as the adoption plan 
was during the 1930s-1950s.  And much like with the adoption plan, it is precisely because 
international adoption is often viewed as an apolitical act of humanitarian rescue that it can be so 
effectively mobilized in the service of Chinese political aims. 
 
The Lucky Ones: American and Chinese Representations of International Adoption 
Since the People’s Republic of China began its international adoption program in 1992, 
China has consistently been the top “sending” country of children through international adoption.  
As of 2017, more than 150,000 children had been adopted internationally from China, with 
approximately 63% of them adopted by families in the United States.  International adoption 
from China has also been highly gendered, with girls constituting approximately 90% of 
adoptees.763  While international adoption from China peaked in 2005, when more than 14,000 
Chinese children were adopted by foreign families, China continues to send a considerable 
                                                
762 Larry Buchanan and Karen Yourish, “The Russia Meeting at Trump Tower Was to Discuss Adoption.  Then it 
Wasn’t.  How Accounts Have Shifted,” Aug. 6, 2018, New York Times. 
763 Outsourced Children, 14. 
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number of children abroad through international adoption each year.  In 2017, more than 2,200 
children were internationally adopted from China—86% of them to the United States.764  
In the United States, international adoption from China has generally been represented in 
a very positive light.  Countless news articles and documentaries have depicted adoption from 
China as an ideal way of forming a multicultural family while also rescuing a Chinese girl from 
institutional care.765   Nonprofit organizations such as Families with Children From China, which 
has branches all across North America, have also emerged to provide resources and public 
advocacy for adoptive families.  A small cottage industry of children’s books, including titles 
such as The Red Thread: An Adoption Fairy Tale, I Love You Like Crazy Cakes, and When You 
Were Born in China, portrays international adoption from China as a way of forming happy, 
global families and building affective bonds between China and the United States.766  Even 
HBO’s popular series Sex and the City positively depicts one of its main characters, Charlotte, 
adopting a Chinese baby girl. 
But how has the spectacle of mass numbers of Chinese girls being adopted into primarily 
white American families been portrayed in China?  In 1995, British filmmakers Brian Woods 
and Kate Blewett produced a documentary film called The Dying Rooms that sought to expose 
the inhumane conditions in China’s state-run orphanages.  Entering China on tourist visas and 
posing as visiting workers from an American orphanage, they secretly filmed conditions inside 
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numerous orphanages, including so-called “dying rooms” where infant girls were left to perish.  
Widely seen and discussed across Britain and the United States, the film created the impression 
that untold numbers of baby girls, unwanted by their parents, were languishing in Chinese 
orphanages that callously neglected their well-being.  The Dying Rooms played a significant role 
in galvanizing humanitarian interest in China’s “lost girls” and coincided with a dramatic uptick 
in Chinese international adoption.767  However, the film was met with outrage in China.  Within 
months, the China Intercontinental Communication Center had released an English-language 
rebuttal film called “The Dying Rooms”: A Patchwork of Lies that attempted to systematically 
debunk The Dying Rooms as a highly misleading portrait created by selective editing, 
decontextualized images, and outright fabrications.  Interestingly, A Patchwork of Lies concludes 
by interviewing several Swedish couples that had internationally adopted children from China, 
all of whom reported that they had personally observed the good conditions in Chinese 
orphanages.  The film’s final frame shows a white couple holding two Chinese babies as the 
narrator intones: “The fabrications invented by Kate Blewett and her colleagues may deceive 
people for awhile but not for long.  China has opened her doors to millions of foreign visitors 
every year.  They all have the opportunity to witness the truth, which is a complete contradiction 
to what they have seen in the British TV program.” 768  As the response to the Dying Rooms 
made clear, rather than view international adoption from China as embarrassing or shameful, 
Chinese authorities instead viewed it as an opportunity to mold global opinion of China.769 
                                                
767 The Dying Rooms is available on YouTube at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zd_nptd2q0M.   
768 “The Dying Rooms”: A Patchwork of Lies is available at: https://truevisiontv.com/films/details/57/the-dying-
rooms-return-to-the-dying-rooms.  
769 For a brief discussion of the controversy over The Dying Rooms, see Outsourced Children, 10-12. 
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 In fact, the rise of international adoption has also been portrayed positively in Chinese 
popular culture.  As a recent example, the highly popular Chinese TV series Ode to Joy (huanle 
song 歡樂頌), which has been described as “China’s answer to Sex and the City,” depicts the 
contrasting fates of a Chinese woman named Andy, who was adopted by American parents, with 
that of her younger brother, Xiao Ming, a special needs child who was left behind in a Chinese 
orphanage.770  While Andy becomes a precociously successful Wall Street executive, her brother 
remains institutionalized into adulthood.  Although Xiao Ming is materially well provided for 
and loved by his caretakers, the show reinforces the perception that international adoption 
provides bright futures to Chinese children who would otherwise remain in institutional care.  
Despite offering some somber reflections on how differences of gender, ability, and citizenship 
shape the highly unequal life chances of children in a globalizing China, Ode to Joy ultimately 
depicts Andy as a poster child for the good fortune of Chinese adoptees in the United States.  
Chinese state-run newspapers have likewise covered international adoption in a mostly favorable 
light.  For example, a 1999 People’s Daily feature described in glitteringly positive terms the fate 
of a Chinese girl who had been adopted by a family in Maryland two years earlier: “Today she is 
already two-and-a-half years old and looks healthy and beautiful.  She is the apple of her parents’ 
eye…They even specially bought her one of the flower-embroidered dresses that Chinese 
children wear to celebrate the New Year.”771  One 2009 article went so far as to describe 
                                                
770 Zhang Xingjian, “TV Drama Ode to Joy Sparks Virginity Debate in China,” The Telegraph, Sept. 27, 2017.  The 
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international adoption as a contemporary manifestation of the ancient Chinese philosopher 
Mozi’s philosophy of “universal love” (jian ai 兼愛).772 
While there has been comparatively less academic interest in international adoption in 
China, scholars have nonetheless offered an optimistic assessment of the motives of foreign 
adopters and the benefits for adoptees.  Nanjing University anthropologist Fan Ke has 
sympathetically described what he sees as the Christian humanitarian motives of those seeking to 
adopt from China: “[I]nfluenced by the Christian traditions of universal love and performing 
good works, many adopters view themselves as saving [girls] from an abyss of suffering.  They 
think that the Chinese government’s family planning policy and China’s traditional concept of 
valuing boys more than girls has led to the abandonment of many infant girls, and that the people 
of the world should care for these children.”  Describing international adoption as “a bridge 
connecting mainstream American society with Chinese society,” he has predicted that adoptees 
from China will soon play important roles in “American social and political life.”773   
 In line with these positive depictions of international adoption in Chinese popular culture, 
newspapers, and academia, many ordinary Chinese people appear to view international adoption 
from China favorably.  According to a survey of both urban and rural Chinese people’s views of 
international adoption published in 2010, the majority of respondents “did not disapprove of 
foreigners adopting Chinese children” and generally considered international adoption to be a 
“positive trend.”  In particular, respondents believed that adopted Chinese children were “lucky” 
because of the good education, material comforts, and economic opportunities it was believed 
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they would enjoy in the United States.  The study also notes that many respondents’ held 
American adoptive parents in high regard and that some described international adoption as an 
act of “humanitarian rescue.”  A female teacher commented, “American parents show great 
internationalism by adopting Chinese children…Most of them show unselfish love to Chinese 
children, who seem to have their fate changed for the better overnight.”774  Sociologist Leslie 
Wang has written about encounters with Chinese parents who described the “good fortune” of 
international adoptees and even expressed a willingness to have their own daughters raised by 
American families as long as they could see them again in the future.775  In short, while 
transnational romance can be a politically fraught topic within both China and the United States, 
international adoption remains a highly privileged form of global intimacy that is widely 
celebrated in mainstream Chinese and American society. 
 
The Politics of International Adoption in China 
The one-child policy occupies a prominent place in virtually all explanations of 
international adoption from China.  Nevertheless, the role of the Chinese state in purposefully 
creating the conditions that led to large numbers of infant girls being relinquished to state-run 
orphanages where they become eligible for international adoption remains under-emphasized in 
both the popular and academic literature.776  In the United States, adoption from China is often 
framed as a form of humanitarian rescue for “unwanted” Chinese girls.  According to this 
                                                
774 Tony Xing Tan and Xiaohui Fan, “Chinese Views on International Adoption,” in Debra Jacobs, Iris Chin Ponte, 
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775 Outsourced Children, 71. 
776 The pioneering research of Kay Ann Johnson and Leslie Wang are important exceptions to this trend, and I rely 
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narrative, China’s controversial one-child policy, in combination with a patriarchal Confucian 
culture that values sons over daughters, causes many Chinese families to abandon baby girls, 
who are fated to languish away in squalid state-run orphanages unless adopted into loving 
American homes.777  To be sure, both the one-child policy and a cultural preference for sons are 
both crucial to explaining why so many girls have landed in state-run orphanages.  However, this 
narrative obscures how the Chinese state deliberately manufactured the “need” for international 
adoption in the 1990s.  Contrary to the popular belief within American adoption communities 
that international adoption is necessary because Chinese are not willing to adopt children outside 
the extended family, stranger adoption has been widely practiced in China since late imperial 
times (Chapter Two).778  In the 1980s, domestic adoption increased dramatically along with 
stricter enforcement of the one-child policy—from an estimated 158,500 adoptions in 1980 to 
562,000 adoptions in 1987, nearly 80% of them of girls.779  A survey of nearly 800 Chinese 
adoptive families conducted in the late 1990s found that “adoption, viewed as a permanent and 
complete transfer of children into the adoptive family, was common in many rural areas, that it 
involved girls far more than boys, and that only a minority involved relatives or close 
                                                
777 For a critical analysis of this narrative, see Kay Ann Johnson, China’s Hidden Children: Abandonment, 
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friends…In other words, many families were willing to adopt the abandoned female children of 
strangers.”780  Conditioned by the well-developed culture of adoption in China, domestic 
adoption was initially highly effective as an informal, grassroots solution to the problem of 
families that, in the context of harsh enforcement of the one-child policy, made the “coerced 
choice” to relinquish a daughter in the hopes of having a son.781 
In the early 1990s, Chinese state authorities simultaneously suppressed domestic 
adoption and encouraged international adoption, creating the conditions for the rise of a large-
scale international adoption program in the years to follow.  China’s 1991 National Adoption 
Law, well known for paving the way for international adoption, also imposed highly restrictive 
limitations on domestic adoption.  Under the law, only childless couples over the age of 35 were 
eligible to adopt—an exceedingly small pool of people in rural China, where 35 remains a very 
advanced age to become a first-time parent.782  While the vast majority of adoptions in China had 
always been unreported, strict enforcement of the new law increased the risks of informal 
adoption and predictably led to a greater number of children relinquished to state-run orphanages, 
where they were eligible for international adoption.  Kay Ann Johnson has persuasively argued 
that the “creation of a pool of children available for international adoption was closely related to, 
if not wholly caused by, active government suppression of customary adoption practices.”783   
Why would the Chinese government deliberately suppress domestic adoption in favor of 
international adoption?  As with the adoption plan in earlier decades, Chinese child welfare 
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institutions and state authorities viewed international adoption as a powerful tool through which 
to attract material and ideological support for their own political projects abroad.  The most 
immediate reason for the Chinese state to favor international over domestic adoption was to help 
with rigid enforcement of its population policies.  Authorities apparently worried that families 
were using domestic adoption to circumvent the one-child policy—either by giving up daughters 
for adoption in the hopes of having a son or by falsely “adopting” their own biological children.  
By making adopted children count against a family’s birth quota under the one-child policy, the 
1991 adoption law closed this “loophole” in family planning regulations.784  In the ensuing years, 
many families were severely punished for the crime of adopting an abandoned child in violation 
of the one-child policy.  Treating such adoptions as legally equivalent to over-quota births, state 
authorities levied fines that were often in excess of the adoptive family’s annual income and 
even forced some adoptive mothers to undergo sterilization.785  Partially in reaction to such 
extreme measures, the national adoption law was eventually revised in 1999 to exempt adoptions 
from social welfare institutions from counting against birth quotas as well as from some of the 
restrictions on eligibility to adopt. 
 Nevertheless, many child welfare institutions have continued to prefer international 
adoption because of the financial benefits it brings.  In total, adopting a child from China 
typically costs between US$15,000 and US$ 30,000, approximately US$ 6,000 of which is given 
directly to the orphanage as a mandatory donation.786  While the influx of funds through 
international adoption may seem miniscule in relation to the overall Chinese economy, the 
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money received can be transformative for perpetually underfunded child welfare institutions.  
Numerous commentators have noted dramatically improved conditions in child welfare 
institutions since the opening to international adoption.787  Nevertheless, these donations, which 
are typically only required of foreign adopters, create a strong incentive for child welfare 
institutions to channel children into international rather than domestic adoption.  A 2006 study of 
32 Chinese orphanages that regularly provide children for international adoption found that more 
than 80% informed prospective Chinese adopters (who met all the legal requirements) that they 
had no healthy babies available for adoption.  Among the minority who did acknowledge having 
babies available for adoption, some demanded fees even higher than the donations required of 
foreigners—in effect creating a bidding war between local and foreign families for healthy 
Chinese babies.788  These practices would seem to violate at least the spirit of the 1993 Hague 
Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect to Intercountry Adoption, 
which specifies that international adoption should be a last resort in the case that “a suitable 
family cannot be found in his or her State of origin.”789 
 In the most extreme cases, the potential profits from international adoption have led to 
the creation of baby trafficking schemes.  In 2005, news broke that the Hengyang Social Welfare 
Institute in Hunan Province had been buying babies from traffickers for years and selling them to 
orphanages that then put them up for international adoption.  With each healthy infant girl 
guaranteed to bring in a large cash donation when adopted, there was plenty of money to go 
                                                
787 See, for example, “Intercountry Adoption and China,” 603; “Politics of Domestic and International Adoption in 
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around: “Someone made money each time a baby changed hands.  The mother of one trafficker 
said her son was paid $36 for each child he procured.  The Hengyang orphanage paid between 
$400 and $588 a piece for the babies.  Hengyang officials then sold the children to participating 
foreign adoption orphanages for $1,000 each.”  In total, the scheme generated at least US$ 1.5 
million.790  Traffickers apparently targeted the children of migrant workers from rural areas 
living in Chinese cities—as their vulnerable legal status makes them less likely to involve 
authorities and their lack of social connections makes them easier to ignore if they do.791  It is 
difficult to know the extent of baby trafficking for international adoption in China, and those 
traffickers who have been caught have been punished severely by Chinese authorities.  
Nevertheless, it was China’s policy of financially incentivizing international adoption that 
created the “demand” for healthy baby girls that made trafficking lucrative.   
Beyond the direct transfer of money to Chinese orphanages via donations from foreign 
adoptive parents, international adoption from China has also inspired a vast influx of 
humanitarian expertise and resources into China.  Since the rise of international adoption brought 
the plight of Chinese children to the back to the forefront of global humanitarian concern, both 
individual volunteers and foreign NGOs have once again devoted significant resources to saving 
China’s children.  Leslie Wang has divided these new global humanitarian institutions dedicated 
to helping Chinese children into three categories: 1) adoption related (e.g., Families with 
Children from China), 2) expatriate/overseas Chinese (e.g., Helping Hands), and 3) faith-based 
(e.g. Tomorrow’s Children).  Cumulatively, these organizations have infused vast quantities of 
money, technology, expertise, training, and volunteer labor into China’s child welfare system.  In 
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doing so, they have both dramatically improved the quality of care for many institutionalized 
children and relieved the Chinese state from much of its responsibility to provide adequate child 
welfare resources on a permanent basis.792 
 Finally, international adoption is also a powerful means through which the Chinese state 
can obtain not only material resources but also positive publicity abroad.  Organizations such as 
Families with Children from China host and fund a wide range of cultural events for adoptive 
families and the general public that promote a positive image of China and Chinese culture 
within the United States.  Chinese newspapers have also reported on instances of the American 
parents of Chinese adoptees releasing public statements praising China’s child welfare 
institutions and sending letters to the Chinese ambassador in Washington to complain about the 
“distorted” and “irresponsible” treatment of China in the American press.793  According to Fan 
Ke, adoptive parents constitute a powerful constituency within American society that can counter 
negative media coverage of China: “After adopting a Chinese child, many American guardians 
begin to have a deeper understanding of China.  For this reason, they often have their own views 
on the American media’s reporting on China.  After seeing some unfair or one-sided reporting, 
some people take up their pens and demand that those who work in the media maintain fair-
minded professional integrity.”794  More recently, China has also begun facilitating subsidized 
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“heritage tours” for adoptees and their families to visit China and tour famous cultural heritage 
sites such as the Terracotta Warriors in Xi’an and the Forbidden City in Beijing.  However, such 
tours are highly stage-managed and sometimes even require visitors to sign a contract agreeing 
that they will not engage in unsupervised interactions with locals or invite locals to participate in 
tour activities.  By carefully scripting how Chinese adoptees and their families experience China, 
the PRC has transformed homeland tours into yet another means of promoting a positive image 
of China abroad.795  One study found that such tours “help not only children but also their 
adoptive parents to draw closer, meaningful connections to Chinese people, language, and 
culture.”796 
 Since the early 1990s, international adoption has provided an effective way for the 
Chinese state to shore up its population policies, channel money and resources to child welfare 
institutions, and cultivate favorable views of China abroad.  As Leslie Wang bluntly concluded, 
“as Western child-savers devote personal resources to caring for and rehabilitating the PRC’s 
unwanted kids, they also bolster Chinese state authority through their willing participation in 
outsourced intimacy.”797  To be sure, the contemporary phenomenon of international adoption 
from China has many differences with the adoption plan of the 1930s-1950s.  Most importantly, 
whereas the adoption plan involved sending money, letters, and gifts to children who remained in 
China, international adoption involves assuming full responsibility for them as parents.  The 
level of financial, legal, and emotional commitment involved in international adoption is orders 
of magnitude greater.  Nevertheless, from a Chinese perspective international adoption fulfills 
                                                
795 Outsourced Children, 73-75; 155-159. 
796 Iris Chin Ponte, Leslie Kim Wang & Serena Pen-Shian Fan, “Returning to China: The Experiences of Adopted 
Chinese Children and Their Parents,” Adoption Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 100 (2010), 117.  
797 Outsourced Children, 154. 
315 
 
many of the same functions as the adoption plan did in an earlier era.   As the plight of Chinese 
children has once more become an international cause célèbre, the promise of an intimate, 
familial relationship with an individual child has again proven among the most effective 
strategies for attracting global humanitarian resources to China.  With the backing of state 
authorities, Chinese child welfare institutions mobilize these emotional and economic ties 
between Chinese children and foreign adults to attract international support for their social 
welfare and political goals. 
 
The End of An Era? 
 It appears as if the era of large-scale international adoption from China is slowly coming 
to a close.  Roughly tracking global patterns, international adoption from China peaked in 2005 
and has been steadily declining ever since.  The reasons for this decline include decreasing rural 
poverty, the partial relaxation of restrictions on domestic adoption, and the recent shift to a 
nationwide “two-child policy”—all of which have decreased the number of healthy babies who 
are relinquished to orphanages and become available for adoption.  Moreover, as China under Xi 
Jinping seeks to transform its image from “developing nation” to “global superpower,” the large-
scale “export” of baby girls through international adoption increasingly contradicts the image of 
strength and prosperity that China aims to project on the world stage.  In the United States and 
Europe, a nationalist backlash against globalization has likewise called into question the ideals of 
multiculturalism and diversity that made transnational adoptive families into powerful symbols 
of an inclusive future.   The end of international adoption may be imminent.  But global politics 
will continue to shape how people forge intimate relationships across national, racial, and 
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